Vers une meilleure formalisation des attaques par canaux cachés by Cherisey, Eloi de
HAL Id: tel-02050017
https://pastel.archives-ouvertes.fr/tel-02050017
Submitted on 26 Feb 2019
HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access
archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci-
entific research documents, whether they are pub-
lished or not. The documents may come from
teaching and research institutions in France or
abroad, or from public or private research centers.
L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est
destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents
scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non,
émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de
recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires
publics ou privés.
Towards a better formalisation of the side-channel threat
Eloi De Cherisey
To cite this version:
Eloi De Cherisey. Towards a better formalisation of the side-channel threat. Embedded Systems.
Université Paris-Saclay, 2018. English. ￿NNT : 2018SACLT016￿. ￿tel-02050017￿
Th
ès
e 
de
 d
oc
to
ra
t
B
N
N
T:
2
0
1
8
S
A
C
LT
0
0
1
6
Vers une meilleure
formalisation des
attaques par canaux
cachés
Thèse de doctorat de l’Université Paris-Saclay
préparée à Télécom ParisTech
(Institut Mines-Télécom)
École doctorale n◦ 580
Spécialité de doctorat: Information et communication
Thèse présentée et soutenue a Télécom ParisTech, le 18 décembre 2018, par
Éloi de Chérisey
Composition du jury :
Anne Canteaut Présidente du jury
DR — INRIA
Damien Vergnaud Rapporteur
Professeur — Paris VI
Emmanuel Prouff Rapporteur
HDR — Chef de laboratoire à l’ANSSI
Philippe Maurine Examinateur
HDR — LIRMM
Jean-Luc Danger Examinateur
Professeur — Télécom ParisTech
Pablo Piantanida Invité
Professeur à Centrale-Supélec — L2S
Sylvain Guilley Directeur de thèse
HDR — Professeur invité à Télécom ParisTech
Olivier Rioul Directeur de thèse
HDR — Professeur à TélécomParisTech
ii
iii
Abstract
In the field of the security of the embedded systems, it is necessary to know and understand
the possible physical attacks that could break the security of cryptographic components. Since
the current algorithms such as Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) are very resilient against
differential and linear cryptanalysis, other methods are used to recover the secrets of these
components. Indeed, the secret key used to encrypt data leaks during the computation of the
algorithm, and it is possible to measure this leakage and exploit it. This technique to recover
the secret key is called side-channel analysis.
The main target of this Ph. D. manuscript is to increase and consolidate the knowledge on
the side-channel threat. To do so, we apply some information theoretic results to side-channel
analysis. The main objective is show how a side-channel leaking model can be seen as a
communication channel.
We first show that the security of a chip is dependant to the signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) of
the leakage. This result is very useful since it is a generic result independent from the attack.
When a designer builds a chip, he might not be able to know in advance how his embedded
system will be attacked, maybe several years later. The tools that we provide in this manuscript
will help designers to estimated the level of liability of their chips.
iv
Re´sume´
Dans le cadre de la se´curite´ des syste`mes embarque´s, il est ne´cessaire de connaˆıtre les attaques
logicielles et physiques pouvant briser la se´curite´ de composants cryptographiques garantissant
l’inte´grite´, la fiabilite´ et la confidentialite´ des donne´es. E´tant donne´ que les algorithmes utilise´s
aujourd’hui comme Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) sont conside´re´s comme re´sistants
contre la cryptanalyse line´aire et diffe´rentielle, d’autres me´thodes plus insidieuses sont utilise´s
pour re´cupe´rer les secrets de ces composants. En effet, la cle´ secre`te utilise´e pour le chiffrement
de donne´es peut fuiter pendant l’algorithme. Il est ainsi possible de mesurer cette fuite et de
l’exploiter. Cette technique est appele´e attaque par canal auxiliaire.
Le principal objectif de ce manuscrit de the`se est de consolider les connaissances the´oriques
sur ce type de menace. Pour cela, nous appliquons des re´sultats de the´orie de l’information
a` l’e´tude par canal auxiliaire. Nous montrons ainsi comment il est possible de comparer un
mode`le de fuite a` un mode`le de transmission de l’information.
Dans un premier temps, nous montrons que la se´curite´ d’un composant est fortement
de´pendante du rapport signal a` bruit de la fuite. Ce re´sultat a un impact fort car il ne de´pend
pas de l’attaque choisie. Lorsqu’un designer e´quipe son produit, il ne connaˆıt pas encore la
manie`re dont son syste`me embarque´ pourra eˆtre attaque´ plusieurs anne´es plus tard. Les outils
mathe´matiques propose´s dans ce manuscrit pourront aider les concepteurs a` estimer le niveau
de fiabilite´ de leurs puces e´lectroniques.
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1.1 On the Importance of Cyber Security
In electronic devices such as embedded systems, personal computers, GPUs, etc, the need of
security has grown wildly over the last 20 years. Indeed, millions of threats may compromise the
security and therefore the private life of users, companies or state agencies, and one breach of
security may alter the privacy of millions of users. For example, when ransomware WannaCry
appeared in May 2017, about 200,000 computers were infected over 150 countries. The financial
impact of this worldwide attack has been evaluated by cyber-risks modeling firm at $4 billion
USD. However, experts of this domain noticed that such an attack could possibly go even worse
since more sensible systems could have been affected, such as nuclear plants. This is why state
agencies and big companies invest a lot of money to secure such sensible sites.
However, it is difficult to predict how a target will be attacked as the security breaches are
very various and are often discovered by attackers. The attackers can have different goals such
as:
• take the control of the target device;
• make the target device inoperant;
• catch the private data of the target.
4
1.2 The Rise of Cryptography
Figure 1.1: Screenshot of an infected system by WannaCry
In order to protect the systems, the designer should protect their software as well as their
hardware systems. The protection of the data can be made thanks to encryption algorithms..
1.2 The Rise of Cryptography
As mentioned earlier, the protection of sensitive data is therefore crucial. This is why the notion
of cryptography appeared.
1.2.1 A Bit of History
The notion of cryptography has appeared more than two thousands years ago. The oldest known
ciphered document dates from the 16th century B.C. in Iraq. This is a clay tablet, in which a
potter wrote his secret recipe. To make it secret, he removed the consonants, modifying the
spelling of the words [41].
The Greeks where also using their own methods of encoding. One of them is the scytale.
The scytale is a stick with a strip of parchment wound around it (cf Figure 1.2). The encoder
and the decoder must own a stick having the same geometric characteristics to encrypt and
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Figure 1.2: A scytale c© CC BY-SA 3.0
decrypt the message. Overall, the encryption that is performed is a transpositions of letters.
Today, it would be considered as a very weak code, but we must not forget that in these times,
a lot of people where not even able to read and write.
During the first century B.C., Caesar ciphers appeared. They were the first letter substitution
codes that appeared. In a message, every letter was changed into the n-th letter after. This
method was used by the Roman army. Once again, this code is weak as one only has to check
26 possibilities to recover the message.
In 1586, French diplomat Blaise de Vigene`re, published a book in which he exposed his own
method of ciphering. This was called the Vigene`re cipher. The method is still simple to encode
and decode a message but the strength of the code is much higher than a Caesar cipher. Indeed,
the code is based on a password and every letter of the message can be changed into different
letter, depending on its place. The Vigene`re cipher was broken in 1863 by Friedrich Kasiki.
During the Second World War, cryptography and cryptanalysis played a crucial role as Alan
Turing managed to break the German encoding algorithm Enigma, supposed to be fully secured
by the Wehrmacht. The impact of this was so important that today’s historians agree that the
war would have been at least two years longer if Enigma had not been broken [47].
1.2.2 Cryptography Today
Nowadays, codes are more sophisticated, but the idea is still the same: protect secrets from
malicious threats.
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For a greater security, Auguste Kerckhoffs showed that the security and the secret of a
crypto-system should only be based on the secret of the encoding key [42]. This means that
anyone can know the process leading to encoded data, but in this process, the encoder uses a
secret key (therefore only known by him).
Eventually, a “good” coding algorithm is supposed to ensure that the best possible way to
recover the secret message is to try every possibility of the key (exhaustive search). For 256 bits
long keys, this would take more than 10 billions years with the best current computing power.
We can divide the codes into two big families:
• The symmetric codes where the secret key is the same for both encoding and decoding.
This means that the sender and the receiver of the message must know the secret key
before.
• The asymmetric codes where there is a key to encode the message (often called a public
key) and a secret key to decode the message (often called the private key).
The advantage of symmetric codes is that they are often very easy to compute and to design on
hardware. The speed of coding is very high (more than 10 Mb/s). The main drawback is the
key exchange. How to share a secret key in a safe manner with someone?
On the contrary, asymmetric codes are much slower, but the sharing of the key is absolutely
not a problem because the public key is used to encode the message and only the owner of the
secret key will be able to decode the message. The only difficulty is to certify the owners of the
public keys.
On the adversary’s side, the goal is to recover the secret key. Obviously, the longer the key
is, the more difficult it will be for the attacker to get it. The most naive way to recover a key is
the brute force, i.e. to check every possible key. This process is very fast when the size of the key
is low (today’s machines can treat more than a billion operations per second). However, when
keys are longer (for example 128 or 256 bits), it would take years to examine all the possibilities,
even with the best processing units of the world. Other possibilities may exist to decrease to
number of possibilities. They are called differential and linear cryptanalysis.
• In the differential cryptanalysis, the attacker is able to choose the input text. He exploits
the differences at the input and sees how these differences behave at the output. A “good”
algorithm transforms small differences into big ones.
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Code Year and Size of Broken?
type the key
DES 1977 - symmetric 56 bits Yes
RSA 1983 - asymmetric 2048 bits No1
RC4 1987 - symmetric 40 to 256 bits Yes
AES (see 1.2.3) 1999 - symmetric 128, 192 or 256 bits No2
Table 1.1: List of the main encryption standards
• In linear cryptanalysis, the attacker approximates the algorithm as a linear function,
and by carefully choosing the plaintext, the secret key can be recovered if the algorithm
presents some linearities.
A small list of the existing encryption methods is given Table 1.1. This list is not exhaustive
since there are many ways to encrypt data but is shows the main standards that are used or
have been used.
1.2.3 AES
Currently, the most used algorithm is called AES [26] (for Advanced Encryption Standards).
AES was invented by Joan Daemen and Vincent Rijmen in 1997. In 2001, the National Institute
of Standards and Technologies (NIST) chooses AES as the main encoding standard. Since then,
AES has acquired a very good reputation of being a very secure algorithm. It has been built so
that differential and linear cryptanalysis have no effect on its security. The only known attack on
a full AES algorithm has been published in 2011 by a team working for Microsoft [10]. However,
this attack recovers the key in 2126 operations, while exhaustive search takes 2128 operations.
This attack is therefore four times faster than the exhaustive search, but it is still a very long.
This is why AES is still considered as safe.
AES is a block encoding algorithm. This means that it cuts the message to be encoded into
blocks of 16 bytes. Then each block is encoded separately with the same secret key. The length
of the secret key is either 16, 24 or 32 bytes. From the secret key, the algorithm first generates
subkeys, as many as the number of rounds of the algorithm. For the first round, the secret key
1The security of RSA is based on the difficulty to reduce very big numbers into a product of prime numbers.
The algorithm is simple and can be used for any key size. Nowadays, it is considered as safe to choose keys
that are at least 2048 bits long. However, it has been proved that RSA will be very vulnerable to quantum
cryptanalysis [80].
2According to the NSA, AES can be considered as secure. It is however advised to encrypt very sensitive
data with keys that are at least 192 bits long.
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meets the plaintext block through an exclusive or function. Then, for each round, the block
passes through linear and non-linear functions such as:
1. SubBytes, a non-linear one-to-one function;
2. ShifRows, a cyclical shift of the rows of the block;
3. MixColumns, an invertible linear transformation.
Then the subkey corresponding to the number of the rounds is added.
1.3 Side-Channel Analysis
As we mentioned earlier, without more information than the message to be encoded and its
encoded version, there is no better way to recover the key than the exhaustive search. To break
the security of a device without performing an exhaustive search, one has therefore to use other
type of information than only the plaintext and the ciphertext. These are the side information.
They can be of any type:
• the computation time of the algorithm;
• the electro-magnetic radiations of the device during the algorithm;
• the power consumption of the device;
• the insertion of faults during the computation of the algorithm.
These methods can be classified into two types of attacks: the invasive and non-invasive attacks.
Invasive attacks may alterate the targeted device while non-invasive attacks are more passive.
They only listen the behaviour of the system and try to establish a model of the leakage.
According to Franc¸ois-Xavier Standaert [82], we can model a side-channel attack by the
framework designed Figure 3.1.
Secret key Leakage
Sensitive
variable
Channel
Traces
Distinguisher Estimation
Plaintext Plaintext
Noise
Figure 1.3: Representation of a side-channel attack
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During the encryption algorithm, the plaintext that is to be encrypted meets the secret key
via an exclusive or function (or xor). As the secret key is used in the algorithm, a possible
leakage may happen since it is possible to measure an image of the secret key.
For example, in AES, the secret key is used during the first round of the algorithm, and in
some devices, it is possible to recover the secret key when the substitution box of the secret key
xor the plaintext is stored in the register of the target device [51].
1.3.1 Vulnerabilities
The main advantage of side-channel analysis compared to classical cryptanalysis, is that it is
possible to recover each of the byte of the secret key separately. For attacker, this is a great
improvement because, they no more supposed to consider at least 2128 possibilities but 16 times
28 = 256 possibilities to recover the secret key. Therefore, in side-channel, the vulnerabilities
come no-more from the algorithm itself, but from the way that this algorithm is implemented in
a hardware chip. This means that, form the designer point of view, it is crucial to perfectly
know the hardware architecture of the chip and to be very aware of any possible power leakage
that may occur.
Nowadays, systems are build with sensors that are able to detect intrusive attacks and
algorithms are developed to bring counter-measures to the leakages.
1.3.2 Attack
In practice, an attack happens in the following way as described by Franc¸ois-Xavier Standaert
in [82]. In this framework, we notice that most of the attack follow the same pattern.
• As mentioned in Section 1.2, the encryption algorithm is known by the attacker. In most
of the cases it will be AES (sometimes RSA or DES).
• The first phase of an attack is called the profiling phase. The attacker builds a modelization
of the leakage using a copy of the target device. This modelization can be under a leakage
model function or via histograms called template. Of course, as this profiling phase is
made on a copy of the target device, the secret key of this copy is known. A drawback of
this technique is that there may exist a bias between the model obtained with the copy
device and the target device.
• Then, the exploitation phase is based on applying the model obtained during the profiling
phase to the target device.
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Figure 1.4: One power consumption trace of DES algorithm
Example: the DPA Contest In 2008, the DPA contest [84] was launched by Te´le´com
Paristech. The challenge was to recover a secret key used in an encrypting algorithm DES with
a very little number of traces. The participants were provided very big sets of data such as:
• For each query, the 64 bits plaintext to be encrypted;
• The corresponding 64 bits ciphertext;
• The power consumption of the whole encryption process.
A trace has the shape given in Figure 1.4. With one figure like this, it is not possible to recover
the secret key. However, if we average them according to existing leakage models such as the
hamming weight leakage [51], we can notice some points of interest. For example, the SNR of
the leakage of one DES substitution box is given in Figure 4.8. In this figure, we notice that
given a leakage model, the SNR is relevant in three points. We call these samples points of
interest. By selecting only theses points of interest and computing mathematical functions called
distinguishers, it is possible to recover the secret key. For the first edition of the DPA contest,
11
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Figure 1.5: The SNR of this leakage according to the Hamming weight model.
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the best attacking method was provided by Christophe Clavier [21]. In his method, the full key
recovery takes only 43 traces in average.
1.4 A Look on Information Theory
1.4.1 Background
The communication of information has benefited from many improvements at the physical level.
However, it is also profitable to optimize the data rate by studying how information shall be
preprocessed before being sent. This need has given rise to Information Theory : the science
of data transmission. It was created in 1948 by Claude E. Shannon from the Bell labs in his
famous article A Mathematical Theory of Communication [78]. In this article, for the first time,
the basis of digital communication were drawn. The idea was: how to send some information
from a sender to a receiver through a noisy channel? To do so, Shannon proposed a framework
for a communication channel, from the message to be sent, to the received message. Figure 1.6
shows this communication system designed in 1948.
Signal
Received
signal
Source Transmitter Receiver Estimation
Noisy source
Figure 1.6: A communication system by Shannon
For the first time, a precise model was proposed to describe distant communications. But
Shannon did not only describe the model. With probabilistic considerations, he proved that it
is possible to send messages with an arbitrary small error at the decoding phase, as long as the
coding rate (i.e. the amount of data per sample) is lower than a given limit. Moreover, this
limit has an analytic expression and is called the Mutual Information between the signal and
the received signal. As the transmitter has access to the way that the data is sent, it is possible
to modify the Mutual Information, and therefore reach the highest possible limit, called the
Channel Capacity. When the noisy source is additive and the noise is Gaussian, the capacity of
the channel takes the well-known expression C = 12 log(1 + SNR), where SNR is the signal to
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noise ratio, i.e. the power or the input signal divided by the power power of the noise. This
formula is known as the Shannon capacity.
However, Shannon did only predict that there exists ways to transmit data that reach this
bound. He did not tell how to find one. For mobile communications, the first time that a team
managed to implement a transmission scheme reaching the Shannon capacity, was in 1996 when
Berrou and Glavieux invented the Turbo-codes [7].
1.4.2 Link With Side-Channel Analysis
The attractive point of information theory is that its fields of applications are wide. Indeed, in
the case of side-channel analysis, we can consider that the secret key is an information, and that
the leakage is a transmission.
In 2014, Annelie Heuser proposed a diagram where both notions of side-channel analysis and
information theory are represented [39]. We have copied this figure in Figure 1.8. The notations
are the following:
• K∗ is the random variable standing for the leaking secret key.
• T is the random vector standing for the plaintext vector.
• Y is the random vector standing for the sensitive variable vector.
• N is the random vector standing for the additive noise (most often supposed as Gaussian).
• X is the random vector standing for the measured traces.
• K̂ is the random variable standing for the estimated key. If the attack is efficient, the
estimated key is equal to the secret key.
• The functions f and ϕ are respectively the algorithmic function (for example a SubBytes
function and the leakage model function. The leakage model function can be supposed
to be known or estimated. The best case for the attacker is of course when the leakage
function is known.
• D is the distinguishing rule. It is a mathematical function taking as inputs the traces and
the plaintext, and returning an estimation of the secret key.
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Figure 1.7: Claude Shannon c©MFO
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Figure 1.8: Framework linking communication channels with leakage model.
1.5 Organization of the Manuscript
The manuscript is organized as follows. In Chapter 2, I describe the main contributions of my
thesis. Part II deals with a generic upper bound to any type of attack thanks to information
theoretic results. In Part III, I consolidate the knowledge of some distinguishers. More specifically,
Chapter 5 deals with monobit leakages while Chapter 6 shows that Mutual Information Analysis
can be optimal in some scenarios. In Part IV, we discuss about practical issues that may happen
in real world devices, in particular for timing attacks.
1.6 Notations
All over this manuscript, we will use the following notations for the mathematical derivations.
The sets will be written with calligraphic letters, and elements of such sets in small caps. If
possible we will use the same letter. for example x ∈ X. Random variables will be written in
capital letter. For example, X is a random variable taking values in X. Probabilities are written
with the symbol P. Therefore, the probability that X is x is noted P(X = x). If it is clear that
the random variable is X, we will only write P(x). We use bold letters to write vectors. For
example x is a vector whose all the element are in X. And X is a random vector taking values
in X. If the set X is continuous, the probability distribution function is written as p(x).
We also recall some information theoretic definitions that are used in this manuscript. The
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entropy of a random variable X is defined as:
H(X) = −
∑
x∈X
P(x) logP(x).
The conditional entropy of X knowing Y is defined as:
H(X | Y ) =
∑
y∈Y
P(y)H(X | Y = y)
=
∑
y∈Y
P(y)
∑
x∈X
P(x | y) logP(x | y).
The mutual information between two random variables X and Y is defined as:
I(X;Y ) = H(X)−H(X | Y )
= H(Y )−H(Y | X)
=
∑
(x,y)∈X×Y
P(x, y) log
P(x, y)
P(x)P(y)
For these definitions, we have not precised the base of the logarithm since it is mathematically
possible to choose any base. However, in communication theory, base 2 is very often used and
information is consequently expressed in bits. This is why we will use this base for all the
logarithms.
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2.1 Formal Security Proofs and Studies
During my thesis, my main concern has been: how to unify and understand the link between
the different metrics used to evaluate the sensitive information leakage of cryptographic chips?
Indeed, various different metrics have been proposed by various authors in respond to specific
issues. For example, we can cite:
• The Mutual Information (MI) between measurements and the sensitive variables;
• The Perceived Information computed with the estimated distribution of the leakage, based
on template attacks;
• The Success Rate or the Guessing Entropy of an attack exploiting a leakage.
2.1.1 A Generic Bound for Any Leakage With Only SNR
For example, the notion of MI is a widely spread concept in Side-Channel Analysis [30], and
everyone agrees that the larger the MI, the better the attack, or from the defender’s side, the
weaker the chip. However, the link between MI and the success rate of an attack, has never been
established formally yet for generic attacks. Some links have already been made [29, 53] but
they have been made for particular types of attacks, especially to show how the masking order
impacts the MI [67] and are therefore true in a specific context. Moreover, I have noticed that
no paper really deals with a tight prediction of the security of a chip. My question was: how can
a designer predict the success rate of an attack with a very restricted number of assumptions.
Indeed, a designer does not know how a device will be attacked. New methods may appear
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several years after the conception of the chip. This is why I have started looking for a framework
that can unify any type of attack under simple concepts and notations.
This is the beginning of my reflection: if we use some information theoretic metrics, then
the answer must be in this field.
In order to better formalize a side-channel attack, I based myself on the framework given by
Franc¸ois-Xavier Standaert in [82]. This framework presents a simple albeit comprehensive look
on what a side-channel attack is.
In 2014, Annelie Heuser has published an article [39] where she demonstrates that the
optimal distinguisher for an attack is the Maximum Likelihood decoder. To obtain this result,
she establishes a first formal link between side-channel analysis and information theory. The
leakage model is there seen as a communication channel with a message to recover (i.e. the
secret key). The method to derive the optimal distinguisher has been to express the expression
for the key decoding rule which maximizes the success rate.
As MI is an information theoretic metric, it becomes here natural to study its impact with
information theoretic models and theorems. I have therefore worked on this aspect. The main
difficulty for me has been to deal with the philosophical differences between information theory
and side-channel. Indeed, the purpose of each is clearly different:
• The goal of an information theorist is to send a message with the highest possible rate
and with an arbitrary small error rate. To do so, the communication engineer can use
correcting codes and choose how the message is encoded.
• In side-channel analysis, the message is the secret key. But the attacker do not have access
to it (which is obvious). This means that the input distributions are imposed by the model
and that there is not coding possibility to improve the success rate.
However, Shannon’s coding theorem and converse coding theorem are still useful to determine
bounds. Indeed, the Shannon’s converse coding theorem shows that the probability of success of
a transmission is upper-bounded by the mutual information of the channel [79]. I have used this
major theorem (proved 60 years ago!) and applied it to my side-channel model.
I have therefore applied the theorem to side-channel. The main problem that I have
encountered is a formal calculation of the Mutual Information. Indeed, the leakages are not
independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.). This means that the Mutual Information
between the traces and the sensitive variables cannot be easily estimated via Shannon’s formula
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C = 12 log2(1 + SNR). This one remains only a loose upper-bound of the real MI. Therefore, I
had to resort to other methods to estimated the MI as tight as possible.
I therefore proposed two new methods to estimate the MI of large vectors:
1. A mathematical upper-bound that converges to the right value when the number of traces
q tends to infinity;
2. A parametric estimation based on empirical results.
The mathematical approach is true for any leakage model and any type of noise. However,
the bound is not tight for small values of q. In this case, a good tradeoff is to merge our
approach with Shannon’s bound. Our parametric estimation is due to empirical observations
with Additional White Gaussian Noise (AWGN). Indeed, I have noticed that the MI between
two vectors behaves like an error function. With such estimation, the only knowledge of the
Signal-to-Noise Ratio (SNR) is enough to approximate the MI. This leads to a computation of
the Success Rate (SR) of an attack that can be computed only with the calculation of the SNR
and with the assumption of an additive white Gaussian noise. We do not suppose anything on
the leakage model.
I have then compared the bound obtained by these estimations of the MI, with the best
possible distinguisher i.e. the Maximum Likelihood distinguisher (as demonstrated by Heuser et
al. in [39]). The results show that the tighter the estimation of the MI, the tighter the bound is.
2.1.2 Extension to Template Attacks
My work on the best possible success rate for a given number of traces relies on the calculation
of the Mutual Information between the sensitive variable and the measured traces. In many
cases, the leakage model is not perfectly known and it has to be estimated. This is the case for
example, when the attacker has a copy of the targeted device and learns the leakage model from
this copy. These are called template attacks. Here the goal is different because we want to know
how fast an attacker can break a secret key after a learning phase.
This means that the attacker does not know the real leakage model, but an estimation that
may even be biased. Franc¸ois-Xavier Standaert proposed the notion of Perceived Information
(PI) [30] to replace a MI that cannot be computed because of the lack of knowledge.
A first formal study about this PI shows that it is obviously lower than the MI and can even
be smaller than zero. But we wish a link between PI and SR. I have shown that, when PI is
strictly positive, the attack will succeed with a sufficient enough number of traces. This result
22
2.2 Adapting Theoretical Tools for Practical Issues
is based on the demonstration of the Shannon theorem and a proof based on the mismatched
decoders by Merhav [57].
2.1.3 MIA is Universal ML
On the distinguishing point of view, I have noticed that when the attacker has to profile with
on-the-fly data, the Maximum Likelihood distinguisher is perfectly equivalent to a Mutual
Information Analysis (MIA).
We have shown with theoretical case-study that MIA is very relevant when the leakage model
is not perfectly known. Indeed, we have built an experiment where Correlation Power Analysis
(CPA) crashes while MIA works well to recover a secret key.
2.1.4 A Unified Vision of Monobit Leakages
Several papers noticed that some distinguishers related to monobit leakages can be linked with
Fei et al.’s confusion coefficient [32]. For example, Heuser et al. derived the Kolmogorov-Smirnov
Analysis (KSA) as a function of the confusion coefficient and the SNR [38]. Moreover, in [51],
Mangard et al. made the link between Correlation Power Analysis (CPA) and the confusion
coefficient.
After reading these articles, we had the feeling that the link between any distinguisher of a
monobit leakage, was deeper. Therefore, we first made the link between Mutual Information
Analysis (MIA) and the confusion coefficient. We noticed that it also depends on the standard
deviation of the noise. We extracted an analytic function linking MIA the confusion coefficient,
and the standard deviation of the noise.
Eventually, we have noticed that for monobit leakages, the confusion coefficient can also be
seen as the transition probability of a Binary Symmetric Channel (BSC). This has allowed us to
prove that any sound distinguisher in monobit leakages is a function of two parameters: the
confusion coefficient and the standard deviation of the noise.
2.2 Adapting Theoretical Tools for Practical Issues
Another task of my thesis was to adapt some of the theoretical tools for practical issues. I
based my studies on an ARM processor edited by ST Microelectronics: the STM32 Discovery
Board [59].
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On this architecture, we compute timing attacks on the AES algorithm. Here, in this
practical example, the leakage model is not easy to find and to deal with. A template attack is
therefore needed to learn the model. However a learning phase may encounter some problems
such as:
• A bias between the learned model and the real leakage;
• A poor learning phase.
2.2.1 Avoid the Empty Bin Issue
One of the issues that we have met is the empty bin issues. The empty bin issue appears when
there is a difference between the distribution of the learning phase and the distribution of the
attack. We may face a strange case: when we compute the maximum likelihood distinguisher
based on the distribution of the templates, we can meet some data such that the probability is
null. This appears even for the correct key guess and therefore, the ML distinguisher crashes.
We have therefore imagined several solutions to avoid this empty bin issue but still keeping
the notion of maximum likelihood that is supposed to be the best distinguishing rule according
to Annelie Heuser’s paper [39].
The solutions that we have imagined are easy to compute and are sound. When the profiling
is correct, the best distinguisher is a ML with a small penalty if an empty bin occurs. On the
contrary, when the profiling is poor, the best possible distinguisher is to compute an MIA based
on the learned model. Indeed, MIA is known to be more robust when the leakage model is not
well characterized.
2.2.2 Extract a Model for a Timing Attack
In addition to the empty bin issue, I have worked on the STM32 Discovery board in order to
extract a leakage model. In a black box view, we have as inputs the plaintext that is to be
encoded and the number of clock cycles to compute AES as the output of this black box.
With this architecture, it is possible to enable or not the data cache (DC) or the instruction
cache (IC). We have noticed that, when the DC is enabled, the computation of AES is not time
constant, meaning that there is a leakage. A part of this leakage is still difficult to understand
but we have managed to find out that the number of cache hits during the computation of the
algorithm has a great impact.
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Introduction
As a general rule, the most successful man in life
is a man who has the best information.
— Benjamin Disraeli.
Side-channel analysis is renown as an effective “eavesdropping” attack technique to extract
sensitive secrets from cryptographic chips. In recent literature, many exploits have been put
forward. Starting from the seminal timing attack of Kocher [44], various biases of different
kinds have been exhibited. Vertical attacks such as power analysis [45] have been shown to be
highly efficient. However, from a designer’s viewpoint, the exact details of the various attacks
are irrelevant. Instead, defenders aim at estimating a security risk in general, e.g., the chance
that a major security breach occurs. It is thus highly desired to protect designs against all
kinds of SCA attacks in a provable way. When implementing a secure design, the natural
question which arises is the quantification of its security, with respect to its architecture and its
operational environment. In [30], the authors present several metrics that can help the designers
to secure cryptographic chips. Shannon’s mutual information (MI) between measured traces
and guessed models has been considered, but is often thought of as theoretical (too far from
practical evaluations) and impracticable (too computationally inefficient). In [83], the authors
explain the relative importance of MI and probability of success, but in a separate way. Our
aim is to join the two concepts and to show how the knowledge of MI allows to derive an upper
bound on the success rate.
We wish to estimate the success rate with very few assumptions, based on simple and
easy-to-compute tools, such as the signal to noise ratio (SNR). The calculation of the SNR can
be made without the knowledge of the leakage model as the SNR is the ratio between the power
of the useful signal and the power of the noise. The power of the noise is easily measured as is
is the measurement noise, and as the power of the useful signal is the difference between the
power of the measured signal and the power of the noise, the SNR is obtained.
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Related Work As our main goal is to find an estimation of the success rate of an attack that
can be as accurate as possible. Using Information theoretic tools, [39] extracted the best possible
distinguishing rule. However, this does not give any clue to estimate the success rate of an
attack. In practice, the success rate is estimated by repeating a sufficient number of simulations.
Moreover, this is dependent of the knowledge of the leakage model. In practice, it is difficult
to know exactly this model. Indeed, the estimation may be biased, the learning phase of the
model, may be too short, the model, may be too complicated, etc. This is why, we wish to use
general information theoretic tools in order to be as generic as possible, and to give bounds that
are true whatever the attacker may do or may know.
In [50], a link between the success rate and the number of traces to succeed in a correlation
power analysis [11] has been studied, and an analytical formula has been derived. However, this
results is untrustworthy in practice because of the assumption that incorrect key guesses lead to
independent distinguishers, which is not true. Subsequent work on this topic therefore consider
the joint distribution of all values of the distinguisher (correct key and all remaining incorrect
key guesses).
In [36, 48, 74], the authors propose an estimation of the success rate of specific distinguishers.
Namely, Rivain [74] studies the distribution of two examples of distinguishers (correlation and
template) in the presence of normal noise. Lomne´ et al. [48] extend this work for masked
implementations, while however still focusing on correlation and template attacks. Guilley et
al. [36] extend the approach from additive to some non-additive distinguishers (such as the
mutual information analysis), but through the approximation that the number of traces tends
to the infinity. To summarize, all three papers [36, 48, 74] have in common that the knowledge
of the leakage model, or at least an estimation via a learning phase with templates, is needed to
predict the success rate. In addition, this estimation, in the three cases, is based on the central
limit theorem, meaning that it is relevant for a large number of traces and only for additive
distinguishers. We wish a bound valid for any distinguisher, for any number of traces (even
small).
A bound on the Mutual Information is proposed in [67]. The MI involved is based on one
trace, supposing that every leakage is independent from each other. We show in this part
that this is not the case in practice. In this paper, the bound is valid for MI with only one
measurement. We will see in this part of the manuscript that calculating MI with the probability
functions of all the traces is crucial.
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In [29, Theorem 2], the authors proposed a link between success rate and the number of
measurements. This bound is based on the the link between MI and random probing. Therefore,
it is valid only for leakages with very low SNR and the bound is very loose For instance (see
Figure 4.6), with SNR > 10−4, the bound of Duc et al. [29] is trivial (the success rate is smaller
than one), and for SNR = 10−5, it predicts a number of traces 4, which is much smaller than
our result of 1.3× 106 (where the best attack using ML predicts 1.5× 106, which is in the order
of magnitude of our prediction). In fact, the main contribution of the bound of Duc et al. [29] is
to show that the masking order of an attack has an exponential impact on the success rate, but
not to yield an accurate link between number of traces and success rate.
In the field of information theory, Arimoto [2] proved a lower bound of the error rate (hence
an upper-bound of the success rate) in terms of a so-called Gallager coefficient. However, not only
requires intensive computations, but also the model assumes a freely chosen input distribution.
In our case, that input distribution is set by the leakage model and therefore, cannot be freely
chosen. Arimoto’s main result (Equation 24 of [2]) remains true because it represents the best
possible case for an attacker for all possible input distributions; but the resulting bound is very
loose in our side-channel context. Equation 9 of [2] could be used instead but depends on a
parameter β. With our notations (presented in section 3.1), Arimoto’s Equation 9 becomes:
∀β > 0, Pe ≤ 1− 2n(β−1)
∑
t∈Tq
P(t)
∑
x∈Xq
[
2n−1∑
k=0
P(k)P(x | k, t)1/β
]β
.
The minimization of the r.h.s is practical untraceable for q > 1. Indeed, it consists in sums over
|X|q elements; the complexity is even worse when the output is continuous.
Overall, we can sum up the related work with the following table 2.1. The table classifies the
state-of-the-art according various criteria, such as the way the results are derived and whether
or not the mutual information is involved in the estimation of the success rate. The last two
columns show whether a closed form bound exists and whether it is generic in the attack method.
Our method provided an analytic expression for the lower bound (Theorem 3.1) and is agnostic
in the attack method.
Contributions In this chapter, we derive bounds on the success rate of any attack, irrespective
to the exact attack. Thus we can consider our bounds as universal. To do so, we address this
problem using rigorous information theoretic tools. This is why we revisit the use of MI as a
conservative security metric. Our main contribution is to give a clear relationship between MI
and probability of success. More precisely, we seek a lower bound on the number of available
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Related work
Link with Usage Closed form
Generic
information theory of MI bound on SR
[39] Yes No No No
[74] [48] [36] No No Yes
(but asymptotic)
No
[67] No Yes No Yes
[29] No Yes Yes
(but very loose)
Yes
[2] Yes No Computationally
too difficult
Yes
This part Yes Yes Yes (Theo-
rem 3.1)
Yes
Table 2.1: Summary of the related work
traces where a given success level can be reached, based only on theoretical assumptions on the
channel. The actual value of MI is important to estimate and such an estimation is not immediate
because random vectors of very high dimensions are involved in its expression. Therefore, we
propose several ways to simply estimate the MI by mathematically proved upper bounds and by
numerical estimations. Our results are applied to the most common type of noise, namely the
additive white Gaussian noise. We show that, in the case of additive Gaussian noise, the only
calculation of the SNR is sufficient enough predict accurately the security of a device. Last,
the main result on success rate is translated in terms of guessing entropy, another informative
criterion in side-channel analysis.
Organization This part is organized as follows. In Chapter 3, we provide the mathematical
computaions to prove this bound and we apply them in the case of additive white Gaussian
noise. Section 3.1 describes the side-channel and shows how a leakage can be modeled with a
Markov chain. Section 3.2 provides our main result and three different ways to exploit it. An
application to leakages with additive Gaussian noise is carried out in Section 3.3, where we
show at the end that the SNR is enough to predict the security of a device. The link to the
guessing entropy is done in Section 3.4. In Chapter 4, we show how we can tighten the bound
with numerical estimations of the mutual information. We give a general conclusion of both
chapters in Section 4.4. Technical computations involved in proofs are in Appendix.
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Notations Throughout this paper we use the following notations. Calligraphic letters (e.g.
X) denote sets. Uppercase letters (e.g. X) denote random variables taking their values in the
corresponding set (e.g. X). Lowercase letters (e.g. x) denote realizations of this random variable.
Vectors are written in bold characters. By default, the length of a vector is q ∈ N. Thus, a
random vector is denoted with a bold capital letter (e.g. X = (X1, X2, . . . , Xq)) and a vector of
realizations on this random vector is denoted with a small bold letter (e.g. x = (x1, x2, . . . , xq)).
Given the random variable X taking its values in X and x ∈ X, the probability that X equals x
is noted P(X = x) or simply P(x).
We also define some information theoretic tools. The entropy of a random vector X of length
q is defined by:
H(X) = −
∑
x∈Xq
P(x) log2 P(x).
The conditional entropy of a random vector X knowing vector Y is defined by:
H(X | Y) = −
∑
y∈Yq
P(y)H(X | Y = y)
= −
∑
y∈Yq
P(y)
∑
x∈Xq
P(x | y) log2 P(x | y).
The Mutual Information between two random vectors X and Y is defined as I(X; Y) =
H(X)−H(X | Y). The conditional Mutual Information I(X; Y | T) where X, Y and T are
random vectors is defined as I(X; Y | T) = H(X | T)−H(X | Y,T). Last, the Kullback-Leibler
divergence between two distributions P and Q over the same set X is defined as:
D(P‖Q) =
∑
x∈X
P(x) log2
P(x)
Q(x)
.
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3. A MATHEMATICAL BOUND OF THE SUCCESS RATE WITH MUTUAL
INFORMATION
This chapter presents a mathematical theory of leakage models. Some open issues are
discussed in Appendix A.
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3.1 Side-Channel Seen as a Communication Channel
The link between side-channel analysis and information theory has been proposed by [39] to
derive the optimal distinguisher. In this section, we review how the side-channel can be seen as
a communication channel. The secret key byte that the attacker wants to recover is denoted
as k∗ and is n bits long (typically n = 8). We assume that the attacker inputs q text bytes
t = (t1, t2, . . . , tq) and receives that many traces in a vector x = (x1, x2, . . . , xq), with the
following leakage model :
xi = f(ti ⊕ k∗) + ni (i = 1, 2, . . . , q) (3.1)
where n = (n1, n2, . . . , nq) is an additive noise independent of x and f(.) is some leakage function.
We assume that f is deterministic but not necessary known to the attacker. This assumption
will make our calculations generic and therefore true for any type of attack. This is the worst
possible case for the security designers. Define the sensitive variable y(k) = yt(k) as
yt(k) = f(t⊕ k) = (f(t1 ⊕ k), . . . , f(tq ⊕ k)) (3.2)
so that the leakage can be written in compact form as
x = yt(k
∗) + n.
Such vectors t,y and x are realizations of random vectors noted T,Y and X. In the case of one
particular sample, t, y and x are realizations of random variables T, Y and X. We assume that
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the channel is memoryless, which means that each trace xi depends on the input y only from yi.
In particular xi and yj are independent for all if i 6= j. We also make the natural assumption
that the secret key is independent from all text bytes: the secret key random variable K is
independent from T. In other words, the text bytes do not give any information about the
secret key (at least in a design which adheres to Kerckhoffs’s principle).
Following [39] we make the following hypotheses:
• K is uniformly distributed over K = {0, . . . , 2n − 1}. K is a scalar (there is one key-byte
to break), and is therefore not written in bold font.
• T is uniformly distributed over T = {0, . . . , 2n − 1}. Moreover, we suppose that vector T
is balanced, meaning that the number of occurrences of each symbol in the vector is the
same.
• As seen above, the random variable Y is such that Y = f(T ⊕ K), with f a known
deterministic function.
• As q textbytes are sent and therefore q traces are received, we consider the random vectors
T,Y and X.
Thus from (3.1), we can write
X = f(T⊕K) + N
= Y + N.
Considering only scalars, this writes for random variables
X = f(T ⊕K) +N
= Y +N.
After acquiring q traces, the attacker applies a function called distinguisher D to obtain
an estimate K̂ = D(X,T) of the secret key from X and T. This allows us to define the
communication channel as depicted in Figure 3.1:
• the “encoder” models the leakage from the device: not only the composition of the
algorithm which mixes the unknown key K with the known text T into a sensitive variable,
but also the way the device leaks the sensitive variable (function f);
35
3. A MATHEMATICAL BOUND OF THE SUCCESS RATE WITH MUTUAL
INFORMATION
K Encoder
Y
Channel
X
Decoder K̂
T T
N
Figure 3.1: Representation of Side-Channel
• the (side) channel consists in noise addition, arising from the untargeted parts of the
design and from the measurement setup; and
• the “decoder” implements the distinguishing rule with allows the attacker to get a key
guess K̂ from the measured leakage X and the knowledge of public text bytes T. The
realizations t of the random vector T are known by the attacker.
From the model we can deduce Lemma 3.1 dealing with Markov chains.We recall that
a Markov chain is a stochastic model describing a sequence of possible events in which the
probability of each event depends only on the state attained in the previous event.
Lemma 3.1. The communication channel just described admits the following Markov chains:
(K,T) −→ (Y,T) −→ (X,T) −→ K̂ (3.3)
K −→ Y −→ X −→ K̂
(K,T) −→ Y −→ X.
Proof. The first case is easily seen by re-drawing Figure 3.1 into the different constitutive blocks
as shown in Figure 3.2, where all the variables pass through different blocks corresponding to
the Markov Chain. The two other cases are proved similarly.
K Encoder
Y
Channel
X
Decoder K̂
T
N
T T
Block 1
Block 2
Block 3
Figure 3.2: The Markov chain (K,T) −→ (Y,T) −→ (X,T) −→ K̂.
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3.2 Theoretical Bounds on Mutual Information
One of the important properties of a Markov chain is the data processing inequality [23], which
is used to prove the following theorem in this section, which is our main result.
3.2.1 Main Result
Let Ps = P(K̂ = K) be the probability of success of an attack and H2(Ps) its binary entropy1 [23]:
H2(Ps) = −Ps log2(Ps)− (1− Ps) log2(1− Ps).
The following theorem is fundamental because it provides a trade-off for any possible type of
attack.
Theorem 3.1. The following inequality is always true for any distinguishing rule:
H(K)− (1− Ps) log2(2n − 1)−H2(Ps) ≤ q · I(X;Y | T ). (3.4)
The probability of success of an attack also follows the following inequality:
H(K)− (1− Ps) log2(2n − 1)−H2(Ps)
≤ ETEK1 log2 EK2 exp
(−D(PX|K1,T‖PX|K2,T)) ; (3.5)
where D(P‖P′) is the Kullback-Leibler divergence [23] and K1,K2 are identically distributed as
K.
Merging these two equations we can write:
H(K) + (Ps − 1) log2(2n − 1)−H2(Ps)
≤ min(ETEK1 log2 EK2 exp
(−D(PX|K1,T‖PX|K2,T)) , qI(X;Y | T )). (3.6)
This theorem shows that the success rate of an attack is directly linked to the Mutual
Information between the leakage and the model. Furthermore, as we consider generic attacks,
this inequality remains true whatever the attacker does with the traces. In the next subsections
we prove both inequalities and we show that (3.4) is more interesting for low values of q while (3.5)
is a better approximation for high values of q.
To do so, we first demonstrate a preliminary lemma in Section 3.2.2 that will be useful for
both Equation (3.4) and (3.5).
1The binary entropy is the entropy of a binary random variable with probabilities p and 1− p.
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3.2.2 A Fundamental Lower Bound on Mutual Information I(X;Y | T)
The first step of the demonstration of Theorem 3.1 is the following lemma that links the Mutual
Information between the random vectors X and Y with the probability of success.
Lemma 3.2. With the notations of Theorem 3.1, we have:
H(K)− (1− Ps) log2(2n − 1)−H2(Ps) ≤ I(X; Y | T). (3.7)
Proof. Using the Markov Chain (3.3) we compare two MI values thanks to the data processing
inequality [4]. Indeed, this is a direct consequence of Lemma 3.1. This inequality states that the
further two random variables are in a Markov Chain, the less MI between these variables. Here
we have
I((K,T) ; (X,T)) ≤ I((Y,T) ; (X,T)). (3.8)
Let us expand both sides of this inequality. In the l.h.s., since the channel is memoryless and K
and T are independent, we have:
I((K,T); (X,T)) = H(K,T)−H((K,T) | (X,T))
= H(K) +H(T)−H(K | T,X).
As K̂ is a deterministic function of T and X, adding the knowledge of K̂ does not change the
entropy:
I((K,T); (X,T)) = H(K) +H(T)−H(K | T,X, K̂);
≥ H(K) +H(T)−H(K | K̂).
The latter inequality holds since conditioning reduces entropy [23]. Now by Fano’s inequality1[23,
Page 43],
H(K | K̂) ≤ H2(Pe) + Pe log2(|K| − 1)
where Pe is the probability of error Pe = P(K 6= K̂). Since Ps = 1−Pe and H2(Pe) = H2(Ps) =
−Pe log2(Pe)− Ps log2(Ps), this is rewritten as
H(K | K̂) ≤ H2(Ps) + (1− Ps) log2(2n − 1).
Plugging this inequality into the previous one gives
I((K,T); (K̂,T)) ≥ H(K) + qH(T )−H2(Ps)− (1− Ps) log2(2n − 1). (3.9)
On the other hand, the r.h.s. of the data processing inequality (3.8) is:
I((Y,T); (X,T)) = H(X,T)−H(X,T | Y,T);
= H(X,T)−H(X | Y,T);
= I(X; Y | T) +H(T). (3.10)
1Fano’s inequality is an important information-theoretic result about the uncertainty of the transmission of a
message, which is due to the error probability and the number of possible errors.
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Combining Equations (3.9) and (3.10), we obtain the following fundamental inequality:
H(K)−H2(Ps)− (1− Ps) log2(2n − 1) ≤ I(X; Y | T), (3.11)
And proving Lemma 3.2.
The same l.h.s. of (3.11) will be used to prove for both inequalities (3.4) and (3.5), the
difference being the way that I(X; Y | T) is evaluated. Indeed, the next part of the proofs for
Equations (3.4) and (3.5) is about finding an upper-bound for I(X; Y | T). We have to do so
because there is no analytic expression for this conditional Mutual Information computed with
vectors of q dimensions.
Remark 3.1. A quick analysis of the value n+ (Ps − 1) log2(2n − 1)−H2(Ps) reveals that it is
always non-negative for any Ps in the range (0, 1) and vanishes if and only if Ps = 1/2
n.
Therefore, when there are no traces, I(X; Y | T) = 0, the only probability that can respect
inequality (3.11) is Ps = 1/2
n, meaning that without information, that attacker can not have a
better success rate than 1/2n obtained with an equiprobable random guess, as expected. Every
trace will bring additional information and therefore increase the probability of success.
3.2.3 First Upper Bound on I(X;Y | T): Proof of Inequality (3.4)
Thanks to Lemma 3.2, the l.h.s. of Theorem 3.1 is given. Inequality (3.4) is a straightforward
consequence of the following lemma.
Lemma 3.3. Let X and Y be two random vectors with joint distribution PX,Y, PX be the
marginal distribution of X, and PX be the marginal of one element X of vector X. Define the
distribution P˜X =
∏q
i=1 PXi . We have
I(X; Y) = qI(X;Y )−D
(
PX‖P˜X
)
;
≤ qI(X;Y ).
This Lemma means that the Mutual Information of two random vectors made of identically
distributed random variables is lower than q times the Mutual Information of the marginal
distribution of these random vectors.
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Proof. From the memoryless assumption of the channel, one has PX|Y =
∏q
i=1 PXi|Yi . Thus
I(X; Y) = EX,Y
[
log2
PX|Y(X | Y)
PX(X)
]
= EX,Y
[
log2
PX|Y(X | Y)
P˜X(X)
]
+ EX,Y
[
log2
P˜X(X)
PX(X)
]
= EX,Y
[
log2
∏
i PX|Y (Xi | Yi)∏
i P˜X(Xi)
]
−D
(
PX‖P˜X
)
=
∑
i
EX,Y
[
log2
PX|Y (Xi | Yi)
P˜X(Xi)
]
−D
(
PX‖P˜X
)
= qI(X;Y )−D
(
PX‖P˜X
)
.
The inequality follows since the divergence is always non-negative.
This upper bound on MI is easily derived but is linear in q, and, therefore, will not converge
to a finite value as the number of measurements increases (q →∞). This will be in contradiction
with Lemma 3.4. Therefore, it is interesting to propose another bound that converges to a finite
value. This will be made in the next section.
3.2.4 Second Upper Bound on I(X;Y | T) - Proof of Inequality (3.5)
Before proving (3.5) we first notice that in our side-channel model, as there is a finite number of
keys, the MI is always bounded by H(K).
Lemma 3.4.
I(X; Y | T) = I(K; X | T) ≤ H(K)
Proof. We use the Markov chain defined in Equation (3.3). Notice that, adding the knowledge
of T,K when T,Y are already known does not change the entropy of X. Therefore,
H(X | T,Y) = H(X | T,Y,K,T);
= H(X | T,Y,K).
As Y is a deterministic function of K and T, it can be removed, so we get:
H(X | T,Y) = H(X | T,K).
Therefore, we obtain I(X; Y | T) = I(X;K | T). Since I(X;K | T) = H(K)−H(K | T,X) in
follows that I(X;K | T) ≤ H(K).
Here H(K) is a constant that depends only on the distribution of K; it reaches its maximum
value for a uniform distribution: H(K) = n bit. As a consequence, since I(X; Y | T) increases
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with q, it must converge to a finite value when q → ∞. This explains why the upper-bound
given by (3.4) is poor when q →∞.
Therefore, we provide another bound that is more accurate for large values of q because it
converges to a finite value when K is finite. First we need the following
Lemma 3.5. For any random variables X and Y and real-valued function (x, y) 7→ f(x, y),
−EY log2 EX [exp(f(X,Y ))] ≤ − log2 EX [exp(EY f(X,Y ))].
Proof. See Appendix A.2.
Corollary 3.1. For any random variables X and Y and positive function (x, y) 7→ g(x, y),
expEY log2 EX [g(X,Y )] ≥ EX [exp(EY log g(X,Y ))]
Proof. See Appendix A.3.
Equipped with Lemma 3.5, we compute MI as follows:
I(X;K | T) = ETEX,K|T log2
P(X | KT)
P(X | T) ;
= ETEKEX|K,T log2
P(X | KT)
P(X | T) ;
We introduce here K2, a random variable following the same distribution as K.
I(X;K | T) = ETEKEX|K,T log2
P(X | K,T)
EK2P(X | K2,T)
;
= −ETEKEX|K,T log2 EK2
P(X | K2,T)
P(X | K,T) ;
= −ETEKEX|K,T log2 EK2 exp
[
log2
P(X | K2,T)
P(X | K,T)
]
.
By Lemma 3.5 we obtain
I(X;K | T) ≤ −ETEK log2 EK2 exp
[
EX|K,T log2
P(X | K2,T)
P(X | K,T)
]
;
= −ETEK log2 EK2 exp
[−D(PX|K,T || PX|K2,T)] .
This proves inequality (3.5) and Theorem 3.1 1.
1An alternative proof of inequality (3.5), which resorts only on convexity arguments, is given in Appendix A.4.
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3.3 Application to Additive White Gaussian Noise
In this section, we develop the results of Theorem 3.1 for leakages with additional white Gaussian
noise. Indeed, this is the most common case for attacks such as DPA, where the noise comes
from the measurement tools.
With this model, we can link the success rate to Shannon’s capacity C = 12 log(1 + SNR),
and therefore, to the SNR, where SNR = VAR(Y )σ2 . Moreover, at the end of this section, we will
extract a parametric estimation of the Mutual Information where the only parameter to know is
the SNR.
Remark 3.2. With additive white Gaussian noise, the SNR of the traces can also been written
as:
SNR =
Var(Y )
σ2
,
where σ is the standard deviation of the noise.
3.3.1 Shannon’s Channel Capacity
Under the additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN) assumption, it is easily seen that the scalar
mutual information I(X;Y | T ) does not exceed Shannon’s capacity. Indeed, we have:
I(X;Y | T ) = ET I(X;Y | T = t);
= ET [H(X | T = t)−H(X | Y, T = t)] ;
= ET [H(f(T ⊕K) +N | T = t)]−H(X | Y );
= ET [H(f(t⊕K) +N)]−H(X | Y );
= H(f(K) +N)−H(X | Y );
≤ 1
2
log2(2pie(VarK(f(K)) + Var(N)))−H(X | Y );
=
1
2
log2(1 + SNR).
Combining this with inequality (3.4) yields a lower bound on the number of traces to reach a
given probability of success:
q ≥ n+ (Ps − 1) log2(2
n − 1)−H2(Ps)
1
2 log2(1 + SNR)
(3.12)
Remark 3.3. The number of traces q to be sure to recover the key is lower-bounded by:
lim
Ps→1
q ≥ n1
2 log2(1 + SNR)
. (3.13)
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However, since as we have seen the MI can never be higher than H(K), the above constant
bound is not accurate for real attacks. The next subsection provides a much more accurate
estimation.
3.3.2 Evaluation of the Kullback-Leibler Divergence
Inequality (3.5) gives an upper bound with a divergence term that depends on PX|Ki,T (i = 1, 2).
In the AWGN model, PX|Ki,T follows a multivariate normal distribution N(y(Ki,T), σ2Iq). For
such distributions, the divergence is very easy to compute as the covariance matrix is diagonal.
It is easily found that
D(PX|K,T‖PX|K2,T) =
‖y(K,T)− y(K2,T)‖22
2σ2
.
Inequality (3.5), when applied to the AWGN model, becomes
n+ (Ps − 1) log2(2n − 1)−H2(Ps) ≤ −ETEK log2 EK2 exp
(
−‖y(K,T)− y(K2,T)‖
2
2
2σ2
)
.
In order to make a precise evaluation of the r.h.s., we need several lemmas.
Lemma 3.6. Let t = (t1, . . . , tq) ∈ Tq and (k1 6= k2) ∈ K2. One has
lim
q→∞ ‖y(k1, t)− y(k2, t)‖
2
2 = +∞ (3.14)
and more precisely:
‖y(k1, t)− y(k2, t)‖22 ∼
q→∞ q.α(k1, k2), (3.15)
where α(k1, k2) =
1
2n
∑2n−1
t=0 (y(k1, t)− y(k2, t))2.
Proof. We make use of the assumption made in Section 3.1 that T is balanced. For k1 6= k2, we
have
‖y(k1, t)− y(k2, t)‖22 =
q∑
i=1
(y(k1, ti)− y(k2, ti))2;
= q
q∑
i=1
(y(k1, ti)− y(k2, ti))2
q
;
= q
∑
t∈T
nt(y(k1, ti)− y(k2, ti))2
q
;
where nt is the number of times that a particular t ∈ T appears in vector t. As t is balanced,
nt
q → 1|T| and therefore:
‖y(k1, t)− y(k2, t)‖22 ∼
q→∞ q
∑
t∈T
(y(k1, ti)− y(k2, ti))2
|T| .
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Lemma 3.7. Let t ∈ Tq be fixed and k ∈ K be a fixed key. We have
lim
q→∞− log2 EK2 exp
(
−‖y(k, t)− y(K2, t)‖
2
2
2σ2
)
= n (3.16)
− log2 EK2 exp
(
−‖y(k, t)− y(K2, t)‖
2
2
2σ2
)
∼
q→∞ − log2 EK2 exp
(
−q.α(k,K2)
2σ2
)
. (3.17)
Proof. One has
− log2 EK2 exp
(
−‖y(k, t)− y(K2, t)‖
2
2
2σ2
)
= − log2
[∑
k2
1
2n
exp
(
−‖y(k, t)− y(k2, t)‖
2
2
2σ2
)]
When q is a multiple of 2n we have exactly
‖y(t, k1)− y(t, k2)‖22 = q.α(k1, k2)
and the proof of Equation (3.17) is trivial. Otherwise, for k 6= k2 we have exp(−qα(k,k2)2σ2 )→ 0
as q →∞; and for k = k2 we have exp(−qα(k,k2)2σ2 ) = 1. Therefore
− log2
[∑
k2
1
2n
exp
(
−‖y(k, t)− y(k2, t)‖
2
2
2σ2
)]
−→ n.
Lemma 3.8. With the assumptions made in Section 3.1, we have as q →∞:
ETEK log2 EK2 exp
(−D(PX|K ||PX|K2)) ∼q→∞ n− nmin2n exp(−q. mink1 6=k2 α(k1, k2)) (3.18)
where nmin is the number of indexes k1 6= k2 reaching the minimum value of α(k1, k2).
This simple asymptotic expression can be used to upper-estimate the MI for high values of q.
Notice that for any k1 6= k2, α(k1, k2) = α(k2, k1), hence nmin is an even number.
Proof. Let t = (t1, . . . , tq) be a balanced vector. By Lemma 3.7, we have
−EK logEK2 exp
(−D(PX|Kt||PX|K2t)) ∼q→∞ −EK logEK2 exp
(
−q.α(K,K2)
2σ2
)
where
−EK logEK2 exp
(
−q.α(K,K2)
2σ2
)
= −EK log
[
1
2n
∑
k2
exp
(
−q.α(K, k2)
2σ2
)]
;
= n− EK log
1 + ∑
k2 6=K
exp
(
−q.α(K, k2)
2σ2
) .
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As the value inside the logarithm vanishes as q →∞, consider its first-order Taylor expansion:
−EK logEK2 exp
(
−q.α(K,K2)
2σ2
)
∼
q→∞ n− EK
 ∑
k2 6=K
exp
(
−q.α(K, k2)
2σ2
) ;
= n− 1
2n
∑
k1 6=k2
[
exp
(
−q.α(K, k2)
2σ2
)]
.
Let k1 6= k2 be a couple such that α(k1, k2) is the minimum of all the possible α. For any other
couple k3 6= k4, there are two possibilities:
1. either α(k3, k4) = α(k1, k2) and the corresponding exponentials will converge at the same
rate;
2. or α(k3, k4) > α(k1, k2) and exp
(− q2σ2α(k3, k4)) is negligible w.r.t. exp (− q2σ2α(k1, k2)).
Hence we can simply count the number of occurrences of the minimum value of α. We have
proven that:
−EK logEK2 exp
(−D(PX|Kt||PX|K2t)) ∼q→∞ n− nmin2n exp
(
−q.mink1 6=k2 α(k1, k2)
2σ2
)
.
As this expansion is true for any vector t that is balanced, and is independent of it, this proves
the lemma.
Remark 3.4. The simplification of Lemma 3.8 is useful to obtain a simple equivalent form for
high values of q. However, it is also possible to compute a tight approximation of the numerical
value of ETEK log2 EK2 exp
(−D(PX|K ||PX|K2)).
Remark 3.5. Interestingly, we notice that parameter α(k1, k2) is proportional to the confusion
coefficient κ(k1, k2) defined first in [32] for binary leakages, and extended in [36, Equation (45)]
for any leakage:
κ(k1, k2) = 4α(k1, k2).
3.4 Link with Guessing Entropy
Another way to quantify the quality of an attack is the Guessing Entropy [55], defined as
H(K | X,T). This metric quantifies the complexity of the exclusive search to recover K
knowing the side-channel measurements. Besides, let NK be the average number of tries to
retrieve the secret key K with the knowledge of X and T. Mathematically, we have:
NK = EXT
[∑
k
δXT(k)P(k | X,T)
]
,
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where δXT(·) is the permutation that re-orders the probabilities P(k | X,T) into the decreasing
order. There exists a relationship between NK and H(K | X,T) called the inequality of
Massey [55, Section 2]:
NK ≥ 2H(K|X,T)−2 + 1.
We propose here an improved inequality relating Nk with H(K | X,T).
Lemma 3.9 (Improved Inequality of Massey). The average number of tries to recover the
correct key is upper-bounded by:
NK >
2H(K|X,T)
e
. (3.19)
Our inequality improves Massey’s inequality as soon as the entropy is greater than log2(
e
1−e/4 ).
Proof. Let bk =
(1−1/NK)k
NK−1 for all k ∈ N∗. As
∑
k bk = 1, bk is a distribution (geometric).
Moreover, by the Gibbs inequality [23],
H(K | X,T) = −
∑
t,x
P(tx)
∑
k
P(k | t,x) log2 P(k | t,x)
≤ −
∑
t,x
P(t,x)
∑
k
P(k | t,x) log2 bδXT(k)
= −
∑
t,x
P(t,x)
∑
k
P(k | t,x)δX,T(k) log2(1− 1/NK) + log2(NK − 1)
= − log2(1− 1/NK)NK + log2(NK − 1)
= NKH2(1/NK)
In fact, the inequality is strict since equality would hold if and only if P(k | X,T) = bδX,T(k),
which is not the case as the support of P is finite and the support of bk is not. Therefore, we
have proven that:
H(K | X,T) < NKH2(1/NK).
Last, we notice that the function f(x) = x log2(x) is convex ( f
′(x) = log2(ex) is increasing).
Therefore, fore any x in the range ]0, 1[, we have:
f(x)− f(x− 1)
x− (x− 1) ≤ f
′(x) = log2(ex).
When we apply this for x = NK , we get:
NKH2(1/NK) = NK log2(NK)− (NK − 1) log2(NK − 1)
≤ log2(eNK).
Overall, this means that H(K | X,T) < log2(eNK) which proves the lemma.
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The lemma can be exploited by replacing H(K | X,T) by log2(eNK) in Subsection 3.2.2.
Therefore, instead of using Fano’s inequality, we directly have
I((K,T); (X,T)) ≥ H(K) +H(T)− log2(eNK),
leading to:
NK ≥ 2
−I(X;Y|T)+H(K)
e
. (3.20)
Once more, we can use Theorems (3.4) and (3.5) to estimate the mutual information.
For example, we suppose that we have a Gaussian channel, with SNR = 1/8 and q = 40
traces. We apply Equation (3.4) to obtain that I(X; T | T) ≤ q 12 log(1 + SNR). For a n = 8
bits leakage, the average number of tries is lower-bounded by:
NK ≥ −2
20∗log2(1+1/8)+8
e
≈ 2
4.6
e
≈ 8.9
This means that, for such a channel, it would take at least 8 tries to recover one byte of the
secret key with 40 traces. However, a secret key is made of 16 or even 32 bytes. Supposing
that the attacker has only 40 traces for each key-byte, after the attack, one would need at least
8.916 ≈ 1.6× 1015 tries in average to recover the entire key as there is no way to check only byte
per byte.
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4. APPLICATION
In this Chapter, we apply the results of Lemma 3.2 and Theorem 3.1 to practical cases. In
addition, we also discuss about the difficulty to estimate the mutual information I(X; Y | T)
and therefore, we provide numerical estimations based on the law of grat numbers. With these
estimations, we then notice that that they fit well with a parametric estimation.
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4.1 Numerical Approximations for Mutual Information
4.1.1 Numerical Estimation of I(X;Y | T)
Theorem 3.1 gave analytic bounds to the success rate. However, one may need to obtain a
precise value of I(X; Y|T) making the bound tighter. In this section, we propose numerical
tools to obtain an accurate value of the Mutual Information as a function of the number of
queries q. A full estimation of I(X; Y | T) by numerical integration becomes impossible for
q-dimensional distributions, and we have recourse to simplifying approximations of MI. Since
I(X; Y | T) = H(X | T)−H(X | Y,T)
= H(X | T)−H(X | Y)
we can estimate only the entropy H(X | T) because H(X | Y) = qH(X | Y ) is easily computable
with classical numerical tools.
One possible approximation is from the law of large numbers [23, Chapter 3]:
H(X | T) = lim
J→∞
− 1
J
∑
t∈Tq
J∑
j=1
P(t) log2 P(xj | t). (4.1)
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Unfortunately, such a computation is not tractable since it involves the sum over all balanced
vectors t, which represents q! possibilities. However, we can obtain a good approximation of
H(X | T) with only one vector t form the following
Lemma 4.1 (A Symmetry Property). Let t = (t1, . . . , tq) ∈ T and τ be a permutation in
{1, . . . , q}. Noting τ(t) = (tτ(1), . . . , tτ(q)), we have:
H(X | T = t) = H(X | T = τ(t)). (4.2)
Proof. See Appendix A.1.
As a consequence of the symmetry of Lemma 4.1, one needs only one balanced vector t to
estimate H(X | T). Therefore, by the law of large numbers,
H(X | T) ≈ lim
J→∞
− 1
J
J∑
j=1
log2 P(xj | t). (4.3)
This leads to Algorithm 1 to evaluate the entropy H(X | T).
Algorithm 1: Computation of the entropy using the law of large numbers.
input : A balanced vector t
An integer J
The probability distribution P(x | t)
output : An approximation of H(X | T)
1 Hxt ← 0 ;
2 Generate a secret key byte k∗ ;
3 for j ← 0 to J do
4 Generate the traces x with the model ;
5 Hxt ← Hxt − 1J log2 P(x | t);
6 end
7 return Hxt
When the leakage models are not perfectly known (e.g. template attacks), a possible way to
estimate Mutual Information is to approximate numerically the distributions. An example is
given in [35].
Other estimation methods can be used, depending on the distribution of the noise. As an
example, for Gaussian noise, we may consider Gaussian mixtures as discussed in [43].
Such numerical estimations are all the more accurate as J is taken large, which means that
they make take a tremendous amount of time to compute. Having I(X; T|T) as a function of q,
even numerically estimated, is very useful as we have the link between the success rate and the
minimum number of traces to reach such probability of success.
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4.1.2 Graphical Comparison
In order to visualize the difference between the two upper bounds given above, we have plotted
the mutual information I(X; Y | T = t), where t is a fixed balanced vector. The leakage model
chosen is given by the equation
y(k, ti) = Hw(Sbox(ti ⊕ k)) (i = 1, 2, . . . , q)
where Hw(·) is the Hamming weight (of the value written in binary), and Sbox(·) is the AES
substitution box[24]. We suppose that the zero-mean additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN)
has standard deviation σ = 4. This gives a signal-noise ratio SNR = 1/8.
Figure 4.1 shows the results on I(X; Y | T = t) obtained by Monte-Carlo simulation. We
notice that
• as expected in Subsection 3.2.3, the first upper bound (3.4) is linear in q;
• as expected in Subsection 3.2.4, the second upper bound (3.5) converges to H(K) = n = 8.
Figure 4.1: Comparison of the two upper bounds (3.4) and (3.5).
4.1.3 A Parametric Estimation of I(X;Y | T)
An estimation of I(X; Y | T) with a simple analytic expression can be obtained by a parametric
estimation of the mutual information. This study is based on an empirical model that fits
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correctly with I(X; Y | T). The information function I(q) = I(X; Y | T) can be approximated
by the error function such as
I(q) ≈ n. erf(q.α), (4.4)
where α is a constant, and erf the error function defined as:
erf(x) =
2√
pi
∫ x
0
e−t
2
dt.
In order to verify this hypothesis numerically, for a Hamming weight leakage with additive
Gaussian noise, we have plotted in Figure 4.2 the estimated parameter α for different values of
σ and different number of traces. The mutual information is estimated using the law of large
numbers and therefore, the parameter α is obtained by:
α =
erf−1(I(X; Y | T)/n)
q
Notice that for each value of σ, α is constant, which suggest that our empirical model fits the
MI well.
We can go even further and find the analytic value of α. Indeed, the first order derivative
of our model is nα 2√
pi
e−q
2
, therefore, the slope at the origin is nα 2√
pi
. We know that I(0) = 0
and I(1) = I(X;Y | T ) ≈ 12 log2(1 + SNR). This means that if we approximate ∂I(q)∂q (0) by
I(1)− I(0), we have:
1
2
log2(1 + SNR) = nα
2√
pi
, (4.5)
and therefore,
α =
√
pi
4n
log2(1 + SNR). (4.6)
Therefore, given the value of the SNR, one can predict the value of MI for additive Gaussian
noise. We can see that the approximation (4.4) holds very well for σ > 2. This happens for low
values of SNR as we encounter in practice when evaluating cryptographic devices. The number
of traces needed to reach a given success rate Ps is therefore lower-bounded by:
q ≥ 4n√
pi log2(1 + SNR)
erf−1
(n−H2(Ps)− (1− Ps) log2(2n − 1)
n
)
(4.7)
The interest of such bound is that it requires only the knowledge of an additive Gaussian noise
and the calculation of the SNR to be exploited and to therefore predict a tight bound on the
number of traces to reach a given success rate.
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Figure 4.2: Estimation of parameter α
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4.2 Application to Two Leakage Models
4.2.1 Example for Monobit Leakage
In this subsection, we consider a monobit leakage model:
f(ti ⊕ k) = LSB(Sbox(ti ⊕ k)) (i = 1, 2, . . . , q)
where Sbox is the AES substitution box and LSB is the least significant bit of a number. Figure 4.3
represents the success rate of a monobit leakage with additive Gaussian noise (standard deviation
σ = 4). The distinguisher used is the maximum likelihood distinguisher which is optimal [39].
The other curves are the bounds obtained with:
• a numerical estimation of I(X; Y | T) (using the law of large numbers, as described in
Section 4.1.1);
• MI’s upper bound (3.4);
• MI’s upper bound (3.5).
(a) σ = 1 (b) σ = 4
Figure 4.3: Success rates with monobit leakage.
The three bounds curves lie above the success rate curve as expected, the one obtained with a
numerical estimation of I(X; Y | T) being the tightest (since it gives the closest approximation
of the MI). The two other curves obtained with Equations (3.4) and (3.5) are not as tight but
very easy to calculate. Theses results show that the better approximation of the MI we have,
the closer we are from the optimal success rate.
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In Figure 4.4, we have plotted the error rate in a semilog scale, so that one can observe that
the curves obtained with Equations (3.4) and (3.5) actually cross each other. This shows that,
(a) σ = 1 (b) σ = 4
Figure 4.4: Error rate for a monobit leakage in a logarithmic scale
closer to Ps = 1 it is more interesting to choose the approximation of Equation (3.5), rather
than Equation (3.4).
Remark 4.1. For this leakage model, with a balanced vector t, one needs at least 8 traces to
obtain 256 different vectors y, since the function k 7→ y(k) is one-to-one.
4.2.2 Example for Hamming Weight Leakage
In practice, the AES algorithms compute SubBytes with 8 bits. The leakage function are
therefore different if we take this into account. Our conclusion is the same. We now consider
the leakage model based on the Hamming Weight:
yi = f(ti ⊕ k) = Hw(Sbox(ti ⊕ k)) (i = 1, 2, . . . , q)
where Sbox is the AES substitution box and Hw is the Hamming weight function. Figure 4.5 shows
the success rate compared with the three other types of estimation with an additive Gaussian
noise with two values of standard deviation σ. For this model, we recall that SNR = 2/σ2.
Once again, we notice that our bounds are above the optimal distinguisher and that the closest
estimation of the MI gives the tightest bound.
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(a) σ = 1 (b) σ = 4
Figure 4.5: Success rate for a Hamming weight leakage
4.2.3 Comparison with Duc’s Bound
In order to show that our bounds are tight, we have plotted the number of traces needed to
reach a success rate of 90% for a monobit leakage with additional Gaussian noise (same leakage
as Section 4.2.1). In this figure, we compare our bound with the ML distinguisher and the
success rate proposed by Duc et al. in [29].
To compute our bound, we only suppose that the noise is AWGN and we apply the parametric
estimation of the SNR, proposed in the previous subsection (cf. Equation (4.7)).
In Figure 4.6, we notice that our bound is always very close to the real success rate, calculated
for the best case for the attacker. This means that our predictions give a good idea of the
security of any device, and we recall that this prediction has been made with the only knowledge
of a Gaussian noise. Therefore, with very low assumptions and very few measurements (needed
to calculate the SNR), we are able to predict the number of traces to reach a given success rate
with a good approximation.
4.3 Practical Applications
In practice, the estimation of the SNR is therefore crucial to estimate the protection level of a
device. In this section, we propose an algorithm that extracts the SNR of a leakage. Then, in
order to compare our results with real world data sets, we apply our methods to that obtained
within the framework of the “DPA Contest” challenge.
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Figure 4.6: Comparison of our prediction with Duc’s bound
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4.3.1 The SNR estimation
In order to apply Theorem 3.1 or Equation 4.4 with the parametric estimation of the Mutual
Information, one shall estimate the SNR of the leakage. When the leakage is monovariate,
meaning that the attacker has at her disposal one share of the leakage, it is possible to estimate
the SNR on-the-fly. The SNR of the leakage can be written as follows:
SNR =
Var(Y )
Var(N)
=
Var(Y )
Var(X − Y )
=
Var(Y )
Var(X)−Var(Y ) .
We also notice that since X = Y + N , where the noise N is independent from the signal Y
(which depends only on the plain/cipher-text T ), we have Y = E[X | T ]. This means that the
SNR can be estimated with:
SNR =
Var(E[X | T ])
Var(X)−Var(E[X | T ]) . (4.8)
This equation is valid for algorithms such as AES, since the leakage model of AES does not
depend on anything else than the 8 bits of the plaintext T .
When the leakage is multivariate, it is possible to compute dimensionality reduction (c.f. [15,
Corollary 4]). In such case, a profiling phase is needed to estimate the noise covariance matrix.
Besides, other methods to estimate the SNR can be used such as Linear Discriminant Analysis
(LDA) [81].
4.3.2 A Real World Case: the DPA Contest
In order to compare our theoretical results with practical evaluations, we used the data set of
the DPA Contest v1 [84]. In the first version of this contest, the goal is to recover the 56-bit key
of the DES encrypting algorithm. The device is a Side-channel Attack Standard Evaluation
Board (SASEBO) developed by the Japan AIST / RCIS.
According to the data given in the DPA contest, the attacker has at her disposal a high
number of traces, each made up of 20003 samples. An example is given in Fig. 4.7. We will
consider here the first round of the algorithm (some attacks consider the last round but the
results are very similar).
For example, we have plotted in Fig. 4.8 the SNR of this leakage considering the first
substitution box. In this figure, we notice that the maximum value of the SNR is 0.144 but we
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Figure 4.7: One trace of DES leakage (from DPA contest v1 [84])
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Figure 4.8: SNR of the first Sbox for the first round of DES.
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Sbox # SNR Prediction for 99% CPA 99%
0 0.144 112 230
1 0.077 203 350
2 0.075 208 350
3 0.071 220 450
4 0.064 243 300
5 0.151 107 190
6 0.079 198 330
7 0.136 118 270
Table 4.1: SNR for each Sbox for the DPA contest
notice that other points of interest may be used.
We have computed a simple CPA on the first round of DES with this data set to recover
6 bits of key. Figure 4.9 shows the partial success rate for all the substitution boxes. This
success rate has been obtained with 100 experiments. We have plotted the CPA for the best
time sample (the one that maximizes the SNR) in the green curve and the CPA over all the
time samples (the blue curve). The red curves corresponds to the bound of Equation 4.7.
According to the figures of the table, without any pre-processing the attacker will need at
least 243 traces to recover the secret key with one sample and 138 traces with two samples. This
corresponds to the results obtained without pre-processing or Build-up Sub-keys.
However, in practice, other methods may help the attacker to increase the SNR of the leakage
such as BS-CPA [46] where the attacker takes into account one broken subkey to recover others.
For such method, the upper-bound is the best SNR i.e. 0.151 for one sample leading to 107
traces for key extraction.
4.4 Conclusion
In this chapter, we have linked two metrics used in the field of side-channel analysis: the
probability of success of an attack (also known as the success rate) and the mutual information
between the leaked traces and the secret key. With such links, designers will be given more
precise tools to secure their cryptographic chips. Our results are of interest to better understand
the different factors that impact the success rate of an attack. This is the first time that a study
gives universal tight bounds to the success rate, in the sense that these bounds are independent
of what the attacker may exploit with the measurements.
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(a) Sbox # 0 (b) Sbox # 1
(c) Sbox # 2 (d) Sbox # 3
Figure 4.9: Success rate for each DES Sbox
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(e) Sbox # 4 (f) Sbox # 5
(g) Sbox # 6 (h) Sbox # 7
Figure 4.8: Success rate for each DES Sbox
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This is therefore a great improvement for designers. Indeed, in practice they are not able to
know how their devices will be attacked in the future, but here, we allow them that to ensure
the minimal security of their device in any adversarial context.
In addition, the link that we have made with the notion of guessing entropy gives an idea of
how many attempts have to be made to recover the key after an attack.
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5. WHEN MONOBIT LEAKAGES ARE DEFINED WITH THE CONFUSION
COEFFICIENT
This chapter presents the work accepted at InsCrypt 2018 conference. The conference will
take place in Fuzhou, China http://xxhb.fjnu.edu.cn/inscrypt2018/.
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5.1 Introduction
Today’s ciphering algorithms such as AES are considered resistant to cryptanalysis. This means
that the best possible way to recover a 128 bit key is about as complex as to compute an
exhaustive search over the 2128 possibilities. With our current computational power, this is
not achievable within a reasonable amount of time. However, it is possible to use plaintexts,
ciphertexts, along with additional side information in order to recover the secret key of a
device. Indeed, the secret key may leak via side-channels, such as the time to compute the
algorithm, the power consumption of the device during the computation of the algorithm, or
the electro-magnetic radiations of the chip.
In order to secure chips from side-channel attacks, designers have to understand how these
work and what could be the future security breaches in the cryptographic algorithm as well as in
the hardware computation. A preliminary step is to identify how the secret keys leak and deduce
leakage models. Then, there are mathematical functions—called distinguishers—that take the
leakage as argument and return an estimation of the secret key. They come in many flavours1
1We cover in this chapter the following distinguishers: Difference of Means or DoM [45], Correlation Power
Analysis or CPA [11], Euclidean distance [39, §3], Kolmogorov-Smirnov Analysis or KSA [90], and Mutual
Information Analysis or MIA [34].
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Leakage model SNR
device acquisition
platform
crypto
algo
Figure 5.1: Illustration of the two parts of the side-channel analysis context (in red).
and have different figures of merit in different contexts. A given context not only involves the
cryptographic algorithm and the device through the leakage model, but also the side-channel
acquisition setup through the measurement characterized by its signal-to-noise ratio (SNR). This
is illustrated in Fig. 5.1 borrowed from Heuser et al. [39] (with our annotations in red).
In practice one may encounter monobit leakages, meaning that the output of the leakage
model can only take two values. In this case, as we shall see, the mathematical computations turn
to be simpler and information theoretic tools may be used to precisely describe the link between
the leakage model and the real-world leaking traces. From another perspective, considering
monobit leakages can also be seen as an “abstraction” trick meant to intentionally ignore the
complex effect of the way the device leaks, thereby keeping only the contribution from the
cryptographic algorithm in the leakage model.
A related question is how the choice of the substitution box in the cryptographic algorithm
may “help” the attacker. The standard AES substitution box was designed to be very secure
against linear and differential cryptanalysis [25]. On the contrary, under side-channel analysis,
the substitution box may be helpful for the attacker, especially for monobit leakages as shown
below.
Related Work. Distinguishers were often studied empirically, yet such an approach does not
allow for generalizations to other contexts and measurement campaigns. A theoretical approach
consists in analyzing the formal expressions of the distinguishers as mathematical functions.
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Fei et al. have shown that distinguishers such as DoM and CPA can be expressed in terms
of a confusion coefficient [32]. They gave the impetus to extend this formal analysis to other
types of distinguishers. In 2014, Heuser et al. [38] relate KSA to the confusion coefficient, and
also noticed that the confusion coefficient can be related to the resistance of a substitution box
against differential cryptanalysis.
Whitnall and Oswald [89] have proposed the relative distinguishing margin metric to compare
distinguishers. However, it has been shown [73] that this metric may not be relevant in all
contexts. Another way to compare distinguishers is to contrast how their success rate (SR)
in key recovery depends on the number q of side-channel traces. However, even if works such
as [32] and [48] were able to provide mathematically models for the SR, the comparison between
different distinguishers has never been actually carried out based on such frameworks. We shall
leverage instead on the so-called success exponent (SE) [36] which allows to compare the SR of
various distinguishers based on only one exponent parameter.
Our Contributions. In this chapter we consolidate the knowledge on side-channel attacks
exploiting monobit leakages. We provide a rigorous proof that any distinguisher acting on
monobit leakages depends on only two parameters: the confusion coefficient and the standard
deviation of the noise. Some distinguishers, namely DoM, CPA and KSA, have already been
expressed as a function of those two parameters [32, 38]. In this chapter, we derive this expression
for MIA and we obtain a simple analytic function when the non zero values of the confusion
coefficient are near 1/2 (which is the case of leakages occurring at cryptographically strong
substitution boxes [18]).
Success exponents allow to characterize the efficiency (in terms of number of traces) of
distinguishers to recover the key. We derive the success exponent of these distinguishers in
terms of the confusion coefficient and the standard deviation of the noise. These closed-form
expressions of the success exponent enable the comparison of distinguishers based only on these
two parameters. The flow chart of Fig. 5.2 situates our contributions in relation to the current
state of the art.
Organization. The paper is organized as follows. In Section 5.2, we recall the main definitions.
In Section 5.3, we mathematically unify all the distinguishers and we show that they are only
functions of two parameters. In Section 5.4, we compare the distinguishers thanks to the success
exponent. Section 8.3 concludes. Appendices provide proofs for technical lemmas.
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Distinguishers:
DoM [45],
CPA [11],
Euclidean
distance
[39, §3],
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MIA [34]
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SNR. See
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q 7→ SR(q)
[31, 48, 74]
Compare
SR using
SE. See
Table 5.2
Figure 5.2: The state of the art in relation to our contributions (in yellow boxes—see also
Tables 5.1 and 5.2 below).
Notations. Throughout this chapter, we use calligraphic letters to denote sets and lower-case
letters for elements in this set (e.g. x ∈ X). Capital letters denote random variables. For
example, X is a random variable taking values in X and x ∈ X is a realization of X. The
probability that X is x is noted P(X = x) or simply P(x) when there is no ambiguity. The
expectation of a random variable is noted E[X] and its variance Var(X). The differential entropy
h(X) of a random variable X following distribution p(x) is defined as
h(X) = −
∫
R
p(x) log2 p(x) dx. (5.1)
The mutual information between two random variables X and Y is defined as
I(X;Y ) = h(X)− h(X|Y ) = E
[
log2
P(X,Y )
P(X)P(Y )
]
. (5.2)
5.2 Modelization and Definitions
5.2.1 The Leakage Model
In order to compare the different distinguishers for monobit leakages, we need a leakage model
upon which our computations will be based. A plaintext t meets the secret key k∗ through
a leakage function f(t, k∗). The resulting variable y(k∗) is called the sensitive variable. The
dependence in the plaintext t will be omitted to make equations easier to read when there is no
ambiguity.
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The attacker measures a noisy version of y(k∗) called trace and denoted by x. When the
key is unknown, the attacker computes a sensitive variable with a key hypothesis k, that is,
y(k) = f(t, k). Thus our model takes the form{
y(k) = f(t, k)
x = y(k∗) + n
(5.3)
where n is an independent measurement noise.
As we consider monobit leakages, we suppose that y(k) can take only two values. In practice,
t (resp. k) are subsets of the full plaintext (resp. key). Typically, in the case of AES where
attacks can be conducted using a divide-and-conquer approach on a per substitution box basis,
t and k are 8-bit works (i.e., bytes).
The above leakage model can also be written using random variables. Let T the random
variable for the plaintext, Y (k) for the sensitive variable, X for the measurement, and N for the
Gaussian noise. We have: {
Y (k) = f(T, k)
X = Y (k∗) +N.
(5.4)
In a view to simplify further mathematical computations, we suppose that the leakage random
variable is reduced, that is, centered (E[Y (k)] = 0 for all k) and of unit variance (E[Y (k)2] = 1
for all k). The noise is also assumed Gaussian of zero mean and its standard deviation is noted
σ > 0. Moreover, we assume that for any key hypothesis the sensitive variable is balanced, that
is, P(y(k)) = 12 . Since Y (k) is a binary random variable, we necessarily have that Y (k) ∈ {±1}
in our model, and consequently the signal-to-noise ratio equals SNR = 1/σ2.
Last, we suppose that the attacker has at his disposal a number of q traces x1, . . . , xq obtained
from leaking sensitive variables y1(k
∗), . . . , yq(k∗) under additive noise n1, . . . , nq.
5.2.2 The Confusion Coefficient
In the side-channel context, the confusion coefficient was defined by Fei et al. as the probability
that two sensitive variables arising from two different key hypotheses are different [32, Section 3.1].
Mathematically, the confusion coefficient is written as
κ(k, k∗) = P(Y (k) 6= Y (k∗)). (5.5)
As the secret key k∗ is constant and understood from the context, we can write κ(k, k∗) = κ(k).
Notice that in practical situations, the EIS (Equal Images under different Subkeys [77, Def. 2])
assumption holds, therefore κ is actually a function of the key bitwise XOR difference k ⊕ k∗.
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Figure 5.3 illustrates the confusion coefficient for a monobit leakage Y (k) = SubBytes(T ⊕
k) mod 2, where SubBytes is the AES substitution box (application F82 → F82) and ⊕ is the
bitwise exclusive or. We notice that except for k = k∗ (here taken = 178), the confusion
Figure 5.3: Confusion Coefficient for the AES SubBytes
coefficient for the AES SubBytes is close to 1/2. This results from the fact the AES SubBytes has
been designed to be resistant against differential cryptanalysis. Specifically, Heuser et al. [38,
Proposition 6] noticed that a “good” substitution box leads to confusion coefficients near 1/2.
The original definition of the confusion coefficient [32] considers only monobit leakages. An
extension for any type of leakage was proposed in [36] where κ(k) is defined by
κ(k) = E
[(Y (k∗)− Y (k)
2
)2]
. (5.6)
Equation (5.5) can be easily recovered from this more general expression by noting that when
Y (k) and Y (k∗) ∈ {±1}, (Y (k∗)−Y (k)2 )2 is 0 or 1 according to whether Y (k) = Y (k∗) or
Y (k) 6= Y (k∗).
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5.2.3 Distinguishers
Distinguishers aim at recovering the secret key k∗ from the traces and the model. For every key
k, the attacker computes the associated distinguisher. The key hypothesis that gives the highest
value of the distinguisher is the estimated key. The attack is successful if the estimated key is
equal to the secret key.
For every key hypothesis k, a distinguisher is noted D̂(k) and the estimated key is k̂ =
arg maxk D̂(k). Five classical distinguishers are:
• Difference of Means (DoM) [32], also known as the Differential Power Analysis (DPA) [45]
where the attacker computes
D̂(k) =
∑
i|yi(k)=+1 xi∑
i|yi(k)=+1
−
∑
i|yi(k)=−1 xi∑
i|yi(k)=−1
. (5.7)
• Correlation Power Analysis (CPA) [11] where the attacker computes the absolute value of
the Pearson coefficient
D̂(k) =
∣∣∣∣ 1q
∑q
i=1 xiyi(k)− 1q
∑q
i=1 xi · 1q
∑q
i=1 yi(k)√
Var(X)Var(Yi(k))
∣∣∣∣. (5.8)
Notice that Var(Yi(k)) do not depend on the index i, since repeated measurements are
i.i.d.
• Euclidean distance, which corresponds to the Maximum Likelihood (ML) attack under the
Gaussian noise hypothesis, where the attacker actually computes the negative Euclidean
distance between the model and the trace
D̂(k) = −1
q
q∑
i=1
(xi − yi(k))2. (5.9)
Maximizing the value of the distinguisher amounts to minimizing the Euclidean distance.
According to [39], as the noise is Gaussian and additive, the Euclidean distance is the
optimal distinguishing rule (ML rule) that maximizes the success probability.
• Kolmogorov-Smirnov Analysis (KSA) [90] where the traces are used to build an estimation
of the cumulative density function F̂ (x), and the distinguisher is
D̂(k) = −EY (k)
[‖F̂ (x|Y (k))− F̂ (x)‖∞] (5.10)
where the infinite norm is defined as ‖F̂ (x)‖∞ = supx |F̂ (x)|. Maximizing the value of the
distinguisher amounts to minimizing the expected infinite norm.
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• Mutual Information Analysis (MIA) [34] where the attacker computes the mutual informa-
tion between the traces and each model. The traces are used to build an estimation of the
joint distribution of X and Y (k), denoted by p̂(X,Y (k)), and with this estimation, we
calculate the mutual information
D̂(k) =
∑
x,y(k)
p̂(x, y(k)) log2
p̂(x, y(k))
p̂(x) · p̂(y(k)) . (5.11)
Given the available data, the attacker computes the distinguisher as a function of x1, . . . , xq
and y1(k), . . . , yq(k). To emphasize the dependence on the data, we may write D̂(k) =
D̂(X1, . . . , Xq, Y1(k), . . . , Yq(k)). As these traces are realizations of random variables, we may
also consider D̂(k) as a random variable which is a function of X1, . . . , Xq and Y1(k), . . . , Yq(k),
with expectation E[D̂(k)] and a variance Var(D̂(k)).
When the number of queries q tends to infinity, we assume that the distinguisher converges
in the mean-squared sense:
Definition 5.1 (Theoretical Distinguisher [36]). The theoretical value of the distinguisher is
defined as the limit in the mean square sense when q →∞ of the distinguisher. The notation
for the theoretical distinguisher is D(k), which is therefore implicitly defined as:
E[(D̂(k)−D(k))2] −→ 0 as q →∞. (5.12)
Put differently, D̂(k) can be seen as an estimator of D(k). An illustration of theoretical
distinguishers is provided in the lower right graph of Figure 5.4. It is easily seen that as q → +∞
the distinguishers presented previously have the following theoretical distinguishers:
• For DoM, the theoretical distinguisher is
D(k) = E[XY (k)]. (5.13)
• For CPA, the theoretical distinguisher is
D(k) =
∣∣E[XY (k)]− E[X]E[Y (k)]∣∣
1 + σ2
. (5.14)
• For Euclidean distance (ML) distinguisher, we have:
D(k) = −E[(X − Y (k))2]. (5.15)
• For KSA, we have:
D(k) = EY (k)
[‖F (x|Y (k))− F (x)‖∞]. (5.16)
• For MIA, it is the mutual information
D(k) = I(X;Y (k)). (5.17)
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Target: AES
Signal: 1 unit
Noise: σ = 2
Distinguisher: DoM
view from here
view from here
(at number of traces = 1000)
Figure 5.4: Illustration of a theoretical distinguisher
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5.3 Theoretical Expressions for Distinguishers
In this section, we show that all distinguishers for monobit leakages are functions of only two
parameters: the confusion coefficient κ(k) and the SNR = 1/σ2. This is confirmed by the
closed-form expressions for classical distinguishers. In particular we derive the one corresponding
to MIA.
5.3.1 A Communication Channel Between Y (k) and Y (k∗)
To understand the link between any sensitive variable Y (k) and the leaking sensitive variable
Y (k∗), consider the following information-theoretic communication channel between these two
variables described in Fig. 5.5. This communication channel is simply a theoretical construction
that helps explain the link between Y (k) and Y (k∗), which are both binary and equiprobable
random variables taking their values in {±1}. The parameters p and p′ are the transition
probabilities defined as p = P(Y (k∗) = +1|Y (k) = −1) and p′ = P(Y (k∗) = −1|Y (k) = +1).
−1
1− p −1
+1
1− p′
+1
p
p′
Y (k) Y (k∗)
Figure 5.5: Abstract communication channel between Y (k) and Y (k∗)
Lemma 5.1. The communication channel defined in Fig. 5.5 is a binary symmetric channel
(BSC) with transition probability equal to the confusion coefficient κ(k).
Proof. To prove that the channel is symmetric, we show that both transition probabilities
coincide: p = p′. In fact, from Fig. 5.5, 12 = P(Y (k
∗) = 1) = pP(Y (k) = −1) + (1− p′)P(Y (k) =
1) = 12 (p+ 1− p′) hence p = p′. Now the confusion coefficient κ(k) = P(Y (k) 6= Y (k∗)) can be
expanded as
κ(k) = 12
(
P(Y (k) 6= Y (k∗)|Y (k) = 1) + P(Y (k) 6= Y (k∗)|Y (k) = −1)) (5.18)
= 12
(
P(Y (k∗) = −1|Y (k) = 1) + P(Y (k∗) = 1|Y (k) = −1)) (5.19)
= 12
(
p+ p′
)
= p = p′. (5.20)
This proves that the BSC has transition probability equal to κ(k).
According to a well-known information theoretic result [23, p. 187], the Shannon’s capacity
in bits per bit of this channel is
C = 1−H2(κ(k)), (5.21)
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where H2(x) is the binary entropy function defined by
H2(x) = x log2
( 1
x
)
+ (1− x) log2
( 1
1− x
)
. (5.22)
This is represented in Fig. 5.6 as a function of κ(k). Interestingly, the value κ(k) = 1/2 corresponds
to null capacity while the capacity is evidently 1 bit per bit for κ(k∗) = 0, since in this case the
above communication channel reduces to the identity.
Figure 5.6: Representation of the channel capacity according to κ(k)
5.3.2 A General Result
We can now explain why all distinguishers for monobit leakages depend only on the two
parameters κ(k) and SNR = σ−2.
Theorem 5.1. Any theoretical distinguisher D(k) for a binary leakage y can be expressed as a
function of κ(k) and σ.
Proof. Any theoretical distinguisher is defined in terms of the joint probability distribution of
X and Y (k), noted p(x, y(k)). Now for any x ∈ R and y(k) = ±1,
p(x, y(k)) = P(y(k)) p(x | y(k)) (5.23)
=
1
2
p(y(k∗) + n | y(k)) (5.24)
=
1
2
∑
y(k∗)
p(y(k∗) + n | y(k), y(k∗)) P(y(k∗) | y(k)) (5.25)
80
5.3 Theoretical Expressions for Distinguishers
where P(y(k∗) | y(k)) is the transition probability of the channel defined in Fig. 5.5. There are
two possibilities. Either y(k) = y(k∗), and in this case P(y(k∗)|y(k)) = 1− κ(k), or y(k) 6= y(k∗)
and in this case P(y(k∗)|y(k)) = κ(k). The sum over y(k∗) has two terms and both cases are
represented. Moreover, the Gaussian noise is independent from every other random variable.
Therefore, we have two possibilities for the joint probability:
p(x, y(k)) =

1
2
(
ϕ( 1+nσ )κ(k) + ϕ(
−1+n
σ )(1− κ(k))
)
1
2
(
ϕ(−1+nσ )κ(k) + ϕ(
1+n
σ )(1− κ(k))
) (5.26)
where ϕ(x) is the probability density function of a standard normal random variable. As the
noise is centered and Gaussian, the only parameter that characterizes ϕ is its standard deviation
σ. Therefore, a joint distribution of a monobit leakage is fully characterized by σ and κ(k).
This proves that the knowledge of the confusion coefficient and the noise power are essential
to predict the performances of the side-channel attacks for monobit leakages.
5.3.3 Classical Distinguishers as Functions of κ(k) and σ2
To highlight the result of section 5.3.2, we compute the classical distinguishers according to the
confusion coefficient and the noise power. As we mentioned in the introduction, some of them
have already been expressed according to these variables: we recall these results in Table 5.1
with references to the articles where the expression of the distinguisher in terms of κ(k) is proven.
These expressions confirm the strong link between confusion coefficient (recall Fig. 5.3) and the
values of the theoretical distinguisher (for all key hypotheses, recall Fig. 5.4).
Distinguisher
Original Theoretical expression
Reference
paper with κ(k)
DoM [45] D(k) = 2(1/2− κ(k)) [52]
CPA [11] D(k) = 2 |
1/2−κ(k)|√
1+σ2
[52]
Euclidean distance [39, §3] Lemma 5.2 This chapter
KSA [90] D(k) = erf
(
1
2σ2
)
|1/2− κ(k)| [38]
MIA [34] Lemma 5.3 This chapter
Table 5.1: Summary of classical distinguishers. Among all the classical theoretical distinguishers,
we notice that the expression of the theoretical value of DoM with κ(k) does not depend on σ.
The new results are given by the following lemmas.
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Lemma 5.2. For monobit leakages, the Euclidean distance distinguisher can be expressed as:
D(k) = 4(1/2− κ(k))− (σ2 + 2). (5.27)
Proof. We have D(k) = −E[(X−Y (k))2] = −E[(Y (k∗)−Y (k)+N)2] = −E[(Y (k∗)−Y (k))2]−
σ2 since the noise is independent from Y (k∗)− Y (k). Then by (5.6), D(k) = −4κ(k)− σ2 =
4(1/2− κ(k))− 2− σ2 where we have stressed the dependence in 1/2− κ(k) as in Table 5.1.
Lemma 5.3. For monobit leakages, when κ(k) ≈ 1/2 for k 6= k∗, the MIA distinguisher can be
expressed at first order as:
D(k) = 2 log2(e)(κ(k)− 1/2)2g(σ) (5.28)
where
g(σ) =
1
2
E
[
tanh2
(Z
σ
+
1
σ2
)
+ tanh2
(Z
σ
− 1
σ2
)]
(5.29)
and Z ∼ N(0, 1). The function g satisfies
lim
σ→0
g(σ) = 1 and lim
σ→∞σ
2 × g(σ) = 1. (5.30)
Proof. See Appendix B.1.
Figure 5.7 plots the shape of g(σ) which tends to 1 when σ → 0 and is equivalent to 1σ2
when σ →∞.
When k = k∗ the MIA distinguisher also has a simple expression since it reduces to the
known expression of the channel capacity for channels with binary input and additive Gaussian
noise [9, p. 274]:
D(k∗) =
1
σ2
−
∫
R
e−
1
2y
2
2pi
log2 cosh(
1
σ2
− y
σ2
)dy. (5.31)
Remark 5.1. With respect to their theoretical distinguishers, DoM is in bijection with the
Euclidean distance, and CPA is in bijection with KSA. Indeed, the Euclidean distance is
D(k) = 4(1/2− κ(k))− 2− σ2 and σ is independent from the choice of the key. Therefore, there
is a bijection between 4(1/2− κ(k))− 2− σ2 and 2(1/2− κ(k)) which is the theoretical value of
DoM. Regarding CPA and KSA, both distinguishers are functions of |1/2− κ(k)|.
We also notice that MIA is in bijection with CPA (and therefore KSA). Indeed, according to
the value of MIA with κ(k), the distinguisher is a function of (1/2− κ(k))2 which is in bijection
with |1/2−κ(k)| = √(1/2− κ(k))2. This means that for monobit leakages, any attack that works
with one of these distinguishers will also work with another, and vice versa.
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Figure 5.7: Representation of g(σ)
5.4 Comparing Distinguishers with the Success Exponent
5.4.1 Mathematical Expression of SE
In the previous section, we have computed the theoretical values of the classical distinguishers in
terms of κ(k) and σ. Now, we wish to compare their success rate. As we mentioned Section 5.2.3,
the attacker computes the estimated distinguisher D̂(k) to recover the secret key. This is the
main reason why all distinguishers do not perform equally in key recovery; indeed, they do not
converge at the same speed towards their theoretical value.
In order to compare them, we have computed their success exponent, a metric proposed by
Guilley et al. in [36] that evaluates how fast the success rate of a distinguisher converges to
100%. With a Gaussian assumption, they prove that the success rate can be modeled as
SR = 1− exp(−q × SE), (5.32)
where q is the number of traces and SE ∈ R+ is the so-called success exponent. Therefore, the
greater the success exponent is, the faster the convergence of the success rate.
We present the theoretical values of the success exponent for the different distinguishers in
Table 5.2. As a direct consequence of Theorem 5.1, all of these success exponents are function
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Distinguisher
Closed form SE
Reference
Numerical value
with κ(k) and σ for AES SubBytes
DoM
1
2
min
k 6=k∗
κ(k)
1 + σ2 − κ(k) [36, Proposition 4] 3.39× 10
−3
CPA Lemma 5.4 This chapter 3.39× 10−3
Euclidean distance
1
2
min
k 6=k∗
κ(k)
1 + σ2 − κ(k) [36, Proposition 5] 3.39× 10
−3
KSA Lemma 5.5 This chapter 1.08× 10−3
MIA Lemma 5.6 [36, Proposition 6] 8.52× 10−5
Table 5.2: Success exponents for the classical distinguishers. The numerical values of SE are
obtained for AES SubBytes least significant bit leakage model and noise of standard deviation
σ = 4. Notice that in the monobit case, Euclidean distance and DoM have strictly the same success
rate because −(X − Y (k))2 = −X2 + 2XY (k)− 1, and X2 is independent of the choice of the key.
of κ(k) and σ. Therefore, if the attacker only knows the type of substitution box that is used
and the SNR of the leakage, he can predict how fast he recovers the secret key.
Lemma 5.4 (Success exponent of CPA). The success exponent of CPA1 is:
SE =
1
2
min
k 6=k∗
1− 2|1/2− κ(k)|
1 + 2σ2 + 2|1/2− κ(k)| . (5.33)
Proof. See Appendix B.2.
Lemma 5.5 (Success exponent of KSA). Assuming that the distributions are estimated with
the kernel method using Heaviside step function, the success exponent of KSA is
SE =
1
2
min
k 6=k∗
erf
(
1√
2σ
)2
(1/2− |1/2− κ(k)|)
2− erf( 1√
2σ
)2
(1/2− |1/2− κ(k)|)
. (5.34)
Proof. See Appendix B.3.
Lemma 5.6 (Success exponent of MIA). When σ  1, the success exponent for an MIA
computed with histograms is
SE =
4 log2(e)
2
σ4
min
k 6=k∗
κ(k)2(1− κ(k))2. (5.35)
Proof. See Appendix B.4.
In order to validate our theoretical results, we have simulated attacks within the monobit
model presented in Sec. 5.2. The success rates of these attacks are presented in Fig. 5.8. In
1In [36], CPA is treated as a distinguisher, but without the absolute values. Those remove false positives
which occur in monobit leakages when there are anti-correlations. Our value of the success exponent is, therefore,
different from theirs.
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this figure, we notice that, as expected, the Euclidean distance (ML) is the best distinguisher,
closely followed by CPA. Both have similar same success rate. The small difference is due to the
use the the absolute values in the distinguishing function of CPA (see discussion in Remark 9
of [39]). The KSA is requiring a bit less than the double of traces, compared to Euclidean
distance, DoM and CPA. The MIA performs really bad compared to the other distinguishers.
Error bars represent the inaccuracy while estimating the SR (here, we ran 100 simulations).
Figure 5.8: Success rate for classical distinguishers (σ = 4)
These simulations are therefore in complete coherence with the theoretical results of Table 5.2.
Indeed, the order of the distinguishers is the same w.r.t. the success rate and w.r.t. the success
exponent. In addition, according to the definition of the success exponent SE in (5.32), the
number of traces q to reach a given success rate (e.g., SR = 80%) is proportional to the inverse
of SE. This quantitative law is satisfied in the simulation of Fig. 5.8. For an accurate validation,
we have plotted in Fig. 5.9 the success exponent vs the success rate, and indeed points are
aligned.
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Figure 5.9: Success rate versus success exponent
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5.4.2 Comparison of Distinguishers Based on their Success Exponent
With the theoretical expressions of the Success Exponent, it is now possible to rank distinguishers
for a given value of σ and a specific set of confusion coefficients (κ(k))k 6=k∗ .
We first show that for all of the distinguishers presented in Table 5.2, the key that minimizes
the expression of the success exponent is either the one that minimizes κ(k) or the one that
maximizes κ(k) (for k 6= k∗). Indeed, there are only two values of κ(k), k 6= k∗, which are
relevant for the comparison of distinguishers presented in Table 5.2.
Lemma 5.7. For all value of σ, the value of k 6= k∗ which minimizes the formal expressions of
monobit distinguishers is either
kmin = argmin
k 6=k∗
κ(k) (nearest rival)
or
kmax = argmax
k 6=k∗
κ(k) (furthest rival).
Proof. For each distinguisher, let us replace κ(k) by a real-valued variable x ∈ [0, 1] in the
formal expression of the theoretical distinguishers given in the second column of Tab. 5.2. If the
expression which is a function of x is increasing, then its minimum value over {κ(k), k 6= k∗} ⊂
[0, 1] is κmin = κ(kmin). Symmetrically, if the function of x is decreasing, than its minimum
value over {κ(k), k 6= k∗} ⊂ [0, 1] is κmax = κ(kmax). The argument of the minimum operator is
always either strictly increasing or decreasing with x. Indeed, we take the derivative of each
function and we notice that it is always positive for any value of x ∈ [0, 1]:
• For DoM and Euclidean distance: ∂∂x 12 x1+σ2−x = 12 1+σ
2
(1+σ2−x)2 > 0.
• For CPA, we distinguish to cases. Either, the minimum is reached for a value k0 such that
(1/2− κ(k0)) is greater than 0, and in this case, the value of the success exponent is equal
to the Success Exponent of DoM (and thus k0 = κmin), or (1/2− κ(k0)) is lower than 0.
In this last case, the value of the Success Exponent is 12
1−κ(k)
σ2+κ(k) . The derivative of this
function is ∂∂x
1
2
1−x
σ2+x = − σ
2+1
(σ2+x)2 < 0. This means that the higher x is, the smaller the
success exponent is. Hence, k0 = κmax.
• For KSA, the computation is similar to the case of CPA. Either the value which minimizes
the expression in Lemma 5.5 is k0, such that (1/2 − κ(k0)) is greater than 0, in which
case the Success Exponent is equal to
erf
(
1√
2σ
)2
2
κ(k0)
2−erf
(
1√
2σ
)2
κ(k0)
, or (1/2− κ(k0)) is nega-
tive, in which case the Success Exponent is equal to
erf
(
1√
2σ
)2
2
1−κ(k0)
2−erf
(
1√
2σ
)2
(1−κ(k0))
. Now,
∂
∂x
erf
(
1√
2σ
)2
2
x
2−erf
(
1√
2σ
)2
x
=
erf
(
1√
2σ
)2
(2−x)2 > 0, hence κ(k0) = κmin, and
∂
∂x
erf
(
1√
2σ
)2
2
1−x
2−erf
(
1√
2σ
)2
(1−x)
=
− erf
(
1√
2σ
)2
(2−x)2 < 0, hence κ(k0) = κmax.
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• For MIA, ∂∂xx2(1−x)2 = 4x(1−x)( 12 −x), which has the sign of 12 −x. As 0 ≤ x ≤ 1, the
Success Exponent for MIA is thus increasing on [0, 1/2] and decreasing on [1/2, 1]. Thus, the
minimum value of the Success Exponent is either occurring for κmin (if κmin < 1− κmax)
or for κmax.
This means that the wrong key k that determines the minimum value in the closed form of
the Success Exponent in the expressions from Tab. 5.2:
• (regarding DoM and Euclidean distance): is also the one which happens to minimize κ(k),
k 6= k∗, i.e., the nearest rival of the correct key k∗;
• (regarding CPA, KSA and MIA): is also the one which corresponds to the nearest confusion
coefficient from its bounds (either 0 or 1).
Lemma 5.7 validates the role of Relative Distinguishing Margin (RDM [89]) metric while
comparing distinguishers. Indeed, the distinguishers DoM and Euclidean distance (resp. CPA,
and at first order, KSA and MIA) only consider the nearest rivals (resp. nearest or furthest) in
terms of confusion coefficient. This is general property of the distinguisher, since it does not
depend on the noise variance σ2.
However, we will highlight other factors that determine the efficiency in terms of “data-
complexity” of the classical distinguishers. To illustrate Lemma 5.7, we have reported in
Table 5.3 the 32 κmin and κmax for the 32 possible fanout bits of Data Encryption Standard
(DES) substitution boxes (sboxes). These values correspond to the 8 sboxes in DES multiplied
by the 4 bits of the output of the LUT. In this table, we notice that each sbox has a particular
behaviour. The value which determines the success exponent represented with a grey background
color. It is interesting to see that CPA, KSA and MIA are actually limited by κmax most of the
time (i.e., 1− κmax < κmin, for about 89% of the bits, excluding ties).
Remark 5.2. It was previously unnoticed that, in the case of DES, distinguishers with “absolute
values”, such as CPA, were better than without the absolute values.
Regarding AES, we notice that for the AES SubBytes function, the values of κmin and κmax
are always the same regardless to the leaking bit. Moreover, we also notice that κmin = 1−κmax.
Indeed, for all output bits of SubBytes, we have:
• κmin = 0.4375
• κmax = 0.5625.
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Element κmin κmax
Bit 1 – Sbox 1 0.2500 0.7500
Bit 2 – Sbox 1 0.1875 0.7500
Bit 3 – Sbox 1 0.3125 0.6875
Bit 4 – Sbox 1 0.2500 0.7500
Bit 1 – Sbox 2 0.2500 0.8125
Bit 2 – Sbox 2 0.3125 0.7500
Bit 3 – Sbox 2 0.1875 0.9375
Bit 4 – Sbox 2 0.2500 0.8125
Bit 1 – Sbox 3 0.2500 0.8750
Bit 2 – Sbox 3 0.3125 0.7500
Bit 3 – Sbox 3 0.2500 0.8750
Bit 4 – Sbox 3 0.2500 0.8125
Bit 1 – Sbox 4 0.3125 0.6875
Bit 2 – Sbox 4 0.3125 0.6875
Bit 3 – Sbox 4 0.3125 0.6875
Bit 4 – Sbox 4 0.3125 0.6875
Bit 1 – Sbox 5 0.3750 0.6875
Bit 2 – Sbox 5 0.3125 0.7500
Bit 3 – Sbox 5 0.3125 0.8125
Bit 4 – Sbox 5 0.2500 0.7500
Bit 1 – Sbox 6 0.2500 0.8125
Bit 2 – Sbox 6 0.3125 0.8125
Bit 3 – Sbox 6 0.2500 0.7500
Bit 4 – Sbox 6 0.1250 0.7500
Bit 1 – Sbox 7 0.2500 0.8750
Bit 2 – Sbox 7 0.2500 0.7500
Bit 3 – Sbox 7 0.1875 0.8750
Bit 4 – Sbox 7 0.2500 0.7500
Bit 1 – Sbox 8 0.3125 0.8125
Bit 2 – Sbox 8 0.2500 0.8125
Bit 3 – Sbox 8 0.2500 0.8125
Bit 4 – Sbox 8 0.2500 0.7500
Table 5.3: Numerical values of κmin and κmax for DES
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Lemma 5.8 (CPA correlating positively or negatively). The CPA correlates negatively (i.e.,
|1/2 − κ(k)| is minimum for k 6= k∗ when 1/2 − κ is positive) when κmin < 1 − κmax. And
vice-versa.
Proof. It is easy to check that
1
2
κmin
1 + σ2 − κmin <
1
2
1− κmax
σ2 + κmax
⇐⇒ κmin(σ2 + κmax) < (1 + σ2 − κmin)(1− κmax)
⇐⇒ κmin < 1− κmax.
Lemma 5.9 (KSA expression of SE). The expression of the Success Exponent for KSA (for
large values of σ) is:
erf
(
1√
2σ
)2
2
κmin
2−erf
(
1√
2σ
)2
κmin
if κmin < 1− κmax,
erf
(
1√
2σ
)2
2
1−κmax
2−erf
(
1√
2σ
)2
(1−κmax)
if κmin > 1− κmax.
Proof. It is a direct consequence of the fact the function x ∈ [0, 1] 7→ erf
(
1√
2σ
)2
2
x
2−erf
(
1√
2σ
)2
x
is
increasing (recall Lemma 5.7).
Lemma 5.10 (MIA expression of SE). The expression of the Success Exponent for MIA (for
large values of σ) is:{
4 log2(e)
2
σ4 κ
2
min(1− κmin)2 if κmin < 1− κmax,
4 log2(e)
2
σ4 κ
2
max(1− κmax)2 if κmin > 1− κmax.
Proof. We have:
4 log2(e)
2
σ4
κ2min(1− κmin)2 <
4 log2(e)
2
σ4
κ2max(1− κmax)2 ⇐⇒ κmin(1− κmin) < κmax(1− κmax)
⇐⇒ (κmax − κmin) [κmax + κmin − 1] < 0
⇐⇒ κmin < 1− κmax.
Corollary 5.1 (Revised expressions of the Success Expoennt for the 5 distinguishers). With
κmin and κmax defined in Lemma 5.7, the success exponents of the 5 distinguishers are written in
Table 5.4. For CPA, KSA and MIA, there are two expressions depending whether κmin ≶ κmax.
Now, we can proceed to compare distinguishers:
Proposition 5.1 (DoM is always better than CPA). For any value of σ, the success exponent
of DoM is always greater than the success exponent of CPA.
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Distinguisher
Condition
κmin < 1− κmax κmin > 1− κmax
DoM 12
κmin
1+σ2−κmin
CPA 12
κmin
1+σ2−κmin
1
2
1−κmax
σ2+κmax
Euclidean distance 12
κmin
1+σ2−κmin
KSA 12
erf
(
1√
2σ
)2
κmin
2−erf
(
1√
2σ
)2
κmin
1
2
erf
(
1√
2σ
)2
(1−κmax)
2−erf
(
1√
2σ
)2
(1−κmax)
MIA 4 log2(e)
2
σ4 κ
2
min(1− κmin)2 4 log2(e)
2
σ4 κ
2
max(1− κmax)2
Table 5.4: Expression of the Success Exponent for the 5 studied distinguishers
Proof. The expression of CPA is either with κmin or with κmax. We therefore have two cases:
• If κmin < 1− κmax, then the expression of CPA is the same as the expression of DoM (cf.
Table 5.4). Therefore, the success exponents of the two distinguishers are the same in this
case.
• In the other case, the expression of the success exponent is 12 1−κmaxσ2+κmax . However, as
1 − κmax < κmin, we have 12 1−κmaxσ2+κmax < κmin1+σ2−κmin , which is the expression of DoM.
Therefore, in this case, the success exponent of CPA is smaller than the success exponent
of DoM.
Overall, DoM is therefore a better distinguisher than CPA in terms of success exponent.
Proposition 5.2 (CPA vs KSA). When σ  1 the success exponent of CPA is always higher
than the success exponent of KSA.
Proof. We consider that σ  1. This means that the success exponent of CPA (we consider
the formula with κmin) is equivalent to
1
2
κmin
σ2 . For KSA, the success exponent is equivalent to
1
2
κmin
piσ2 . Indeed, when σ  1,
(
1√
2σ
)2
is equivalent to 2piσ2 .
Therefore, when σ  1, the success exponent of CPA is always higher than the success
exponent of KSA. The calculations are the same if we consider κmax.
Proposition 5.3 (MIA vs DoM). For σ > 1, the success exponent of MIA is always smaller
than the success exponent of CPA.
Proof. For DoM, the expression of the success exponent is proportional to 1σ2 while the expression
of the success exponent for MIA is proportional to 1σ4 .
To highlight these lemmas, we have plotted in Figure 5.10 the success exponents obtained
for every distinguisher with respect to the value of σ. We notice that the order obtained in the
previous lemmas is verified1 In this case, the value of κmin is lower than the value of 1− κmax.
Therefore, the Success Exponent based on the value κmin will be used.
1We did not plot for values of σ lower than 5, since the lemmas are true for large values on σ.
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Figure 5.10: Success Exponent for DES (κmin = 0.125, κmax = 0.75)
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Figure 5.11: Success Exponent for DES (κmin = 0.25, κmax = 0.8125)
On the contrary, we have plotted in Figure 5.11 the Success Exponents for values of κmin
and κmax such that κmin > 1 − κmax. In this case, the Success Exponents of CPA, KSA and
MIA is based on the value of κmax.
In the state-of-the-art, the only assertion which could be done was that the optimal dist-
inguisher is performing the best, i.e., it is better than all others. However, in general, it was
difficult to formal and numerical comparison between distinguishers was not possible. We enable
that. More precisely, we rate distinguishers according to whether they match for minimum or
maximal values of κ. Then, we classify them when there is one distinguisher better than another
one over the full range of σ > 0. Finally, we show that depending on the values of κmin and
κmax, some distinguishers might be better than others.
5.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, we have mathematically proven that only two parameters, the confusion coefficient
and the SNR, determine the side-channel distinguishing efficiency for monobit leakages. Both of
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them are easy to compute because the confusion coefficient can be calculated with the knowledge
of the operating substitution box and the SNR can be measured offline.
Our work is useful to predict how fast a distinguisher will succeed to recover the secret key.
Long and painful simulations can be advantageously replaced by the computation of the success
exponent using closed-form expressions.
This chapter also consolidates the state of the art about the classical distinguishers, especially
for MIA and KSA. We have derived the success exponent for these two distinguishers as a
function of the confusion coefficient and the standard deviation of the noise.
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This chapter covers the work presented at ArticCrypt 2016.
Contents
6.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96
6.2 Optimality of Mutual Information Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
6.2.1 Notations and Assumptions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
6.2.2 Mathematical Derivation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
6.2.3 MIA Faster Than ML Distinguisher . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
6.3 Non-Gaussian Noise Challenge . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
6.3.1 Pedagogical Case-study . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
6.3.2 Application to Bitslice PRESENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106
6.4 Partially Unknown Model Challenge . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
6.5 Fast Computations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110
6.5.1 Fast computation of CPA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110
6.5.2 Fast computation of MIA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112
6.5.3 Standard computation algorithm for MIA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115
6.6 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115
6.1 Introduction
Many embedded systems implement cryptographic algorithms, which use secret keys that must
be protected against extraction. Side-channel analysis (SCA) is one effective threat: physical
quantities, such as instant power or radiated electromagnetic field, leak outside the embedded
system boundary and reveal information about internal data. SCA consists in exploiting the
link between the leakage signal and key-dependent internal data called sensitive variables.
The cryptographic algorithm is generally public information, whereas the implementation
details are kept secret. For high-end security products, the confidentiality of the design is
mandated by certification schemes, such as the Common Criteria [22]. For instance, to comply
with ALC_DVS (Life-Cycle support – Development Security) requirement, the developer must
provide a documentation that describes “all the physical, procedural, personnel, and other security
measures that are necessary to protect the confidentiality and integrity of the TOE (target of
evaluation) design and implementation in its development environment” [22, clause 2.1 C at
page 141]. In particular, an attacker does not have enough information to precisely model the
leakage of the device. On commercial products certified at highest evaluation assurance levels
(EAL4+ or EAL5+), the attacker cannot set specific secret key values hence cannot profile
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the leakage 1 Therefore, many side-channel attacks can only be performed online using some
distinguisher.
Correlation Power Analysis (CPA) [12] is one common side-channel distinguisher. It is
known [39, Theorem 5] that its optimality holds only for a specific noise model (Gaussian) and
for a specific knowledge of the deterministic part of the leakage—namely it should be perfectly
known up to an unknown scaling factor and an unknown offset.
Linear Regression Analysis (LRA) [28] has been proposed in the context where the leakage
model is drifting apart from a Hamming weight model. Its parametric structure and ability to
include several basis functions makes it a very powerful tool, that can adjust to a broad range
of leakage models when the additive noise is Gaussian. Incidentally, CPA may be seen as a
2-dimensional LRA [39].
When both model and noise are partially or fully unknown, generic distinguishers have been
proposed, such as Mutual Information Analysis (MIA) [34], Kolmogorov-Smirnov test [86, 90]
or Crame´r-von-Mises test [86, Sec. 3.3.]. Thorough investigations have been carried out (e.g.,
[17, 60, 88]) to identify strengths and weaknesses of various distinguishers in various scenarios,
including empirical comparisons. In keeping with these results, we aim at showing some
mathematical justification regarding MIA versus CPA and LRA. Our goal is thus to structure the
field of attacks, by providing theoretical motivations why attacks strength may differ, irrespective
of the particular traces datasets.
Contributions. In this chapter, we derive MIA anew as the distinguisher which maximizes
the success rate when the exact probabilities are replaced by online estimations. In order to
assess the practicability of this mathematical result, we show two scenarios where MIA can
outperform its competitors CPA and LRA, which themselves do not estimate probabilities.
In these scenarios, we challenge the two hypotheses needed for CPA to be optimal: additive
Gaussian noise and perfect knowledge of the model up to an affine transformation. This is
illustrated in Fig. 6.1.
Last, we extend the fast computation trick presented in [49] to MIA: the distinguisher is
only computed from time to time based on histograms obtained by accumulation, where the
accumulated histograms are shared for all the key guesses.
1Obviously, this hypothesis only holds provided the device manufacturer does not reuse the same cryptographic
engine in an open platform, such as a JavaCard, where the user is able to use the cryptographic API at its will.
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CPA is optimal [39]:
• known model,
• Gaussian noise.
Section 6.3: MIA > CPA:
• known model,
• non-Gaussian noise.
Section 6.4: MIA > CPA, LRA:
• unknown model,
• Gaussian noise.
Figure 6.1: Illustration of two practical situations where MIA can defeat CPA
Organization. The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 6.2 provides
notations, assumptions, and the rigorous mathematical derivation that MIA reduces to a
maximum likelihood distinguisher, where exact leakage probabilities are replaced by online
probabilities. Section 6.3 studies two examples where the attacker knows the one-bit model under
non-Gaussian algorithmic noise, and for which MIA is shown to outperform CPA. Section 6.4
provides a scenario in which the leakage model is partially unknown under additive Gaussian
noise, and where MIA outperforms CPA and LRA. Last, in Section 6.5, we propose a fast MIA
computation deduced from our mathematical rewriting allowing to factor several computations.
Section 6.6 concludes.
6.2 Optimality of Mutual Information Analysis
6.2.1 Notations and Assumptions
We assume that the attacker has at his disposal q˜ independent online leakage measurements1
x˜ = (x˜1, . . . , x˜q˜)
2 for some sequence of independent and uniformly distributed text n-bit words
t˜ = (t˜1, . . . , t˜q˜) (random but known). The n-bit secret key k
∗ is fixed but unknown.
We do not make any precise assumption on the leakage model—in particular the attacker
is not able to estimate the actual probability density in a profiling phase. Instead we choose
an algorithmic-specific function f and a device-specific function ϕ to compute, for each key
hypothesis k, sensitive values y˜ = (y˜1, . . . , y˜q˜) by the formula
y˜ = ϕ(f(k, t˜)), (6.1)
1We comply with the usual notations of [30] where offline quantities are indicated with a hat, whereas online
quantities are indicated with a tilde. In this chapter, there is no profiling phase hence no offline quantities.
2We use bold letters to indicate vectors while scalars are presented using small italic letters.
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that is, y˜i = ϕ(f(k, t˜i)) for all i = 1, . . . , q˜. In practice, a suitable choice of ϕ should be optimized
depending on some leakage model but in what follows, f and ϕ can be taken arbitrarily such
that they fulfill the following Markov condition.
Assumption 6.1 (Markov condition). The leakage x˜ depends on the actual secret key k∗ only
through the computed model y˜ = ϕ(f(k∗, t˜)).
Thus, while the conditional distribution Pk(x˜|˜t) depends on the value k of the secret key,
the expression P(x˜|y˜) depends on k only through y˜ = ϕ(f(k, t˜)). If we let Pk(x˜, t˜) be the joint
probability distribution of x˜ and t˜ when k∗ = k, one has the Fisher factorization [19]
Pk(x˜, t˜) = P(t˜)Pk(x˜|˜t) = P(t˜)P(x˜|y˜) where y˜ = ϕ(f(k, t˜)). (6.2)
In the latter expression we have P(t˜) = 2−q˜n since all text n-bit words are assumed independent
and identically distributed (i.i.d.) and uniformly distributed.
In the case of an additive noise model, we simply have x˜ = y˜ + n˜ where n˜ is the noise
vector, and the Markov condition is obviously satisfied. In general, in order to fulfill the Markov
condition the attacker needs some knowledge on the actual leakage model. We give two examples
regarding the Markov condition:
Example 6.1. If leakage xi is linked to ti and k
∗ through the relationship xi = wH(k∗ ⊕ ti) + ni
for all i = 1, . . . , q˜, where wH is the Hamming weight and ni is the noise (independent of ti),
then both models yi = k ⊕ ti and yi = wH(k ⊕ ti) satisfy the Markov condition.
In order to uniquely distinguish the correct key, some conditions on the expressions of y are
required. Specifically, let us denote by yk the function t 7→ yk(t) = y(k, t), and let B the set of
bijections on the leakage space X. We have:
if ∀k,∃k′ 6= k, ∃β ∈ B s.t. yk′ = β ◦ yk, then the distinguisher features a tie, (6.3)
if ∀k,∀k′ 6= k, ∃β ∈ B s.t. yk′ = β ◦ yk, then the distinguisher is not sound . (6.4)
Indeed, in Eq. (6.3), there is no way for the distinguisher to tell k∗ from k′, and in Eq. (6.4),
the distinguisher yields the same value for all the key guesses 1. Sections 6.3 and 6.4 give other,
more sophisticated, examples that satisfy the Markov condition.
Example 6.2. In the same scenario as in Example 6.1, consider the bit-dropping strategy (called
7LSB in [34] and used in [72, 89]). Then e.g., yi = (k ⊕ ti)[1 : 7] (the first seven bit components)
does not satisfy the Markov condition. Note that the leakage model in this example intentionally
discards some information, hence may not be satisfactory [72].
1 We refer the interested reader to the work done in [91, Sec. 3]. We note that yi = k ⊕ ti does not lead to a
sound distinguisher, as for all k′, x 7→ x⊕ k′ is bijective, and maps yk to yk⊕k′ . On the contrary, there is no
bijection β such that for all t, wH(k ⊕ t) = β(wH(k ⊕ k′ ⊕ t)). So the choice yi = wH(k ⊕ ti) is sound.
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Let k˜ be the key estimate that maximizes a distinguisher D given x˜ and t˜, i.e.,
k˜ = arg max
k∈K
D(x˜, y˜) (6.5)
where K is the key space.
We also assume that leakage values are quantized1 in a suitable finite set X. Letting Y denote
the discrete sensitive value space, we have x˜ ∈ Xq˜ and y˜ ∈ Yq˜. The actual probability densities
being unknown, the attacker estimates them online, during the attack, from the available data
in the sequences x˜ and y˜ (via t˜), by counting all instances of possible values of x ∈ X and y ∈ Y:
P˜(x) =
1
q˜
q˜∑
i=1
1x˜i=x, (6.6)
P˜(y) =
1
q˜
q˜∑
i=1
1y˜i=y, (6.7)
P˜(x, y) =
1
q˜
q˜∑
i=1
1x˜i=x,y˜i=y, (6.8)
P˜(x|y) =
∑q˜
i=1 1x˜i=x,y˜i=y∑q˜
i=1 1y˜i=y˜
=
P˜(x, y)
P˜(y)
, (6.9)
where 1A denotes the indicator function of A: 1A = 1 if A is true and = 0 otherwise.
Definition 6.1 (Empirical Mutual Information). The empirical mutual information is defined
as
I˜(x˜, y˜) =
∑
x∈X,y∈Y
P˜(x, y) log2
P˜(x, y)
P˜(x)P˜(y)
, (6.10)
which can also be written as
I˜(x˜, y˜) = H˜(x˜)− H˜(x˜|y˜), (6.11)
where the empirical entropies are defined as
H˜(x˜) =
∑
x∈X
P˜(x) log2
1
P˜(x)
(6.12)
and
H˜(x˜|y˜) =
∑
x∈X,y∈Y
P˜(x, y) log2
1
P˜(x|y)
. (6.13)
These quantities are functions of the sequences x˜ and y˜ since P˜(x, y) is a function of x˜ and y˜.
They also depend on the key guessed value k, via the expression of y˜.
1Some side-channels are discrete by nature, such as the timing measurements (measured in units of clock
period). In addition, oscilloscopes or data acquisition appliances rely on ADCs (Analog to Digital Converters),
which usually sample a continuous signal into a sequence of integers, most of the time represented on 8 bits
(hence X = F82).
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6.2.2 Mathematical Derivation
In this subsection, we show that MIA coincides with the maximum likelihood expression where
leakage probabilities P are replaced by online estimated probabilities P˜.
Definition 6.2 (Success Rate [82, Sec. 3.1]). The success rate (averaged over all possible secret
key values) is defined as:
SR =
1
2n
2n−1∑
k=0
Pk(k˜ = k). (6.14)
Here we follow a frequentist approach. An equivalent alternative Bayesian approach would
be to assume a uniform prior key distribution [39].
Theorem 6.1 (Maximum Likelihood [20]). Let y˜ = ϕ(f(k, t˜)). The optimal key estimate that
maximizes the success rate (6.14) is:
k˜ = arg max
k
P(x˜|y˜). (6.15)
Proof. We give here a formal proof, which nicely relates to Definition 6.2. Straightforward
computation yields:
SR =
1
2n
2n∑
k=1
∑
x˜,˜t
Pk(x˜, t˜) 1k=k˜ (6.16)
=
1
2n
2n∑
k=1
∑
x˜,˜t
P(x˜|y˜ = ϕ(f(k, t˜))) P(t˜) 1k=k˜ (by (6.2) & Assumption 6.1) (6.17)
=
1
2n(q˜+1)
2n∑
k=1
∑
x˜,˜t
P(x˜|y˜ = ϕ(f(k, t˜))) 1k=k˜ (6.18)
=
1
2n(q˜+1)
∑
x˜,˜t
P(x˜|y˜ = ϕ(f(k = k˜, t˜))). (6.19)
Thus, for each given sequences x˜, t˜ maximizing the success rate amounts to choosing k = k˜ so
as to maximize P(x˜|y˜) = P(x˜|y˜ = ϕ(f(k = k˜, t˜))):
k˜ = arg max
k
P(x˜|y˜). (6.20)
When no profiling is possible the conditional distribution
P(x˜|y˜) =
q˜∏
i=1
P(x˜i|y˜i) (6.21)
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is unknown to the attacker. Therefore, Theorem 6.1 is no longer practical and we require a
universal1 version of it.
Definition 6.3 (Universal Maximum Likelihood). Let y˜ = ϕ(f(k, t˜)). The universal maximum
likelihood (UML) key estimate is defined by
k˜ = arg max
k
P˜(x˜|y˜), (6.22)
where
P˜(x˜|y˜) =
q˜∏
i=1
P˜(x˜i|y˜i). (6.23)
Here P˜, defined in Equations (6.9), (6.8), (6.7) and (6.6), is estimated directly from the
available data, that is, from the actual values in the sequences x˜ and y˜.
Theorem 6.2 (UML is MIA). The universal maximum likelihood key estimate is equivalent to
the mutual information analysis (MIA) [34]:
k˜ = arg max
k
P˜(x˜|y˜) = arg max
k
I˜(x˜, y˜), (6.24)
where I˜(x˜, y˜) is the universal mutual information (definition 6.1).
Proof. Rearrange the likelihood product according to values taken by the x˜i and y˜i’s:
P˜(x˜|y˜) =
q˜∏
i=1
P˜(x˜i|y˜i) =
∏
x∈X,y∈Y
P˜(x|y)n˜x,y (6.25)
where n˜x,y is the number of components (x˜i, y˜i) equal to (x, y), i.e.,
n˜x,y =
q˜∑
i=1
1x˜i=x,y˜i=y = q˜ P˜(x, y). (6.26)
The second inequality in Eqn. (6.25) is based on a counting argument: some events collide, i.e.,
we have (xi, yi) = (xi′ , yi′) for i 6= i′. The exponent n˜x,y is meant to enumerate all such possible
collisions. This gives
P˜(x˜|y˜) =
∏
x∈X,y∈Y
P˜(x|y)q˜ P˜(x,y) = 2−q˜H˜(x˜|y˜), (6.27)
(see Definition 6.1). Therefore, maximizing P˜(x˜|y˜) amounts to minimizing the empirical condi-
tional entropy H˜(x˜|y˜). Since H˜(x˜) is key-independent, this in turn amounts to maximizing the
empirical mutual information I˜(x˜, y˜) = H˜(x˜)− H˜(x˜|y˜).
1Universal, in the information theoretic sense of the word, means: computed from the available data without
prior information.
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From Theorem 6.2 we can conclude that MIA is “optimal” as a universal maximum likelihood
estimation. This constitutes a rigorous proof that mutual information is a relevant tool for
key recovery when the leakage is unknown (in the case where the model satisfies the Markov
condition) as was already hinted in [34, 66, 72, 88].
Corollary 6.1. MIA coincides with the ML distinguisher as q˜ →∞.
Proof. By the law of large numbers, the online probability P˜ converges almost surely to the
exact probability of the leakage as q˜ →∞. For any fixed values of x˜ ∈ X, y˜ ∈ Y,
P˜(x˜|y˜) −→
q˜→∞
P(x˜|y˜) a.s.
Thus in the limit, MIA coincides with the maximum likelihood rule.
Remark 6.1. It is well known [66] that if the mapping t˜ 7→ y˜ = ϕ(f(k, t˜)) is one-to-one (for all
values of k), then MIA cannot distinguish the correct key. This is also clear from Eq. (6.4) in
footnote 1: given two different keys k, k′, there is a bijection between yk and yk′ , which is simply
β = yk′ ◦ y−1k . In our present setting this is easily seen by noting that when y˜ = ϕ(f(k, t˜)),
P˜(x|y) =
∑q˜
i=1 1x˜i=x,y˜i=y∑q˜
i=1 1y˜i=y
=
∑q˜
i=1 1x˜i=x,t˜i=t∑q˜
i=1 1t˜i=t
(6.28)
is independent of the value k. Note that this is true for any fixed number of measurements q˜
during the attack.
6.2.3 MIA Faster Than ML Distinguisher
Now that we have shown that the Universal Maximum Likelihood distinguisher is strictly
equivalent to the MIA distinguisher, we show that the use of the MIA Distinguisher is cheaper
in terms of calculations than the ML distinguisher. Both distinguishers require the knowledge
of P˜, the online estimation of the leakage probability. However, the summation is not exactly
the same:
• the ML distinguisher consists in a sum of q˜ logarithms, whereas
• the MIA involves a sum over |X| × |Y| logarithms1.
This means that computing a ML requires q˜ logarithm computations while computing a MIA
requires |X| × |Y| logarithm computations. As long as |X| × |Y| is smaller than q˜, which is
verified for practical signal-to-noise values, the MIA is faster than the ML in terms of logarithm
computations. Furthermore, in section 6.5.2, we present a fast algorithm to compute MIA; it
takes advantage of precomputations, which are similar to that already presented in [49].
1In practice, logarithms require a high computational power, hence the number of calls to this function shall
be minimized.
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6.3 Non-Gaussian Noise Challenge
In this section, we show two examples where MIA outperforms CPA due to non-Gaussian noise.
The first example presented in subsection 6.3.1 is an academic (albeit artificial) example built
in order to have the success rate of CPA collapse. The second example in subsection 6.3.2 is
more practical.
6.3.1 Pedagogical Case-study
We consider a setup where the variables are X = Y +N , with Y = ϕ(f(k∗, T )), where Y ∈ {±1},
and N ∼ U({±σ}) (meaning that N takes values −σ and +σ randomly, with probabilities 12
and 12 ), where σ is an integer. Specifically, we assume that k
∗, t ∈ Fn2 , with n = 4, and that
f : Fn2 × Fn2 → Fm2 is a (truncated version) of the SERPENT Sbox1 fed by the XOR of the two
inputs (key and plaintext nibbles) and ϕ = wH is the Hamming weight (which reduces to the
identity F2 → F2 if m = 1 bit).
The optimal distinguisher (Theorem 6.1) in this scenario has the following closed-form
expression:
D(x˜, t˜) = arg max
k
P(x˜|˜t, k) = arg max
k
1
2q˜
q˜∏
i=1
δ(x˜i, t˜i, k), (6.29)
where δ : Fm2 × Fn2 × Fn2 → {0, 1} is defined as:
δ(x, t, k) =

1 if x− ϕ(f(k, t)) = −σ,
1 if x− ϕ(f(k, t)) = +σ,
0 otherwise.
The evaluation of this quantity requires the knowledge of σ, which by definition is an unknown
quantity related to the noise. Our simulations have been carried out as follows.
1. Generate two large uniformly distributed random vectors t˜ and n˜ of length q˜;
2. Deliver the pair of vectors (t˜, x˜ = ϕ(f(k∗, t˜)) + n˜) to the attacker;
3. Estimate averages and PMFs (probability mass functions) of this data for q˜step (= 1), then
for 2q˜step, 3q˜step and so on;
1The least significant bit S0 of the PRESENT Sbox S is not suitable because one has ∀z ∈ F42, S0(z) =
S0(z ⊕ 0x9) = ¬S0(z ⊕ 0x1) = ¬S0(z ⊕ 0x8). As in Eq. (6.3) of footnote 1, ties occur: it is not possible to
distinguish k∗, k∗ ⊕ 0x9, k∗ ⊕ 0x1, k∗ ⊕ 0x8 (the corresponding bijections are respectively x 7→ x and x 7→ 1− x).
Therefore, we consider component 1 instead of 0, which does not satisfy such relationships.
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Figure 6.2: Success rate for σ = 2 (left) and σ = 4 (right), when Y ∼ U({±1}) and N ∼ U({±σ})
4. At each multiple of q˜step, carry out CPA and MIA.
The attacks are reproduced 100 times to allow for narrow error bars on the estimated success
rate.
Remark 6.2. We do not consider linear regression analysis because the model is not parametric.
The only unknown parameter is related to the noisy part of the leakage, not its deterministic
part.
Simulation results are given in Fig. 6.2 for σ = 2 and σ = 4. The success rate of the “optimal”
distinguisher (the maximum likelihood distinguisher of Theorem 6.1 – see Eqn. (6.29)) is drawn
in order to visualize the limit between feasible (below) and unfeasible (above) attacks. It can
be seen that MIA is almost as successful as the maximum likelihood distinguisher, despite
the knowledge of the value of σ is not required for the MIA. In addition, one can see that
the CPA performs worse, and all the worst as σ increases. In this case, the CPA is not the
optimal distinguisher (as e.g., underlined in [39, Theorem 5]) since the noise is not Gaussian
(but discrete).
Remark 6.3. Another attack strategy for the leakage model presented in this subsection would
simply be to filter out the noise. One could for instance dispose of all traces where the leakage is
negative. The remaining traces (half of them) contain a constant noise N = +σ > 1, hence the
signal Y can be read out without noise. Such attack, known as the subset attack [62, Sec. 5.2],
is not far from the optimal one (Eqn. (6.29)). It actually does coincide with the optimal attack
if the attacker recovers Y from both subsets {i/Xi > 0} and {i/Xi < 0}. Still it can noted that
MIA is very close to being optimal for this scenario.
Asymptotics. We can estimate the theoretical quantities for CPA and MIA as follows. We
have Var(Y ) = 1 and Var(N) = σ2, hence a signal to noise ratio SNR = 1/σ2. In addition, X
can only take four values: ±1± σ. Since E(XY ) = E(X2) + E(Y N) = V ar(X) + E(Y )E(N) =
1 + 0× 0 = 1, the correlation is simply ρ(X,Y ) = 1/σ, which vanishes as σ increases.
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However, for σ > 1, the mutual information I(X,Y ) = 1 bit. Indeed, H(X) = −∑x∈{±1±σ} P(X =
x) log2 P(X = x) = −
∑
x∈{±1±σ}
1
4 log2
1
4 = log2 4 = 2 bit, H(X|y = ±1) = log2 2 = 1 bit, so
I(X,Y ) = log2 4−
∑
y∈{±1} P(X = x) log2 2 = log2 4− log2 2 = 1 bit, irrespective of σ ∈ N.
The important fact is that the mutual information does not depend on the value of σ.
Accordingly, it can be seen from Fig. 6.2 that the success rate of the MIA is not affected by the
noise variance. This explains why MIA will outperform the CPA for large enough σ.
6.3.2 Application to Bitslice PRESENT
Bitslicing algorithms is a common practice. This holds both for standard [70] (e.g., AES) and
lightweight [56] (PRESENT, Piccolo) block ciphers. Here the distinguishers must be single-bit:
Y ∈ {±1}. However, compared to the case of Sec. 6.3.1, the noise takes now more than two
values: On an 8-bit computer, the 7 other bits will leak independently. They are, however,
not concerned by the attack, and constitute algorithmic noise N which follows a binomial law
α×B(7, 12 ), where α is a scaling factor.
Figure 6.3: Success rate for the attack of a bitsliced algorithm on an 8-bit processor, where 7
bits make up algorithmic noise, and have weight 0.5, 1.0 (top) and 0.8 and 2.0 (bottom).
Simulation results for various values of α are in Fig. 6.3. Interestingly, MIA is efficient for
the cases where the leakage Y ∼ U({±1}) is not altered by the addition of noise: For α = 0.8
and α = 2.0, it is still possible to tell unambiguously from X what is the value of Y . On the
contrary, when α = 0.5 or α = 1.0, the function (Y,N) 7→ X = Y +N is not one-to-one. For
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instance, in the case α = 1.0, the value X = 2 can result as well from Y = −1 and N = 3, or
Y = +1 and N = 2. (see Fig. 6.4).
α = 1.0
X
P(X|Y = −1)
α = 0.8
X
Caption: P(X|Y = +1)
Figure 6.4: Illustration bijectivity (left) vs. non-injectivity (right) of the leakage function.
6.4 Partially Unknown Model Challenge
Veyrat-Charvillon and Standaert [86, section 4] have already noticed that MIA can outperform
CPA if the model is drifted too far away from the real leakage. However, LRA is able to make
up for the model drift of [86] (which considered unevenly weighted bits). In this section, we
challenge CPA and LRA with a partially unknown model. We show that, in our example, MIA
has a much better success rate than both CPA and LRA.
For our empirical study we used the following setup:
X = ψ(Y (k∗)) +N, Y (k∗) = wH(Sbox(k∗ ⊕ T )),
where Sbox is the AES substitution box, ψ is the non-linear function given by:
x 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
ψ(x) +1 +2 +3 +4 0 −4 −3 −2 −1
which is unknown to the attacker, and N is a centered Gaussian noise with unknown standard
deviation σ. The non-linearity of ψ is motivated by [60], where it is discussed that a linear
model favors CPA over MIA.
The leakage is continuous due to the Gaussian noise. In order to discretize the leakage to
obtain discrete probabilities, we used the binning method. We conducted MIA with several
different binning sizes:
B = {[(i− 1)×∆x, i×∆x[, i ∈ Z} for ∆x = {1, 3, 5, 7, 9}. (6.30)
In this chapter, we do not try to establish any specific result about binning, but content ourselves
to present empirical results obtained with different bin sizes.
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We have carried out LRA for the standard basis in dimension d = 9 and higher dimensions
d = {37, 93, 163}. More precisely, for d = 9 we have y˜′(k) = (~1, y˜1(k), y˜2(k), . . . , y˜8(k)) with
y˜j(k) = [Sbox(k ⊕ T )]j where [·]j : Fn2 → F2 is the projection mapping onto the jth bit. For
d = 37 the attacker additionally takes into consideration the products between all possible y˜j
(1 ≤ j ≤ 8), i.e., y˜1 · y˜2, y˜1 · y˜3, y˜1 · y˜4 and so on. Consequently, d = 93 considers additionally
the product between 3 y˜’s and d = 163 includes also all possible product combinations with 4
columns. See [37] for a detailed description on the selection of basis functions.
(a) σ = 0 (b) σ = 1
(c) σ = 2 (d) σ = 3
Figure 6.5: Success rate for σ ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3} when the model is unknown
Fig. 6.5 shows the success rate using 100 independent experiments. Perhaps surprisingly,
MIA turns out to be more efficient than LRA. Quite naturally, MIA and LRA become closer as
the the variance of the independent measurement noise N increases. It can be seen that LRA
using higher dimension requires a sufficient number of traces for estimation (for d = 37 around
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100, d = 93 around 150, and d = 137 failed below 200 traces). Consequently, in this scenario
using high dimensions is not appropriate, even if the high dimension in question might fit the
unknown function ψ.
One reason why MIA outperforms CPA and LRA in this scenario is that the function ψ was
chosen to have a null covariance. Moreover, one can observe that the most efficient binning
size depends on the noise variance and thus on the scattering of the leakage. As σ grows larger
values of ∆ should be chosen. This is contrary to the suggestions made in [34], which proposes
to estimate the probability distributions as good as possible and thus to consider as many bins
as there are distinct values in the traces. In our experiments, when noise is absent (σ = 0) the
optimal binning size is ∆ = 1 which is equivalent to the step size of Y , while for σ = 2 the
optimal binning is ∆ = 5 (see Fig. 6.5(c)).
(a) ∆ = 1, correct key guess (b) ∆ = 1, false key guess
(c) ∆ = 5, correct key guess (d) ∆ = 5, false key guess
Figure 6.6: Estimated P˜(X|Y ) using 40 traces for σ = 2 (see Fig. 6.5(c))
It can be seen that using 40 traces the success rate of MIA with ∆ = 5 reaches 90%, whereas
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using ∆ = 1 it is only about 30%. To understand this phenomenon, Fig. 6.6 displays the
estimated P˜(x|y) in a 3D histogram for the correct key and one false key hypothesis, such
that MIA is able to reveal the correct key using ∆ = 5 but fails for ∆ = 1. Clearly, the
distinguishability between the correct and false key is much higher in case of ∆ = 5 than for
∆ = 1.
More precisely, as the leakage is dispersed by the noise the population of bins of the false key
becomes similar to the the ones of the correct key when considering smaller binning size (compare
Fig. 6.6a and 6.6b). In contrast, the difference is more visible when the leakage is quantified
into larger bins (compare Fig. 6.6c and 6.6d). Therefore, even if the estimation of I˜(x˜, y˜) using
P˜(x|y) for larger ∆ is more coarse and thus looses some information, the distinguishing ability
to reveal the correct key is enhanced.
6.5 Fast Computations
In this section, we explain how we compute CPA and MIA in a faster way. We first show an
algorithm for CPA, then we move to MIA.
6.5.1 Fast computation of CPA
We recall here the definition of empirical CPA:
ρ(X,Y (k)) =
1
m
∑m
i=1 xiyi(k)−
(
1
m
∑m
i=1 xi
) (
1
m
∑m
i=1 yi(k)
)√
1
m
∑m
i=1 x
2
i −
(
1
m
∑m
i=1 xi
)2√ 1
m
∑m
i=1 y
2
i (k)−
(
1
m
∑m
i=1 yi(k)
)2
=
m
∑m
i=1 xiyi(k)− (
∑m
i=1 xi) (
∑m
i=1 yi(k))√
m
∑m
i=1 x
2
i − (
∑m
i=1 xi)
2
√
m
∑m
i=1 y
2
i (k)− (
∑m
i=1 yi(k))
2
, (6.31)
where yi(k) = ϕ(f(k, ti)). For the fast computation the following accumulators are required:
• sx[t] = ∑i/ti=t xi, the sum of leakages for a common t;
• sx2[t] = ∑i/ti=t x2i , the sum of leakage squares for a common t;
• qt[t] = ∑i/ti=t 1, the number of t which occurred.
We detail the various terms in the two next paragraphs.
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6.5.1.1 Averages
First, we simply have:
m∑
i=1
xi =
∑
t
sx[t],
which is key independent. Second:
m∑
i=1
yi =
∑
t
∑
i/ti=t
yi
=
∑
t
∑
i/ti=t
ϕ(f(k, ti))
=
∑
t
ϕ(f(k, ti))qt[t],
which, quite surprisingly, is key independent.
6.5.1.2 Scalar product
The scalar product can be written the following way:
m∑
i=1
xiyi =
∑
y
∑
i/yi=y
xiyi
=
∑
y
y
∑
i/yi=y
xi
=
∑
y
y
∑
i/ϕ(f(k,ti))=y
xi
=
∑
y
y sx′[y],
where sx′[y] =
∑
t/ϕ(f(k,t))=y sx[t]. This optimization is certainly useful for long traces, because
it minimizes the number of multiplications (precisely, only 2m multiplications are done). But,
we need 2m temporary accumulators to save the sx′[y].
However, in monosample traces, we can also use this more simple computation:
m∑
i=1
xiyi =
∑
t
∑
i/ti=t
xiϕ(f(k, ti))
=
∑
t
∑
i/ti=t
ϕ(f(k, ti))xi
=
∑
t
ϕ(f(k, ti))
∑
i/ti=t
xi
=
∑
t
ϕ(f(k, ti))sx[t].
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6.5.2 Fast computation of MIA
We setup a structure for the PMF, namely an array of hash tables, denoted as PMF[t][x], where
t and x live in the sets Fn2 and Im(ϕ ◦ f) + supp(N). So, let us say we have accumulated q˜
leakage pairs (t, x).
At this stage, we have the joint probability given by
P˜(t, x) =
1
q˜
PMF[t][x].
Now, when using MIA as a distinguisher, we need to compute PMF[y][x], where y ∈ Fn2
(and we expect the (t, k) 7→ y = ϕ(f(k, t)) function to be non-injective [91], which is the case
in the previous sections). The value PMF[y][x] implicitly depends upon a key guess k, as:
PMF[y][x] = PMF[y = ϕ(f(k, t))][x]. Now, instead of computing P˜(x, y) through PMF[y][x]
explicitly for each key guess, we are able to reformulate
P˜(y, x) =
∑
t
P˜(t, y, x) =
∑
t/ϕ(f(k,t))=y
P˜(t, x) =
1
q˜
∑
t/ϕ(f(k,t))=y
PMF[t][x].
Thus, we can reuse the tabulated PMF[t][x] for each key guess, which requires thus much less
computations as a straightforward implementation.
Recall the expression of the estimated mutual information:
I˜(x˜, y˜) =
∑
x,y
P˜(x, y) log2
P˜(x, y)
P˜(x) P˜(y)
.
The value for P˜(x) is identical for all key hypotheses and thus can be factored out. Indeed,
this quantity is a scaling constant which could be omitted. But for the sake of completeness, we
have
P˜(x) =
∑
t
P˜(t, x) =
1
q˜
∑
t
PMF[t][x].
Lastly, we need to evaluate P˜(y). This is simply done as:
P˜(y) =
∑
x
P˜(x, y),
Algorithm 2 illustrates the fast computation process for MIA while Algorithm 3 computes
the success rate of MIA. It calls the function MIA-Distinguisher as a subroutine. This last
function corresponds to the of the computation of fast MIA (Alg. 2). However, it is optimized
this way:
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Algorithm 2: Fast computation algorithm for MIA
input : x˜ a set of q˜ traces which take discrete values,
t˜ a corresponding set of q˜ plaintexts/ciphertexts
output : (I˜(x˜, y˜(k)))k∈K
// From x˜ and t˜, build a hash table PMF[t][x] (i.e., an histogram)
1 for i ∈ {1, . . . , q˜} do
2 PMF[t˜i][x˜i] += 1
3 end
4 for x ∈ X do
5 P˜(x) = 0 // P˜(x) holds mP˜(x), cf. Eqn. (6.6)
6 for t ∈ Fn2 do
7 P˜(x) += PMF[t][x]
8 end
9 end
10 for k ∈ K do // Key enumeration
11 ∀x ∈ X, y ∈ Y, P˜(x, y) = 0 // P˜(x, y) holds mP˜(x, y), cf. Eqn. (6.8)
12 for t ∈ Fn2 do
13 for x ∈ X do
14 P˜(x, ϕ(f(k, t))) += PMF[t][x] // y = ϕ(f(k, t)), cf. Eqn. (6.1)
15 end
16 end
17 I˜(x˜, y˜(k)) = 0
18 for y ∈ Y do
19 P˜(y) = 0 // P˜(y) holds mP˜(y), cf. Eqn. (6.7)
20 for x ∈ X do
21 P˜(y) += P˜(x, y)
22 end
23 for x ∈ X do
// Nota bene: (P˜(x) = 0 ∨ P˜(y) = 0) =⇒ P˜(x, y) = 0
24 if P˜(x) 6= 0 and P˜(y) 6= 0 then
25 I˜(x˜, y˜(k)) += P˜(x,y)m log2
(
mP˜(x,y)
P˜(x)P˜(y)
)
26 end
27 end
28 end
29 end
30 return (I˜(x˜, y˜(k)))k∈K // As in Eqn. (6.10)
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Algorithm 3: Computation of the MIA success rate
input :
• x˜ a set of q˜ traces which take discrete values,
• t˜ a corresponding set of q˜ plaintexts/ciphertexts,
• k∗ ∈ K, the correct key,
• q˜step, typically of the order of q˜/100 (number of times the success rate is computed),
• M , the number of experiments
output : ŜRk∗ , the empirical rate of MIA (computed as per Eqn. (6.10))
1 ŜRk∗ = {0, . . . , 0} // Initialization of m/mstep values to zero
2 foreach experiment ∈ {1, . . . ,M} do
3 PMF[t][x] = 0,∀t ∈ Fn2 , x ∈ X
4 foreach step ∈ {1, . . . , q˜/q˜step} do
5 for i ∈ {1 + (step− 1)× q˜step, . . . , step× q˜step} do
6 PMF[ti][xi] += 1
7 end
8 for k ∈ K do // Key enumeration
9 + + scorek = MIA-Distinguisher(PMF, k) + +
// See MIA-Distinguisher
10 scorek = MIA-Distinguisher(PMF, k) // Function at page 116
11 end
12 if arg maxk∈K scorek = k∗ then
13 ŜRk∗ [step] += 1/M
14 end
15 end
16 end
17 return ŜRk∗ // The empirical Success Rate
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• The values of P˜(x) and q˜ do not impact the result, hence they are not computed. This
means that lines 4–8 of Alg. 2 are not part of Alg. MIA-Distinguisher, and that in the
accumulation of I˜(x˜, y˜(k)) at line 15 of Function MIA-Distinguisher, the terms P˜(x) and
q˜ (present at line 25 of Alg. 2), are simply dropped.
• In the line 17 of MIA-Distinguisher, we subtract the term which corresponds to the
denominator P˜(y) of line 25 of Alg. 2. Notice that all the parameters of the logarithms
are now integers. We can thus tabulate the logarithms in a table log[i], for i = 1, . . . , q˜.
Incidentally, the basis of the logarithm can be arbitrarily chosen. If q˜ is really large, say
larger than 10 millions, then log[i] can be precomputed from all i < 106, and evaluated
otherwise, since anyhow the call of log for large values is restricted to the case of P˜(y)
which is expected to be way larger than any P˜(x, y).
6.5.3 Standard computation algorithm for MIA
The standard computation for MIA unfolds as in Alg. 4. This algorithm outputs exactly the
same as Alg. 2 but is slower for two reasons:
1. All the q˜ samples are scanned for each key hypothesis;
2. Probability mass functions are normalized. Now, divisions are costly, and also they require
a conversion from integer to floating point numbers;
6.6 Conclusion
We derived MIA anew as the distinguisher which maximizes the success rate when the exact
probabilities are replaced by online estimations. This suggests that MIA is an interesting
alternative when the attacker is not able to exactly determine the link between the measured
leakage and the leakage model. This situation can either result from an unknown deterministic
part or from an unknown noise distribution. We have proved that, if the number of traces is
greater than the number of possible values of x and y, the MIA is faster in terms of logarithm
computations.
We have presented two practical case-studies in which MIA can indeed be more efficient
than CPA or LRA. The first scenario is for non-Gaussian noise but known deterministic leakage
model. The second scenario is for Gaussian noise with unknown deterministic leakage model,
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Function MIA-Distinguisher
input : PMF[t][x] ∈ NFn2×X, a non-normalized bi-dimensional histogram,
k ∈ K, a key guess
output : A score, affinely proportional to MIA (computed as per Eqn. (6.10)), with the
same (irrelevant) affine scaling factors for all the keys
1 ∀x ∈ X, y ∈ Y, P˜(x, y) = 0 // P˜(x, y) holds mP˜(x, y), cf. Eqn. (6.8)
2 for t ∈ Fn2 do
3 for x ∈ X do
4 P˜(x, ϕ(f(k, t))) += PMF[t][x] // y = ϕ(f(k, t)), cf. Eqn. (6.1)
5 end
6 end
7 I˜(x˜, y˜(k)) = 0 // Quantity actually affine with I˜(x˜, y˜(k))
8 for y ∈ Y do
9 P˜(y) = 0 // P˜(y) holds mP˜(y), cf. Eqn. (6.7)
10 for x ∈ X do
11 P˜(y) += P˜(x, y)
12 end
13 for x ∈ X do
14 if P˜(x, y) 6= 0 then // P˜(x, y) 6= 0 =⇒ (P˜(x) 6= 0 ∧ P˜(y) 6= 0)
15 I˜(x˜, y˜(k)) += P˜(x, y) · log[P˜(x, y)]
16 end
17 I˜(x˜, y˜(k)) −= P˜(x) · log[P˜(y)]
18 end
19 end
20 return I˜(x˜, y˜(k))
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Algorithm 4: Standard computation algorithm for MIA
input : x˜ a set of m traces which take discrete values,
t˜ a corresponding set of m plaintexts/ciphertexts
output : (I˜(x˜, y˜(k)))k∈K
1 I˜(x˜, y˜(k)) = 0, ∀x ∈ X, k ∈ K
2 for k ∈ K do // Key enumeration
// From x˜ and y˜, build a hash table PMF[y][x] (i.e., an histogram)
3 for i ∈ {1, . . . ,m} do
4 PMF[ϕ(f(k, ti))][xi] += 1 // y = ϕ(f(k, t)), cf. Eqn. (6.1)
5 end
6 ∀x ∈ X, y ∈ Y, P˜(x, y) = 0 // cf. Eqn. (6.8)
7 for y ∈ Y do
8 for x ∈ X do
9 P˜(x, y) = 1/m PMF[y][x]
10 end
11 end
12 for y ∈ Y do
13 P˜(y) = 0 // cf. Eqn. (6.7)
14 for x ∈ X do
15 P˜(y) += P˜(x, y)
16 end
17 end
18 for x ∈ X do
19 P˜(x) = 0 // cf. Eqn. (6.7)
20 for y ∈ Y do
21 P˜(x) += P˜(x, y)
22 end
23 end
24 for y ∈ Y do
25 for x ∈ X do
// Nota bene: (P˜(x) = 0 ∨ P˜(y) = 0) =⇒ P˜(x, y) = 0
26 if P˜(x) 6= 0 and P˜(y) 6= 0 then
27 I˜(x˜, y˜(k)) += P˜(x, y) log2
(
P˜(x,y)
P˜(x)P˜(y)
)
28 end
29 end
30 end
31 end
32 return (I˜(x˜, y˜(k)))k∈K // As in Eqn. (6.10)
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where one leverages a challenging leakage function which results in failure for CPA, and in harsh
regression using LRA. Incidentally, this example is in line with the work carried out by Whitnall
and Oswald [88] where a notion of relative margin is used to compare attacks. Our findings go
in the same direction using the success rate as a figure of merit to compare attacks.
Finally, we extended the computation trick given for CPA to MIA avoiding the histogram
estimation of conditional probabilities for each sub key individually, improving the speed of the
computation.
We note that all our results are ϕ-dependent. It seems obvious that the closer we are to the
actual leakage, the better the success rate will be. An open question is to find an analytic way
to determine the function model that will provide the highest success rate.
Last, we note that our analysis is monovariate: we consider a leakage which consists in only
one value. A future work would be to extend our results to mutivariate attacks.
Another topic of research is to carry out practical examples where MIA beats CPA. An
viable option would be the exploitation of some specific timing attacks where the behaviour of
the processor changes at every start-up.
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Part IV
Practical Issues With Timing
Attacks
119

Introduction
The field of cryptography is currently very sensitive as it deals with data protection and safety.
Thus, in order to assess the security of cryptographic devices, it is crucial to know and test
their weaknesses. For example, the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) [26] is renowned
as trustworthy from a mathematical point of view—there is currently no realistic way to
cryptanalyze the AES-128. However, it is possible to break the 128-bit secret key byte by byte
using side-channel analysis (SCA). SCA exploits the physical fact that the secret key leaks
some information out of the device boundary through various “side-channels” such as power
consumption or timing—number of clock cycles to perform a given operation. These leakages,
correctly analyzed by SCA, yield the secret key of a device.
A good side-channel attack needs a good leakage model. Timing, for example, can be modeled
easily when the implementation is unbalanced: Several successful attacks [13, 14, 75, 76] exploit
a timing leakage in the conditional extra-reductions of Montgomery modular multiplications.
Some conditional operations can also happen in AES, e.g. in field operations, as for instance
discussed in [27, Alg. 1].
Even when the code is balanced—a recommended secure coding practice—some residual un-
balances in timing can result from the hardware which executes the code. Indeed, processors
implement speed optimization mechanisms such as memory caching and out-of-order execution.
As a consequence, it is not possible to predict with certainty how timing leaks information. The
attacker is then led to make predictions about the way the device leaks.
In this part, we consider side-channel attacks that are performed in two phases:
1. a profiling phase where the attacker accumulates leakage from a device with a known
secret key;
2. an attacking phase where the attacker accumulates leakage from the device with an
unknown secret key.
This type of attack is known as a template attack [20]. It has been shown [20] to be very efficient
under three conditions: (a) leakage samples are independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.);
(b) the noise is additive white Gaussian; and (c) the secret key leaks byte by byte, which enables
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a divide-and-conquer approach. For some side-channels, such as power or electromagnetic
radiations, condition (b) is met in practice. However, for timing attacks, the noise cannot be
Gaussian as timing is discrete. Moreover, the noise source is non-additive in this case, since it
arises from complex replacement policies in caches and processor-specific on-the-fly instructions
reordering.
The first proposed profiled timing attack is the seminal timing attack of Kocher [44]. The
same methodology can be used on AES, as noted by Bernstein in 2005 [5]. Further works used
the same method [8, 69, 87]. To our best knowledge, all these works consist in profiling moments,
such as the average timing under a given plaintext and key. However, it is known [20] that the
best attacks should use maximum likelihood1
In this part, as illustrated in Tab. 6.1, we focus on a profiling where the distribution is
characterized and used as such, and is not reduced to its moments. The attacker computes
distributions using histogram methods. These distributions are then used to recover the correct
secret key.
Table 6.1: State-of-the-art on profiled timing attacks
Profiling method Reference articles
Moments [5, 8, 69, 87]
Distributions This part (Caution about empty bins)
The discrete nature of timing leakage leads to an empty bin issue which appears when a
data value in the attacking phase has never been seen during the profiling phase. Based on
profiling only, this data should have a zero probability, which can be devastating for the attack.
One known workaround is to use kernel distribution methods [64] to estimate probabilities since
the smoothing can be such that no empty bins remain. This method can however be seen as a
postprocessing in existing information. This alters therefore the data. In addition, this method
has very large computational complexity and its performance highly depends on ad-hoc choices
of several parameters such as kernel type and bandwidth. Moreover the estimation via the
kernel method depends on other parameters such as the choice of the kernel and the size of the
1We will explain in Subsec. 8.2.2 that in practice, maximum likelihood might not always perform better
than moment-based distinguishers in ideal situations (no noise), because the learning stage for probability mass
functions demands too many traces; besides an imperfect profiling is very detrimental to maximum likelihood
distinguishers, and affects less the moment-based distinguishers. However, in non-ideal situations, e.g., in the
presence of random delay kind of noise, maximum likelihood remains robust, where the model-based distinguishers
collapse (since they are value-based).
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kernel. In this part, we have decided to keep information as it comes as we focus on information
theoretic distinguishers.
Contributions In this part, we show that even when all abovementioned requirements (a),
(b), and (c) are not present, timing attacks with incomplete profiling can be achieved successfully
by adapting the maximum likelihood distinguisher and keeping the histogram method for
probabilities estimation. We build six different distinguishers, which are all good answers to
the empty bin issue. For some of them, new histograms are built, such that the empty bin
issue totally disappears. Furthermore, we compare these distinguishers and show which one
of them is the best in every specific context. We underline that, in practice, for a moderate
profiling with 256 000 offline measurements, the soft drop and the combined offline-online
profiling approaches are clearly the two best strategies: the AES key is typically extracted with
only about 2 000 online measurements, i.e., a complete break in about 0.2 ms. Finally, we
provide some theoretical results proving how optimal some of the distinguishers can be.
Organization The part is organized according to the following structure. In Chapter 7, we
first provide the mathematical tools to deal with the empty bins issue. Section 7.1 provides
mathematical tools to understand distinguishers and notations. Section 7.2 introduces new
distinguishers that are suitable in the context of empty bins. Section 7.3 provides simulations
for these distinguishers. In Chapter 8 we focus on the timing leakages for a specific implemen-
tation. Section 8.1 investigates real attacks on an ARM processor. Interestingly, all proposed
distinguishers work, albeit with very noticeably different performances. In section 8.2, some
interpolations of the obtained results in the presence of external measurement noise are derived.
Section 8.3 concludes for both chapters.
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Chapter 7
Methods to Solve the Empty-Bin
Issue
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7. METHODS TO SOLVE THE EMPTY-BIN ISSUE
A part of the work of this chapter has been presented at HASP 2018.
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7.1 Mathematical Derivations
The mathematical notations and assumptions presented here will also be used in Chapter 8.
7.1.1 Notations and Assumptions
We consider a side-channel attack with a profiling stage and use the following notations:
• during the profiling phase, a vector t̂ of q̂ text bytes is sent and the profiler garners a
vector of x̂ measurements;
• during the attacking phase, a vector t˜ of q˜ text bytes is sent and the attacker gathers a
vector x˜ of leakage measurements—also customarily known as traces;
• we use simplified notations t, q and x when discussing either profiling data or attacking
data;
• the probability of a vector x with i.i.d. components xi is denoted by P(x) =
∏
i P(xi);
• we define the following sets:
1. X̂, T̂, X˜ and T˜ are the sets of possible values of components x̂, t̂, x˜ and t˜, respectively;
2. X = X̂ ∪ X˜ and T = T̂ ∪ T˜;
3. K is the set of all possible values for the key k.
• k and t are made of n bits (in particular, they are “bytes” when n = 8).
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Here all sample components of one vector are i.i.d. and belong to some discrete set. Typically,
X is a finite subset of N and T is equal to {0, 1}n.
In the profiling stage, the secret key k̂∗ is known and variable. In the attacking phase, the
secret key k˜∗ is unknown but fixed. Further, we assume that xi depends only on ti and k∗ for
all i = 1, 2, . . . , q, in the form:
xi = ψ(ti ⊕ k∗) (i = 1, 2, . . . , q) (7.1)
where ⊕ is the XOR (exclusive or) operator and ψ is an unknown function which may contain
noise, masking and other hidden parameters1.
Furthermore, in this part, we use of the notation nx,t to denote the number of occurrences
of (x, t). Thus we can write
n̂x,t =
∑q̂
i=1 1x̂i=x,t̂i=t n̂x =
∑q̂
i=1 1x̂i=x,
n˜x,t =
∑q˜
i=1 1x˜i=x,t˜i=t n˜x =
∑q˜
i=1 1x˜i=x.
where 1A = 1 if A is true, = 0 otherwise.
Definition 7.1 (Probabilities). We define three2 different types of probabilities P, P̂ and P˜. P
is the actual (real) underlying probability distribution, but it is generally not available and has
to be estimated by either P̂ or P˜.
• P̂ is computed using the profiling data:
P̂(x, t) =
1
q̂
q̂∑
i=1
1x̂i=x,t̂i=t =
n̂x,t
q̂
, (7.2)
P̂(x) =
1
q̂
q̂∑
i=1
1x̂i=x =
n̂x
q̂
. (7.3)
• P˜ is computed using the attacking data:
P˜(x, t) =
1
q˜
q˜∑
i=1
1x˜i=x,t˜i=t =
n˜x,t
q˜
, (7.4)
P˜(x) =
1
q˜
q˜∑
i=1
1x˜i=x =
n˜x
q˜
. (7.5)
1The AES meets the secret and the text byte through a xor (SubBytes) executed in a fixed number of clock
cycles. However, the rest of the AES consists in table look-ups and other miscellaneous operations which are
difficult to model and need different amounts of time to execute, hence the use of unknown function ψ.
2For the sake of evading the empty bin issue, we will also introduce yet another notation “sPα” in section 7.2.1
(Equation (7.15)).
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In practice, as the secret key leaks through the function via a XOR (Equation (7.1)), we
shall often consider P(x, t⊕ k).
For a fair comparison between distinguishers, Standaert et al. [82] have put forward the
success rate as a measure of efficiency of a given distinguisher.
Definition 7.2 (Success Rate). The success rate SR is probability, averaged over all possible
keys, of obtaining the correct key.
SR =
1
2n
2n−1∑
k∗=0
Pk∗(k˜ = k∗), (7.6)
where k˜ is the key guess obtained by the distinguisher during the attack.
It has been proven [39, Theorem 1, equation (3)] that for equiprobable keys the optimal
distinguisher maximizes likelihood:
DOptimal(x˜, t˜) = arg max
k∈K
P(x˜|˜t⊕ k). (7.7)
In real life, however, the attacker does not know the leakage model perfectly and thus P(x˜|˜t⊕ k)
is not available. In order to get an estimation of P, we use the profiling data to build P̂ defined
in Equation (7.2). This is the classical template attack. The distinguisher becomes
DTemplate(x˜, t˜) = arg max
k∈K
P̂(x˜|˜t⊕ k). (7.8)
This distinguisher is no longer optimal as it does not use the real distribution P. However, if
profiling tends to exhaustivity, P̂ and P will be very close since by the law of large numbers,
∀x, t P̂(x, t) −→
q̂→∞
P(x, t).
Moreover, we notice that non-optimality is not the only issue with template attacks in the
context of discrete leakage. The attacker also faces the problem that the attack is ill-formed.
In practice, it is convenient to use the logarithm arg max
k∈K
log P̂(x˜|˜t ⊕ k). In fact, since the
samples are i.i.d., we have
P(x˜|˜t⊕ k) =
q˜∏
i=1
P(x˜i|t˜i ⊕ k) and P̂(x˜|˜t⊕ k) =
q˜∏
i=1
P̂(x˜i|t˜i ⊕ k).
Therefore, the attacker computes
DTemplate(x˜, t˜) = arg max
k∈K
q˜∑
i=1
log P̂(x˜i|t˜i ⊕ k) (7.9)
where the logarithm is used to transform products into sums for a more reliable computation.
However, we would like to avoid empty bins for which P̂(x˜i|t˜i⊕k) = 0; otherwise, Equation (7.9)
would not be well defined.
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7.1.2 About Empty Bins
The empty bin issue appears when there exists i ∈ {1, . . . , q˜} and k ∈ K such that P˜(x˜i|t˜i⊕k) > 0
and P̂(x˜i|t˜i ⊕ k) = 0. This may even happen for the correct key hypothesis, leading to a wrong
key guess during the attack.
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Figure 7.1: Empirical probability P̂(x|t⊕ k) for t = 0 and k = 67 and q̂ = 2 560 000
Figures 7.1 and 7.2 show how empty bins can look like after a profiling phase1. We notice
that some parts of the histograms are left blank, some of them indicated by arrows noticed
as “holes” in the figures. These timing values x are possible “empty bins”. When such a hole
is called during the attack, meaning that the attacker gets a trace with corresponding with a
hole, we call this an empty bin. Notice that no additional “binning” is needed as in the case
of continuous distributions. The figures also show that the noise is not Gaussian as can be
observed from the shape of the distribution.
The shortcoming of empty bins can be seen when evaluating the likelihood. The attacker
encounters a zero probability, which makes the product vanish for the probability of a given key
guess, even if many traces are used. As we wrote earlier, the empty bin may appear even for the
correct key guess in template attacks, leading to a null success rate if not taken into account and
1Figures obtained with the STM Discovery Board presented in Section 8.1. The unit of x is the “clock cycle”.
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Figure 7.2: Empirical probability P̂(x|t⊕ k) for t = 0 and k = 149 and q̂ = 2 560 000
not well treated. As an example, the number of empty bins for the practical example presented
Section 8.1 for the correct key guess is around 500 for a poor learning phase and around 50 for
a good learning phase. This multiplication by zero is not inherent to the attack; it is rather a
profiling artifact. In fact, with more profiling traces, the empty bin would likely be populated.
Thus, the empty bin issue is a mere side-effect of insufficient profiling, which results in an attack
failure if it is encountered in the computation of the likelihood of the correct key.
7.2 Distinguishers which Tolerate Empty Bins
7.2.1 Building Distributions or Models
Before presenting the novel distinguishers in Subsection 7.2.2, we need to define yet another
other type of distribution known as a Dirichlet a posteriori in a Bayesian approach.
The Dirichlet A Posteriori
In order to avoid zero probabilities, we use a method based on Dirichlet Prior calculations [33,
Section 1]. This method leads to a new distribution denoted by sPα, where α > 0 is a user-defined
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parameter whose value (typically = 1) will be discussed next.
Let X be the set of possible values for x and T be the set of possible values for t. For any x,
we set px,t = P(x, t) their joint probability and p = (px,t)x,t. Prior to obtaining any trace, px,t
is completely unknown and we consider a Bayesian approach to estimate px,t.
1. We consider the following a priori : without further information, we suppose that for all
x, t, sPα(x, t) = αx,t∑
x′,t′ αx′,t′
,
where αx,t > 0 is an a priori parameter. To simplify, we may choose αx,t = α constant for
all x, t. Let us suppose that p follows a Dirichlet (prior) distribution, whose probability
density function is
f(p) =
Γ(
∑
x,t αx,t)∏
x,t Γ(αx,t)
∏
x,t
p
αx,t−1
x,t , (7.10)
where Γ is the Gamma function defined for x > 0 as
Γ(x) =
∫ +∞
0
tx−1e−t dt. (7.11)
The Dirichlet distribution can also be written as
f(p) =Nα
∏
x,t
p
αx,t−1
x,t , (7.12)
where Nα =
Γ(
∑
x,t αx,t)∏
x,t Γ(αx,t)
is a normalization factor. Notice that the prior distribution is
uniform when αx,t = α = 1 for all x, t.
2. Then suppose we know x̂, x˜, t̂ and t˜. We can now compute the a posteriori probability
P(x, t|x̂, x˜, t̂, t˜) =
∫
f(p, x, t|x̂, x˜, t̂, t˜) dp.
By Bayes’ rule,
f(p, x, t|x̂, x˜, t̂, t˜) = P(x, t|p, x̂, x˜, t̂, t˜)f(p|x̂, x˜, t̂, t˜).
As components xi and ti are i.i.d., we can write
f(p, x, t|x̂, x˜, t̂, t˜) = P(x, t|p) · f(p|x̂, x˜, t̂, t˜, t)
= px,t · f(p|x̂, x˜, t̂, t˜)
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Again by Bayes’ rule,
f(p|x̂, x˜, t̂, t˜) = P(x̂, x˜, t˜, t̂|p)f(p)
P(x̂, x˜, t˜, t̂)
=
∏
x′,t′∈X×T p
n̂x′,t′+n˜x′,t′ (k)
x′,t′
P(x̂, x˜, t˜, t̂)
f(p)
=
Nα
P(x̂, x˜, t˜, t̂)
∏
x′,t′∈X×T
p
n̂x′,t′+n˜x′,t′+αx′,t′−1
x′,t′ .
We recognize another Dirichlet distribution with parameters n̂x′,t′ + n˜x′,t′ + αx′,t′ . Let
Nα′ =
Γ(
∑
x′,t′ αx′,t′+n˜x′,t′+αx′,t′ )∏
x,t Γ(αx,t+n˜x′,t′+αx′,t′ )
be the new normalization constant for this distribution.
We, finally, obtain
f(p, x, t|x̂, x˜, t̂, t˜) = px,t ·Nα′
∏
x′,t′∈X×T
p
n̂x′,t′+n˜x′,t′+αx′,t′−1
x′,t′ . (7.13)
Therefore,
P(x, t|x̂, x˜, t̂, t˜) =
∫
px,t ·Nα′
∏
x′,t′∈X×T
p
n̂x′,t′+n˜x′,t′+αx′,t′−1
x′,t′ dp.
which is known as the Dirichlet a posteriori.
3. The integral can be easily expressed in terms of the Gamma function:
P(x, t|x̂, x˜, t̂, t˜) = Γ(
∑
x′,t′ αx,t + n̂x′,t′ + n˜x′,t′)∏
x′,t′ Γ(αx,t + n̂x′,t′ + n˜x′,t′)
×
∏
x′,t′ Γ(αx,t + n̂x′,t′ + n˜x′,t′ + δx,t)
Γ(
∑
x′,t′ αx,t + n̂x′,t′ + n˜x′,t′ + δx,t)
which simplifies to
P(x, t|x̂, x˜, t̂, t˜) = n̂x,t + n˜x,t + αx,t
q̂ + q˜ +
∑
x′,t′ αx′,t′
.
This new distribution will now be noted:
sPα(x, t) = P(x, t|x̂, x˜, t̂, t˜) = n̂x,t + n˜x,t + αx,t
q̂ + q˜ +
∑
x′,t′ αx′,t′
. (7.14)
It is important to notice that for all (x, t) ∈ X× T, one has sPα(x, t) > 0. In other words,sPα has no empty bin issue.
4. With sPα(x, t) we can calculate
sPα(t) = ∑
x
sPα(x, t) = ∑
x
n̂x,t + n˜x,t + αx,t
q̂ + q˜ +
∑
x′,t′ αx′,t′
=
n̂t + n˜t +
∑
t αx,t
q̂ + q˜ +
∑
x′,t′ αx′,t′
=
n̂t + n˜t + αt
q̂ + q˜ +
∑
x′ αx′
,
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where αt =
∑
x αx,t. The resulting conditional probability
1 is
sPα(x|t) = sPα(x, t)sPα(t) = n̂x,t + n˜x,t + αx,tn̂t + n˜t + αt . (7.15)
The Learned MIA Model
When q̂ is small, the model cannot be profiled accurately, and P̂ is a bad approximation of
P. However, these profiled values x˜ and t˜ can still be useful, yet they require a more robust
distinguisher.
Distinguishers that compute models using profiling have already been proposed. For example,
[61] computes a correlation on moments. However, correlations analysis may be sensitive to
model errors [85]. Mutual Information Analysis (MIA) yields a distinguisher that can be robust
when models are not perfectly known [85, Section 4], but it requires at least a vague estimation
of the leakage model.
Since our function ψ is unknown, we can create a first-order model ψ̂ with the profiled data
as
ψ̂(t⊕ k̂∗) = Step
( 1
nt
∑
i s.t. t̂i=t
x̂i
)
(∀t ∈ T). (7.16)
The Step function is a function that ensures the non-injectivity of the model. The simplest way
to define Step is the following:
Step(x) =
bd · xc
d
(x ∈ R)
where d > 0—the greater d, the smaller the step size. This parameter d has to be small enough
in order to make the model non-injective [34, Sec. 4.1]. In our case, we choose, for all our
experiments, d = 1. With such a model, it is possible to compute a MIA, which successfully
distinguishes the correct key.
7.2.2 Robust distinguishers
In this subsection, we present six distinguishers that tackle null probabilities. Some of these
solutions seem quite obvious while others are deduced from the notions presented in the preceding
Subsection 7.2.1.
1We should normally have used the notation
˜̂Pα instead of sPα, but we found this too heavy and confusing;
hence the use of sPα.
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Ê Hard Drop Distinguisher
The first naive method consists in removing all the traces which, for any key guess, have a zero
probability.
Definition 7.3 (Hard Drop Distinguisher). The hard drop distinguisher is defined as followed:
DHard(x˜, t˜) = arg max
k∈K
∑
i∈I
log P̂(x˜i|t˜i ⊕ k), (7.17)
where set I is defined as
I =
{
i ∈ {1, . . . , q˜} | ∀k ∈ K, P̂(x˜i|t˜i ⊕ k) > 0
}
. (7.18)
Recall that P̂, defined in Equation (7.2), is an empirical histogram estimated on profiled
data x̂ (along with corresponding texts t̂).
The Hard Drop Distinguisher, as the name indicates, drops some data. In very noisy cases,
it may even drop most of the data.
Ë Soft Drop Distinguisher
The second possibility is to drop values only for some keys. However, it has to be done carefully
because dropping a value in a product implicitly implies a probability value of one. For this
reason, instead of removing the trace, we replace the zero probability by a constant which is
smaller than the smallest probability.
Definition 7.4 (Soft Drop Distinguisher). We define the Soft Drop Distinguisher as
DSoft(x˜, t˜) = arg max
k∈K
∑
i s.t. P̂(x˜i|t˜i⊕k)>0
log P̂(x˜i|t˜i ⊕ k) +
∑
i s.t.P̂(x˜i|t˜i,k)=0
log γ, (7.19)
where γ ∈ R∗+ is a constant such that ∀i, k ∈ {1, . . . , q˜} ×K, γ ≤ P̂(x˜i|t˜i ⊕ k). This means
that we penalize data with zero probability. The smaller γ, the harder the penalty.
The choice of parameter γ is thus important in order to get a fair result for the distinguisher.
If we choose γ ≥ 1q̂ , the penalty may be greater than the smallest strictly positive probability.
This case would mean that the penalty is less important than some licit probabilities. On the
other hand, choosing γ smaller than 1q̂ means a very strong penalty. In this case, the limit when
γ → 0 is a distinguisher for which only the number of empty bins is really matters. This leads
to the Empty Bin Distinguisher presented next in Definition 7.8.
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Ì The Dirichlet Prior Distinguisher
The Dirichlet Prior Distinguisher uses the Dirichlet a posteriori distributions presented in
Subsection 7.2.1.
Definition 7.5 (The Dirichlet Distinguisher). We define the Dirichlet Distinguisher as:
DDirichlet(x˜, t˜) = arg max
k∈K
sPα(x˜|˜t⊕ k). (7.20)
Remark 7.1. As can be seen in the construction of the Dirichlet a posteriori, the Dirichlet
distinguisher is α-dependent. It is important to evaluate the influence of α over the success
rate. In practice, α = 1 seems a natural choice since the corresponding prior is uniform, which
minimizes the impact of the a priori. In contrast, another value of α like 1/2 can be interpreted
as an a priori bin count. We may also consider scenarios where α ≈ 0 to have the least possible
impact to the modified values of the histogram.
Í Offline-Online Profiling
The Dirichlet Prior Distinguisher is set by α. As we discussed in Remark 7.1, we can choose
any α so long as it is strictly positive (the Dirichlet distribution would not be defined if α = 0).
However, it is interesting to study its asymptotical behavior as α vanishes:
lim
α→0
sPα(x|t) = n̂x,t + n˜x,t
n̂t + n˜t
.
This distribution can be denoted as sP0(x|t) and resembles a profiling stage that would start
offline and continue online.
Definition 7.6 (Offline-Online Profiling). The Offline-Online Profiled (OOP) distinguisher is
defined as:
DOOP(x˜, t˜) = arg max
k∈K
sP0(x˜|˜t⊕ k) (7.21)
The OOP distinguisher seems easier than the Dirichlet prior distinguisher since α is no
longer in use. Of course, it also solves the empty bin issue since for all (x, t) ∈ X× T, one hassP0(x, t) > 0.
Î Learned MIA Distinguisher
The Learned MIA Distinguisher is constructed with the profiled model function ψ̂ presented in
Eqn. (7.16) of Subsection 7.2.1.
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Definition 7.7 (The Learned MIA Distinguisher).
The Learned MIA Distinguisher is defined as:
DMIALearned = arg max
k∈K
I˜
(
x˜; ψ̂(t˜⊕ k)
)
, (7.22)
where I˜ is the empirical mutual information [34].
Ï Empty Bin Distinguisher
The empty bin Distinguisher is yet another intuitive solution based on the idea that instead of
avoiding null probabilities, we may take only these into account. It is the key guess with the
least number of null probabilities that “should” be the correct key.
Definition 7.8. The Empty Bin Distinguisher is defined as:
DEmptyBin(x˜, t˜) = arg min
k∈K
q˜∑
i=1
1P̂(x˜i|t˜i⊕k)=0. (7.23)
The Empty Bin Distinguisher assumed that missing data contain more information than
actual (measured) data. More precisely, a drop should normally not happen unless the guessed
key is wrong; hence, the key guess with the least drops should be the correct key. Obviously,
this distinguisher is not effective anymore if no drop occurs for at least two key guesses.
Further Remarks All these distinguishers use a profiling phase. Before comparing them,
we would like to make a priori discussion about their respective efficiency. As the Hard Drop
Distinguisher does not take into account some data, we may suppose that it will be the one
with the least success rate for a given number of traces. The OOP Distinguisher takes into
account two types of data: profiling and attacking data. Therefore, it should be more efficient
than other distinguishers. Lastly, we build the Learned MIA Distinguisher in order to prevent
model errors, such as inaccurate profiling. In that case, we suppose that Learned MIA should
work better with few data during the profiling stage.
7.3 Simulated Results
In this section, we present the results obtained on a simulated model. With these results, we
can give a comparison of the proposed distinguishers.
136
7.3 Simulated Results
7.3.1 Presentation of the Simulated Model
The simulated model is built as follows:
xi = Hw(Sbox(ti ⊕ k∗)) + ui
= ϕ(ti ⊕ k∗) + ui = yi(k∗) + ui,
(7.24)
where ui is a discrete uniformly distributed noise ui ∼ U(−σ, σ), Sbox is the AES substitution
box function, and Hw is the Hamming weight of a byte.
This very simple leakage is used to compare distinguishers in the case the attacker has no
information about the model.
Remark 7.2 (Optimal Distinguisher). The optimal distinguisher (7.7) can be easily calculated if
the model is perfectly known, as
DOptimal(x˜, t˜) = arg max
k∈K
q˜∏
i=1
δσ(x˜i −Hw(Sbox(t˜i ⊕ k))), (7.25)
where δσ is defined such that δσ(x) = 1 if |x| ≤ σ and 0 otherwise. In Figures 7.3, 7.4 and 7.5,
we include the optimal distinguisher for reference, to show how far the other curves are from
the fundamental limit of performance.
By construction, the leakage simulation (7.24) generates some traces with zero probability,
but notice that there is no i such that P(xi|ti, k) = 0 for the correct key guess. This academic
example is useful to compare the distinguishers defined in Section 7.2.
7.3.2 Attack Results
We computed the success rates (7.6) of the various attacks (namely attacks Ê, Ë, Í, Î and Ï —
attack Ì being less efficient than its limit Í) for for σ = 24, n = 4 bits, and q̂ ranging from
small to high values.
The only difference between Figures 7.3, 7.4, and 7.5, is that we have increased the number
of data during the profiling stage. When profiling is bad (Figure 7.3), the best distinguisher is
the Offline-Online profiling distinguisher, while the Learned MIA Distinguisher is not as good as
was expected. When q̂ = 1 600 (Figure 7.4), all distinguishers improve. Finally, when profiling is
good (q̂ = 4 000, Figure 7.5), the best distinguisher is now the Empty Bin distinguisher, followed
by the Soft Drop distinguisher and the Offline-Online profiling.
Remark 7.3. In this very special case, we can show that the Empty Bin Distinguisher can
accurately approximate the Optimal Distinguisher. Indeed, the actual probability is such that
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for all (x, t) ∈ X× T,
P(x|y(k)) =
 12σ+1 if −σ ≤ x− ϕ(t⊕ k) ≤ σ,0 otherwise, (7.26)
which is constant if x is in the appropriate interval. For the Empty Bin Distinguisher,
P̂(x|y(k)) > 0 =⇒ P(x|y(k)) = 1
2σ + 1
due to the leakage model. Therefore, we can predict that at least q̂ = (2σ+ 1)|Y| 1min P(y) = 3 920
profiling traces are needed to make sure that the Empty Bin Distinguisher becomes as efficient
as the Optimal Distinguisher. As profiling consists in random draws with replacement, the
DEmptyBin distinguisher is found very close to the DOptimal distinguisher with q̂ = 4 000 profiling
traces.
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8.1 Results on Real Devices
We have chosen to carry out a timing attack on an STM32F4 discovery board [59]. One
interesting aspect is that we do not make any assumption on the model. In real life, the
leakage model happens to be much more complex than the one employed in simulations (e.g.,
Equation (7.24)). As will be seen, in practice empty bins appear even for the correct key guess
and for a “good” profiling phase. This observation differs from the ideal case of our simulations
carried out in the preceding Section 7.3.
8.1.1 The ARM processor
We used a STM32F4 discovery board by STMicroelectronics1. It contains an STM32F407VGT6
microcontroller, which has an ARM cortex-M4 MCU with 1 MB flash memory for instructions
and data, and a 192 KB Random Access Memory (RAM). The RAM is divided into three
sections: one of 16 KB, another one of 112 KB, and the last one consisting of 64 KB Core
Coupled Memory (CCM). The CCM has a zero flash wait state and is often used to store critical
data such as data from the operating system. Since the RAM is divided into three regions, the
users are unable to make use of the 192 KB RAM as a continuous memory block.
1We emphasize that the attacks we present are not due to a flaw in ARM or STMicroelectronics processors.
Instead, as we will discuss next, the CCM feature of STM32F4 processors allows to protect the implementation
against timing attacks by granting a constant execution time.
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STM32F4 microcontrollers contain a proprietary prefetch module (Adaptive Real-Time
memory accelerator - ART accelerator). ART accelerator contains an instruction cache which
has 64 lines and a data cache which contains 8 lines. The line size of both instruction cache
and data cache is 128-bits. The precise details about ART accelerator (cache replacement
policy and cache associativity) are not mentioned as the module is an intellectual property of
STMicroelectronics
The STM32F407VGT6 microcontroller does not have either a CPU cycle counter or a
performance register to measure a cycle accurate time. However, the Data Watchpoint and
Trace (DWT) unit has a cycle accurate 32 bit counter (DWTCYCCNT register), which can be
used for measuring the duration of critical operations. When processor runs at 168 MHz, the
DWTCYCCNT register will overflow at every 25.5 seconds providing enough time window to
measure the encryption / decryption time for an adversary to measure the elapsed time without
timer overflowing. In practice, we collected timing data repeatedly within the ARM, and then
dump it as large data buffers sporadically. This modus operandi allowed us to reach about
10 000 measurements per second.
8.1.2 Weaknesses - Non Constant AES Time
We use OpenSSL (version 1.0.2) AES as the cryptographic library, where the Sbox function
is implemented with large 1 KB T-boxes (see [63, Sec. 5.2.1, page 18]). Interestingly, the
OpenSSL code (copied in Appendix C.1) does not contain any conditional statement, hence can
be considered constant-time by a code review. However, once programmed on the STM32F4
processor, one notices that the execution duration depends on the inputs. The AES timing
acquisition is illustrated in Figure 8.1. Before each encryption, we reset DWTCYCCNT register.
This yields the exact timing of the AES execution (which is about 2 600 clock cycles in average
— recall Figure 7.1 and 7.2). In a real attack, an attacker would measure a noisy timing using an
external “chronometer”. However, our attack models the best case for an attacker; hence, bounds
the security of the analyzed implementation. In particular, we underline that our measurement
methodology is fully non invasive: the timing measurement is performed in parallel to the AES
computation, thereby keeping the victim circuit run at full speed, without interference.
Time deviations for different configurations of Instruction Cache (IC) and Data Cache (DC)
are shown in Figure 8.1. We observe a huge time difference when data cache is turned Off / On.
When DC is turned off, there is no timing leakage as AES is constant time. Yet, when DC is
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Figure 8.1: Measuring elapsed time for AES encryption
turned on, AES is not time constant. This non-constant time on AES leads to the following
conclusions:
• This is a weakness for the security of the processor as two different plaintext lead to two
different time clock to compute AES.
• Following Figure 8.1, it seems the enabling or not Instruction Cache, does not modify the
behaviour of the leakages.
• Data presented Figure 8.1 are obtained using a fixed key and varying one byte of the
plaintext.
Figure 8.1 instructs us that caches shall be disabled to reduce the leakage in timing. However,
we emphasize that such decision has a strongly negative impact on the AES performance: with
DC off, the overall AES execution time is about 27% longer.
Therefore, in a realistic context, we shall assume that both DC and IC are enabled, which
we will do in the sequel (see next Sec. 8.2 for some indications how well attacks perform when
caches are disabled).
8.1.3 Characterizing the leakages for Data Cache On
As seen earlier, when the Data Cache in enabled, the AES computation is not time constant.
This can be due to the T-boxes called during the computation. Indeed, calling a value in a
table also stores this in the Data Cache. If this value is called within the eight next calls, the
load will be faster. In Appendix C.1, we have copied the OpenSSL source code for the AES
encryption with a 128 bits key. In this code, we notice that there are 160 calls to the T-boxes.
In order find a model of the leakage, we inferred the cache policy of STM32F4 ARM micro-
controllers based on a thorough study of their timing response to some adaptively constructed
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Figure 8.2: Time deviations for different configurations of Instruction Cache (IC) and Data
Cache (DC).
145
8. OBTAIN A LEAKAGE MODEL WITH TIMING ATTACKS
 4120
 4130
 4140
 4150
 4160
 4170
 4180
 4190
 4200
 4210
 4220
 0  200  400  600  800  1000  1200
(c) IC ON and DC OFF
 4120
 4130
 4140
 4150
 4160
 4170
 4180
 4190
 4200
 4210
 4220
 0  200  400  600  800  1000  1200
(d) IC OFF and DC OFF
Figure 8.1: Time deviations for different configurations of Instruction Cache (IC) and Data
Cache (DC).
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requests. We discovered that it is actually a FIFO (First-In, First Out) cache. If one requests a
particular table lookup within last eight cache accesses, then the access is a hit (if not, it is a
miss).
In case of a hit, the time to access such register is 5 or 6 clock cycles faster than a miss. To
show this behaviour, we have done a very simple experiment:
• We generate a table of length 256;
• We generate 16 random values between 0x00 and 0xff;
• We call 16 elements of the table corresponding to the 16 values generated previously;
• We measure the time to call these 16 elements of the table.
We have plotted in Figure 8.2 the histogram of the clock cycles. the negative number in the
x axis is due to the fact that we have set the 0 at the maximum value of the clock cycles, which
is the obtained value for not hit at all1. We notice that when a hit occurs, the time is faster by
5 or 6 clock cycles. For two hits, there are three possible values: 10, 11 or 12 clock cycles.
Figure 8.2 has to be compared with a full AES encryption timing in order to see if this model
is relevant. Therefore, we have plotted in Figure 8.3 the histogram for a full AES encryption.
Once more, the 0 in the x axis is set to the maximum.
Very interestingly, we can observe in this figure high density levels corresponding to the hits:
1. One hit at -5 and -6;
2. Two hits at -10 and -11;
3. Three hits at -15 and -16.
Below -16 clock cycles, the hits are lost into the noise.
The comparaison of these two figures show that the FIFO model for table hits is correct,
but does not explain all the time leakage due to the cache policy of the processor.
8.1.4 Attack Results
As already noticed above, the leakage model is mostly unknown. We only suppose that the
text byte is mixed with the key through a XOR operation. As a consequence, the optimal
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Figure 8.2: Distribution of the clock cycles for a simple example
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Figure 8.3: Distribution of the clock cycles for a full AES encryption
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Figure 8.4: SR for q̂ = 25 600 on real-world measurements
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distinguisher (giving the limit of performance) is not known. The SNR of the leakage is
Var(E(x|t))/E(Var(x|t)) = 0.4.
In Figure 8.4, we notice that Learned MIA is the best distinguisher in the case of poor
profiling. The Hard Drop Distinguisher is not succeeding at all since it drops about 90% of the
data.
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Figure 8.5: SR for q̂ = 256 000 on real-world measurements
Figure 8.5 presents the success rate for a better profiling stage. We notice the following
interesting improvements:
• The Learned MIA distinguisher is only slightly better than in Figure 8.4. To reach 80%
success rate, 1 100 traces are needed as compared to 1 250 traces previously.
• The Soft Drop and Offline-Online distinguishers are the best distinguishers in this scenario,
with a small advantage for the Soft Drop distinguisher.
• The Hard Drop distinguisher remains unsuccessful.
1This is a voluntary choice as we only focus on the gap between two picks of distribution. The absolute value
has no real sense since we are comparing two computations that are not the same.
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We notice that the Soft Drop Distinguisher has been established using the γ parameter defined
in Equation 7.19 such that γ = 1/q˜.
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Figure 8.6: SR for q̂ = 2 560 000 on real-world measurements
Figure 8.6 is the continuation of Figure 8.5 with much more traces in the profiling stage. The
resulting profiling is very good and one may consider that the approximation of P is tight. In this
case, Soft Drop and OOP Distinguishers are both very successful, which seems natural regarding
the fact that P̂ has converged to the actual probability P. For this attack, we recall that the
timing of 10 000 traces can be acquired in one second. Therefore, the attack is successfully in
about 0.2 second using Soft Drop or OOP distinguishers.
As a conclusion to this study on the STM32F4 discovery board, we have learned the following
comparisons between the proposed distinguishers:
• when the profiling stage is poor, the best distinguisher is the Learn MIA Distinguisher;
• when there is enough data in the profiling stage, the best distinguisher is the Soft Drop
Distinguisher, closely followed by the OOP Distinguisher;
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• the Empty Bin Distinguisher converges to the optimal success rate, but is not as efficient
as previously in Section 7.3. This can be explained by the fact that we skip a lot of data
in the computation;
• the Hard Drop Distinguisher is the slowest to converge to 100% success rate.
Remark 8.1. When comparing Figures 8.5 and 8.6, we notice that the Empty Bin distinguisher
does not improve as the number of profiling traces increases. An explanation that there is no
more empty bins to be filled between these two situations; then only a more precise estimation
of the probability would make the difference.
Remark 8.2. As discussed in Definition 7.4, the value of γ is important. We have run the
same experience as in Figure 8.5 with γ = 1q̂×1010 . The results, we obtained, are presented in
Figure 8.7. When comparing this figure with Figure 8.5, we notice that the performance of
Figure 8.7: SR for q̂ = 256 000 with γ = 1
q̂×1010 .
the Soft Drop Distinguisher has dropped and is now much closer to that of the Empty Bin
Distinguisher, as we had forecast.
8.1.5 Nature of Empty Bins
Defined in 7.1.2, Empty Bins can appear under two circumstances. The first possibility is
insufficient profiling: some rare occurrences are not encountered by lack of training measurements.
The second possibility is what we call Structural Empty Bins. They are present whatever the
profiling under fixed key and do not depend on the number of traces q̂ in the profiling stage. In
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order to decide for the reason of Empty Bins, we have drawn the number of empty bins for a
given key according to the number of traces in the profiling stage.
Figure 8.8: Empirical number of empty bins
Figure 8.8 presents this study obtained with the STMicroelectronics Discovery Board. We
considered q̂ = 1 280 000, and define the number of empty bins as:∣∣∣∣{x ∈ { q̂minq=1 x̂q, . . . , q̂maxq=1 x̂q}, such that 6 ∃q, x̂q = x
}∣∣∣∣ .
We can see that the number of empty bins decreases, but never reaches 0. At the beginning, the
high number of empty bins is due to both poor profiling and structural empty bins. With a
good profiling, we only keep the structural empty bins.
8.1.6 Study on the Mean-Square Error
An interesting point noticed in Figures 8.4, 8.5, and 8.6 is that the Learned MIA distinguisher
is working better than the Soft Drop Distinguisher for a poor learning phase (i.e., q̂ = 25 600).
However, with a better learning phase (i.e., q̂ = 256 000 and q̂ = 2 560 000), the Soft Drop
Distinguisher has a much better success rate. In order to understand why the Learned MIA
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Distinguisher does not improve that much with a better learning phase, we have computed
the Mean-Square Error of these two distinguishers for the three learning phases (i.e., q̂ ∈
{25 600, 256 000, 2 560 000}).
Definition 8.1 (MSE, Bias and Variance). Let us consider a random variable X and its
expectation θ = E[X]. An estimator of the random variable is noted sX. The MSE is defined as
follows:
MSE = E
[
( sX − θ)2] .
The bias of the estimator is the expectation of the difference between the estimator and the
mean of the random variable:
Bias = E
[ sX − θ] .
At last, the variance of the estimator is:
Variance = E
[ sX2]− E [ sX]2
From these definitions, we have the following relation between MSE, bias and variance:
MSE = Bias2 + Variance (8.1)
The Mean-Square Error (MSE) is computed using the following method:
1. For the secret key k∗, we calculate the value of the distinguisher i.e. the value of P̂(x˜|˜t⊕k∗)
for the Soft Drop and I(x˜; ϕ̂(t˜ ⊕ k∗) for the Learned MIA. We compute this value for
different number of traces q˜. This gives an estimation of the normalized distinguisher for
the correct key.
2. The most accurate estimation is obtained for the highest value of q˜. Therefore, taking
the average over a large number of experiences for this highest value of q˜ gives a good
estimation of the Expectation of the estimator.
3. Then we calculate, for every value of q˜ the bias and the variance of the estimator, and the
Average MSE is obtained using the formula: MSE = Bias2 + Variance.
We have plotted in Figures 8.9 and 8.10 the Average MSE for the two distinguishers. In order
to be more relevant, we have plotted the logarithm of the MSE. Furthermore, we have chosen to
plot the MSE separately as the distinguishers are not comparable.
The MSE for the Learned MIA Distinguisher stays almost constant with the improvement
of the learning phase whereas the MSE of the Soft Drop Distinguisher is much smaller. This
means that a better learning phase gives a much better estimator of the distinguisher.
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Figure 8.9: Average MSE for the Learned MIA Distinguisher
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Figure 8.10: Average MSE for the Soft Drop Distinguisher
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To understand more deeply this MSE, we separate bias and variance for these two distinguish-
ers. The results are computed Figure 8.11 for the Learned MIA Distinguisher and Figure 8.12
for the Soft Drop Distinguisher.
Figure 8.11: Variance and bias of the Learned MIA Distinguisher
We notice the following aspects:
• For the Soft Drop Distinguisher, the bias is almost equal to zero. In fact, the MSE is the
variance.
• For the Learned MIA Distinguisher, it is mainly the opposite: the biggest part of the MSE
is the bias.
To conclude with the MSE, the Soft Drop Distinguisher improves because the estimator has a
much smaller variance with a better learning phase. Meanwhile, the Learned MIA Distinguisher
does not improve because it is a biased estimator and a better learning phase does not reduce
this bias.
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Figure 8.12: Variance and bias of the Soft Drop Distinguisher
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8.2 Success Rate in Presence of External Noise
The measurement setup used in simulation (Sec. 7.3) and on real-world traces (Sec. 8.1) is
ideal. Indeed, the only considered noise is said algorithmic, i.e., it consists in the varying timing
which arise from the parts of the algorithm not under study. In this section, we analyse the
effect of noise external to the monitored cryptographic algorithm. Subsection 8.2.1 discusses
in general terms the effect of noise addition, and subsection 8.2.2 details quantitatively how
distribution-based distinguishers cope efficiently with noise (while moment-based distinguishers
fail to resist noise).
8.2.1 Effect of Measurement Noise
However, in practice, timing measurements contain a noisy part. Let us give three examples:
1. Measure of a difference of timing between request and response from the AES (over a
network of unknown latency);
2. Use of a side-channel signal (such as the power or the electromagnetic field) to observe the
AES computation; the beginning and the end of an AES are easy to identify, as they consist
in sixteen consecutive operations (namely sixteen XOR making up the AddRoundKey
operations). As these patterns have a remarkable signature, they can be extracted with
great accuracy thanks to a mere cross-correlation. Still, the AES itself might not be
executed in constant time, hence some alignments issues;
3. Use of a cache attack, which would disclose that the program flows entered and exited the
AES function. However, the timing for access to cache is non deterministic.
Let us denote the variance of the added noise as σ2.
Now, it is known that any additive distinguishers (which is the case of our distinguishers),
the number of traces to recover the secret for a given success rate is inversely proportional to
the inverse of the signal-to-noise ratio (see e.g., [36, Corollary 2]).
As a direct consequence, we can predict the complexity of the attacks when IC and DC are
disabled. It can be seen in Figure 8.1 that the timing variation is about divided by three (from
≈ 20 to ≈ 8) when the DC is disabled. Therefore, the number of required traces to recover the
key is about multiplied by three.
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In addition, we can approximate the required number of traces to extract the key in presence
of external noise of standard deviation σ. In our case-study of OpenSSL AES on ARM, the
algorithmic noise has standard deviation about 20 clock cycles (see Figure 7.1 and 7.2).
So, if the external noise has standard deviation σ < 20, the impact is small. But when
σ/20 > 1, the influence of the external noise becomes preponderant. As the algorithmic noise
and the external noise are independent, the number of traces required to extract the key will
actually grow linearly with σ as soon as σ/20 1.
8.2.2 Comparison with Existing Methods in the Presence of Noise
In this subsection, we aim at comparing our distribution-based method with the existing methods
(moment-based method mentioned in Tab. 6.1). In particular, we focus on the representative
Bernstein correlation [5] with a learned model [the timing expectation for each value of the
target AES byte], that we refer to as “CPA”. This “CPA” between timing measurements and
the learned average of timing per byte of the key does not suffer from the empty bin issue. We
start by a comparison with little external noise. In this case, we have plotted in Figure 8.13
the success rate for both the soft drop distinguisher and the CPA. The x axis represents the
number of traces for the profiling phase while the y axis is the number of traces needed during
the attack to reach 80% of success rate. We notice that the CPA performs better than the soft
drop method, for any profiling (even when learning with several million of traces). This can be
due to bias between the profiled distribution and the attack distribution.
However, in a practical case, we encounter noisy timing leakages. In order to compare
our methods with the existing methods (such as CPA) in the presence of external noise, we
plotted Figure 8.14. In this figure, we took a good profiling phase (q̂ = 3× 106), i.e., profiling is
performed on sufficiently enough traces. This figure is obtained for a noisy timing, that is the
nominal time to compute AES (as in Subsec. 7.1.2), where the noise follows the following law:{
0 added time with probability 50%,
T added (T ∈ N, a number of clock periods), with probability 50%. (8.2)
This models the interruption of the CPU from a peripheral when AES is baremetal, or a
descheduling of the AES process during one time slot on systems with an operating system
(OS). Indeed, such events have the consequence, when they occur, to add a long period of time
(often as long or even longer than the duration of the AES) to the encryption time, so that the
interruption can be served, or so that the OS re-schedules the AES process. We notice that, in
such case, it is more interesting to compute one of our methods, rather than previous existing
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Figure 8.13: Comparison between CPA and soft drop distinguisher at 80% of success rate
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(a) Standard deviation = 5
(b) Standard deviation = 50
Figure 8.14: Success rate for soft drop versus CPA for small noise and noise of standard deviation
T = 50 (recall (8.2))
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methods such as CPA. Indeed, distribution-based profiling is more accurate than CPA estimation
with noisy signals. For instance, the results from Hassan Aly and Mohammed ElGayyar [1] show
that 222 encryptions are required for a key extraction on a more recent processors (Pentium
Dual-Core and Core 2 Duo), which is significantly more than that used by Bernstein CPA in his
original attack [6]. The authors of this paper remark incidentally that the best method is not to
use correlation with the means of each class, but with the minimum value in each class. This
confirms that the complexity of the distributions are better suited for distinguishing that simply
the average per class. This justifies that our study focuses on distribution-based distinguishers
(more robust to binary noise situations encountered while measuring durations) rather than
moment-based distinguishers (recall Tab. 6.1).
8.3 Conclusion and Perspectives
We have derived several “information-theoretic” distinguishers as possible solutions to the empty
bin issue. Some of them, like the Dirichlet Prior and the Offline-Online distinguishers, required
the computation of novel distributions. We have shown in particular that the empty bins,
previously believed to be an annoyance and dropped accordingly, can turn out to be valuable
assets for the attacker as long as they are treated carefully. In all the part, real timing data are
used, making the results very practical.
We have also compared the various distinguishers under two frameworks: a simulated test
with synthetic leakage and real-world timing attacks. In both cases, we noticed that the outcome
of the attacks depends on the quality of the profiling stage. A good profiling improves the results,
where the best distinguisher seems to be the Soft Drop Distinguisher. A poor profiling makes the
traditional distinguishers break down. More sophisticated solutions like Offline-Online Profiling
and Learned MIA distinguishers are very useful in this case. A possible way to investigate more
on this aspect is to use more powerfull statistical tools in order to extract the most precise
model for the Learned MIA Distinguisher.
The interesting aspect on the studied timing attack is that one does not have to make
any assumption on the leakage model. In addition to this, the main advantage of the new
distinguishers is that the empty bin issue is completely solved. We also introduced distinguishers
which can jointly exploit offline and online side-channel measurements. As an interesting
perspective, our approach could advantageously be analyzed using the “perceived information”
metric recently introduced by Standaert et al. in [71, Eqn. (1)].
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Another perspective would be to compare our information-theoretic attacks with attacks
based on machine learning techniques. Surprisingly and contrary to results reported in other
papers, our preliminary results show that SCA based on support vector machines [40] has poor
performance, even when profiling with very few traces (q̂ is small), which may be due to the
univariate nature of the leakage.
An interesting observation is that writing cryptographic code robust to timing attacks is
challenging. While the OpenSSL code for AES has no obvious flaw (such as unbalanced branches
which depend on sensitive data), the timing of AES is data-dependent, due to microarchitectural
features of the studied ARM core. There seem to exist two classes of solutions against timing
attacks: The first aims at randomizing the execution timing, as studied for instance in [6]. Such
an implementation can still be attacked with high-order distinguishers, albeit with more traces
than without any protection. The second would attempt to balance the timing, yet this requires
some hardware support such as the CCM feature of the STM32F4 processors.
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9.1 Conclusion
The title of my Ph.D. is “Towards a Better Formalization of the Side-Channel Threat”. When I
was recruited by Olivier Rioul in 2015 to start my Ph.D., Annelie Heuser was finishing writing
her manuscript. During her thesis, she specially focused on the study of distinguishers. I could
therefore use her fresh results to work on my thesis.
During my thesis, I focused on the similarities between a side-channel leakage model and a
communication channel. The main result of these three years is based on a mathematical link
between the success rate of an attack and the signal-to-noise ratio of the leakage. To obtain
this result, I have used information theoretic tools. More specifically, I focused on the Mutual
Information between the sensitive variable and the measured traces. When the noise is Gaussian,
the Mutual Information is a function of the SNR. However, the main difficulty is that the
leakage is not independent. This means that the Mutual Information is more complicated than
Shannon’s formula. I have therefore investigated on the estimation of Mutual Information for
this particularity of side-channel analysis. This is indeed a particularity since in the literature in
communication theory, most of the channels are considered with independent random variables.
According to me, this result will give a good bound to the efficiency of a model. Indeed, in
side-channel analysis, the SNR is model dependant. With this knowledge of the SNR, we have
an upper-bound on the success rate. This gives a first idea of the level of security of a chip
without making simulations to calculate the success rate.
It is possible to extend this result to protected implementations but the formula of the
mutual information is much more difficult to calculate. A possibility would therefore be to
consider the approximation of Independence even if the bound is therefore looser.
On a more personal point-of-view, this thesis has been for me a very intense period. When
I arrived at Te´le´com in 2015, I had never heard of cryptography. Side-channel analysis has
therefore been for me a very good mean to enter this particular world. Side-channel analysis is
a mixture between cryptography, electronics, mathematics and physics. This is therefore a very
beautiful topic of research and I am confident that several talented researchers will invest time
in this field.
More generally, this three years and a half Ph.D. has made of me a more mature man. When
I started in 2015, I had no idea of what I could do after my thesis. During these three years I
have learned how to be rigorous and how to self-criticize my work. I believe that I will be very
well prepared for my future work.
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9.2 Further Perspectives
Side Channel analysis has a very large spectrum of applications and studies. This topic is quite
new since the first literature on this subject appeared in the 1990s.
The next challenges for the coming years will be focused on the Artificial Intelligence. Indeed,
neural networks will be soon able to extract leakage models and furthermore, be able to recover
secret keys. On the future of cryptography, post-quantum is a big topic of research. To prepare
this quantum revolution, designers are already rethinking asymmetric algorithms (such as RSA)
to be secured against quantum cryptanalysis. These new algorithms will be of course subject to
side-channel analysis and it will be interesting to study them on different architectures.
On the study of distinguishers, another interesting topic of research will be the success rate
under a wrong leakage model. In communication theory, this is called mismatch decoding. I
mentioned this issue in the appendix but I believe that there is a lot to study in order to predict
the success rate of an attack under this supposition.
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A. APPENDIX ON THE SHANNON BOUND
A.1 Proof of Lemma 4.1
Let t ∈ T and τ be the considered permutation. We have
H(X | T = t) = −
∑
x
P(x | t) log2 P(x | t))
= −
∑
x
[∑
k
P(k)P(x | t, k)
]
log2
(∑
k
P(k)P(x | t, k)
)
= −
∑
x
[∑
k
P(k)
q∏
i=1
P(xi | ti, k)
]
log2
(∑
k
P(k)
q∏
i=1
P(xi | ti, k)
)
Re-arranging both products so that they are ordered in accordance with the permutation, we
obtain
H(X | T = t) = −
∑
x
[∑
k
P(k)
q∏
i=1
P(xτ(i) | tτ(i), k)
]
log2
(∑
k
P(k)
q∏
i=1
P(xτ(i) | tτ(i), k)
)
= −
∑
x
[∑
k
P(k)
q∏
i=1
P(xi | tτ(i), k)
]
log2
(∑
k
P(k)
q∏
i=1
P(xi | tτ(i), k)
)
= H(X | T = τ(t))
A.2 Proof of (3.5)
We study the sign of the difference
∆ = −EY log2 EX [exp(f(X,Y ))] + log2 EX [exp(EY f(X,Y ))];
= − log2 expEY log2 EX′ [exp(f(X ′, Y ))] + log2 EX [exp(EY log2 exp f(X,Y ))];
= log2 EX
exp(EY log2 exp f(X,Y ))
expEY log2 EX′ [exp(f(X ′, Y ))]
;
= log2 EX expEY [log2 exp f(X,Y )− log2 EX′ [exp(f(X ′, Y ))]] ;
= log2 EX expEY
[
log2
exp f(X,Y )
EX′ [exp(f(X ′, Y ))]
]
.
Since the log function is concave:
∆ ≤ log2 EX exp log2 EY
[
exp f(X,Y )
EX′ [exp(f(X ′, Y ))]
]
;
= log2 EXEY
[
exp f(X,Y )
EX′ [exp(f(X ′, Y ))]
]
;
= log2 EY
[
EX exp f(X,Y )
EX′ exp(f(X ′, Y ))
]
;
= log2 EY [1] ;
= 0.
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A.3 Proof of Corollary 3.1
In Lemma 3.5, we have proven that:
EY log2 EX [exp(f(X,Y ))] ≥ log2 EX [exp(EY f(X,Y ))]
or
EY log2 EX [exp(f(X,Y ))] ≥ log2 EX [exp(EY log exp f(X,Y ))].
Setting g(x, y) = exp(f(x, y)), we have:
EY log2 EX [g(X,Y )] ≥ log2 EX [exp(EY log g(X,Y ))].
Hence,
expEY log2 EX [g(X,Y )] ≥ exp log2 EX [exp(EY log g(X,Y ))]
≥ EX [exp(EY log g(X,Y ))]
A.4 Alternative Proof of (3.5) and Further Comments
Consider, for any random vector Y′,
∆ = I(X; Y) + EY logEY′ exp
(
EX|Y log
P(X | Y′)
P(X | Y)
)
= EYEX|Y log
P(X | Y)
P(X)
+ EY logEY′ exp
(
EX|Y log
P(X | Y′)
P(X | Y)
)
= EY log expEX|Y log
P(X | Y)
P(X)
+ EY logEY′ exp
(
EX|Y log
P(X | Y′)
P(X | Y)
)
= EY logEY′ expEX|Y log
P(X | Y)
P(X)
+ EY logEY′ exp
(
EX|Y log
P(X | Y′)
P(X | Y)
)
= EY logEY′ expEX|Y log
P(X | Y)P(X | Y′)
P(X)P(X | Y)
= EY logEY′ expEX|Y log
P(X | Y′)
P(X)
By the concavity of the log function,
∆ ≤ EY logEY′ exp logEX|Y P(X | Y
′)
P(X)
= EY logEX|Y
EY′P(X | Y′)
P(X)
= EY logEX|Y
P(X′)
P(X)
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where the X′ distribution is given by P(x′) = EY′P(x | Y′). It is important to note that this
derivation can be applied for any random vector Y′. The derivations made in Section 3.2 were
made for Y′ following the same distribution as Y. In this case P(X′) = P(X) and
∆ ≤ EY logEX|Y P(X)P(X) = 0
which proves inequality (3.5).
Another choice is to take an i.i.d. vector Y′ having the same marginals as Y. Then
∆ = EY logEY′ expEX|Y log
P(X | Y′)
P(X)
and by Corollary 3.1,
∆ ≤ EY log expEX|Y logEY′ P(X | Y
′)
P(X)
= EYEX|Y log
EY′P(X | Y′)
P(X)
= EX,Y log
∏
i P(Xi)
P(X)
× P(X | Y)
P(X | Y)
= I(X; Y)− qI(X;Y )
which is to be compared to Lemma 3.3. This proves that if applying our second bound with
such an i.i.d. distribution Y′ would lead to a bound that would be worse than the first upper
bound (3.4).
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A.5 A Discussion about Masking
In chapter 3, we supposed that there was no masking in the AES protocols. Nowadays, as
side-channel analysis becomes a real threat, designers have started to invent new types of security
against side-channel analysis. Masking is a good way to improve the security of a chip. Indeed,
the higher the order of masking is, the more difficult it is to break the security of an embedded
system.
Even if the security of the chip increases, it is though possible to recover the secret key.
Nicolas Bruneau et al. mathematically proved that the best possible attack in case of masking
is the maximum likelihood [16]. We can also cite once again Duc’s paper where he showed that
the order of making exponentially increases the security of a chip in the sens that the number of
traces needed to recover the secret key are much higher [29, Equation (10)].
According to the leakage model of [16], we obtain the following framework for the communi-
cation channel.
K Encoder
Y0, . . . ,Yd
Channel
X0, . . . ,Xd
Decoder K̂
T T
N0, . . . ,Nd
Figure A.1: Representation of Side-Channel with masks
We consider that the masking order is d. In Figure A.1, the notations are the following:
• the d shares of sensitive variables are represented by Y0, . . . ,Yd.
• N0, . . . ,Nd are the d shares of additive noise.
• The d shares of the traces are X0, . . . ,Xd.
The Markov chain with masking security, therefore becomes:
(K,T) −→ (Y0, . . . ,Yd,T) −→ (X0, . . . ,Xd,T). −→ K̂ (A.1)
This means that Lemma 3.2 can be adapted to masking and becomes
H(K)− (1− Ps) log2(2n − 1)−H2(Ps) ≤ I(X0 . . .Xd;K | T). (A.2)
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This means that, one again, the Mutual Information between the traces and the key is
relevant to calculate a bound on the success rate. However, estimating such Mutual Information
is a open issue.
A.6 About Mismatched Decoding
The upper-bound obtained by Theorem 3.1 is always true for any distinguisher. Moreover, as
we have based our calculations with the best possible case for the attacker. Indeed, the lower
bound is obtained because we have supposed that the attacker knows the leakage model and
therefore the distributions P.
However, in many cases, the attacker only knows an estimation of the leakage distribution
(noted P̂) that may not be exactly equal to P. In this case, our bound is still correct since
the knowledge of P is the best possible case for the attacker. In this filed, Franc¸ois-Xavier
Standaert proposed the notion of Perceived Information [30] as a metric to measure the impact
of the estimation distribution P̂ on the mutual information. In this section, we first re-write the
Shannon channel coding theorem to show that it is possible to recover the secret key if perceived
information is strictly positive (cf. Subsection A.6.1). Then we discuss about an information
theoretic paper written by Neri Merhav and Amos Lapidoth in 1994 that deals with mismatch
decoding [58](cf. Subsection A.6.2).
A.6.1 The Channel Coding Theorem with Divergence
In Information Theory, the Channel Coding Theorem written and proved by C.E. Shannon
in [79] shows that, it is possible to send a message with an arbitrary small amount of error
through a channel, as long as the rate of the message (i.e. the number of sent bits) is lower than
the mutual information of this channel.
In his demonstration, Shannon supposed that the channel was perfectly known, meaning
that the probability P(y|x) was known. In our case, we only have P̂(y|x) at our disposal. This
means that even if Shannon’s theory is true, we do not how far we can go with our estimation.
Thus, we will re-write the proof of the channel-coding theorem with the consideration that the
attacker makes an error of estimation.
Theorem 1.1 (Channel Coding with Divergence). Let us consider a channel noted (Y,P(y|x),X),
where the decoder only knows P̂(y|x) an estimation of P(y|x). We suppose furthermore that the
decoder perfectly knows the distribution of X (i.e. P(x)).
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Let a message M to be sent taken uniformly in a set M and to be sent over a block of length
q. The rate of the transmission is thus R = log2(|M|q . Let ε > 0, there exists a code C such that
the probability of error is smaller than ε as long as R < I(X;Y )−D(P(y|x)||P̂(y|x))− ε.
To prove Theorem 1.1, we first show the law of great numbers for a random variable taken
under another distribution.
Lemma 1.1. Let X a random i.i.d. vector of size q following the distribution P and P̂ another
distribution taking its values in the same set as X. Then, we have:
−1
q
log2 P̂(X) −→
q→∞ H(X) + D(P||P̂)
This is a convergence in probability.
Proof for Lemma 1.1. We use the Bienayme´-Chebychev inequality to show the convergence. Let
ε > 0, we know that:
P
[
| − 1
q
log2 P̂(X)− E
[
− 1
n
log2 P̂(X)
]
| ≥ ε
]
≤ qVar
q2ε2
P
[
| − 1
q
log2 P̂(X)−H(X) + D(P||P̂)| ≥ ε
]
≤ Var
qε2
Therefore, we have:
P
[
| − 1
q
log2 P̂(X)−H(X) + D(P||P̂)| ≥ ε
]
−→ 0
As this is true for any ε > 0, this proves the lemma.
We have now shown that the law of great numbers leads to a value which is H(X) + D(P||P̂).
In order to prove the Channel-Coding Theorem, C.E Shannon defined subsets of Xq × Yq called
typical sets. All the definitions of the typical sets, and their properties may be found in [23,
Chapter 7]. We define here typical sets related to the estimation P̂ of a random variable.
Definition 1.1 (Typical set related to P̂). Let X a random i.i.d. vector of size q following the
distribution P and P̂ the estimation of this distribution. Let ε > 0. The typical set related to P̂
is defined as:
AεP̂ = {x ∈ Xq | | −
1
q
log2 P̂(x)−H(X)−D(P||P̂)| ≤ ε}
For two random vectors X and Y, we can also define the joint typical set.
Definition 1.2 (Joint Typical set related to P̂). Let X and Y two i.i.d. random vectors of
length q each. (X,Y) follows the distribution PXY and the estimation is P̂XY . The marginal
distribution of X is PX and the marginal distribution of Y is PY . Let ε > 0. The joint typical
set related to P̂ is noted AεP̂XY . (x,y) ∈ X
q × Yq belongs to AεP̂XY if and only if the three
conditions below are verified:
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1. | − 1q log2 P̂X(x)−H(X)−D(PX ||P̂X)| ≤ ε;
2. | − 1q log2 P̂Y (y)−H(Y )−D(PY ||P̂Y )| ≤ ε;
3. | − 1q log2 P̂XY (x,y)−H(X,Y )−D(PXY ||P̂XY )| ≤ ε.
In [23], Cover and Thomas prove that the joint typical set has several very interesting
properties. Here, with the joint typical set related to P̂, we adapt these properties so they can
fit with the estimation.
Lemma 1.2 (Properties of the joint typical set related to P̂). Let (X,Y) a random vector of
length q drawn i.i.d. according to PXY and estimated by P̂XY . Let ε > 0. We have:
1. P
[
(X,Y) ∈ AεP̂XY
]
−→ 1 as q →∞;
2. |AεP̂XY | ≤ 2
q(H(X,Y )+D(PXY ||P̂XY )+ε)
3. For X˜, Y˜ two independent random vectors such that X˜ ∼ PX and Y˜ ∼ PY the marginals
of PXY , we have:
P
[
(X˜, Y˜) ∈ AεP̂XY
]
≤ 2−n(I(X;Y )−D(PXY ||P̂XY )+D(PX ||P̂X)+D(PY ||P̂Y )−3ε)
The last property of the Lemma 1.2 seems quite heavy with the number of divergences.
However, in our case, we suppose that the attacker knows the distribution of Y, meaning that
D(Py||P̂Y ) = 0. Furthermore, we have the relation between D(PX ||P̂X) and D(PXY ||P̂XY ):
D(PX ||P̂X)−D(PXY ||P̂XY ) = −D(PY |X ||P̂Y |X) (A.3)
Proof of Lemma 1.2. We prove each term of the lemma one by one. Let ε > 0.
1. By the law of large numbers we know that there exist n1, n2, n3 such that:
P
[
| − 1
n1
log2 P̂X(X)−H(X)−D(PX ||P̂X)| > ε
]
≤ ε
3
P
[
| − 1
n2
log2 P̂Y (Y)−H(Y )−D(PY ||P̂Y )| > ε
]
≤ ε
3
P
[
| − 1
n3
log2 P̂XY (X,Y)−H(X,Y )−D(PXY ||P̂XY )| > ε
]
≤ ε
3
Taking n = max{n1, n2, n3}, and the union of the three probabilities, we obtain, for every
q ≥ n:
P
[
(X,Y) /∈ AεP̂XY
]
≤ ε
This proves the first part of the lemma.
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2. We have the following inequality:
1 =
∑
x,y∈Xq×Yq
P̂XY (x,y)
≥
∑
x,y∈AεP̂XY
P̂XY (x,y)
≥ |AεP̂XY |2
−n(H(X,Y )+D(PXY ||P̂XY )+ε)
This show the second part of the lemma.
3. We consider X˜ and Y˜ defined in the lemma. We have:
P
[
(X˜, Y˜) ∈ AεP̂XY
]
=
∑
x,y∈AεP̂XY
P̂X(x)P̂Y (y)
≤ |AεP̂XY |2
−n(H(X)+D(PX ||P̂X)−ε)2−n(H(Y )+D(PY ||P̂Y )−ε)
Putting this with the proof result of item 2, we obtain the inequality.
With all of these tools, we are now able to proof the Channel-Coding Theorem with divergence.
This proof will be mainly inspired by the proof of the Coding-Channel Theorem written by
Cover and Thomas in [23]. Our main contribution is to add the divergence into the proof and
use typical sets including divergence to do so.
Proof of the Channel-Coding Theorem. To prove the Channel-Coding theorem, Shannon did
not consider the probability of error of one particular code, but the average of the probability of
error, taken over all the possible codebooks for a given message. Let us consider a rate R and
the length q of the sent vector of the message. Shannon proved that the average probability of
error over all the codebooks, is equal to the average probability of error over all the codebooks
supposing that one particular index was sent. Let us consider a massage modeled by the random
equiprobable variable M and the possible set of M is {1, . . . , 2qR}. Y is therefore a function of
M . Let us suppose that we send a 1 over the channel. Then, the average probability of error
over all the codebooks knowing that a 1 is sent is noted P(E|M = 1).
We consider the following decoding scheme: y(1) is sent over the noisy channel and x is
received. The decoder tests for which i ∈ {1, . . . , 2qR} the y(i) and x are jointly typical with
probability P̂XY . An error occurs if y(1) and x are not jointly typical, or if there is another
i 6= 1 such that y(i) and x are jointly typical. Let us note Bi the event: y(i) and x are jointly
typical. We notice that if index 1 is sent, then, for any i 6= 1, Y(i) and X will be independent as
the code is chosen randomly. The average probability of error over all the codebooks is therefore:
P(E|M = i) = P [Bc1 ∪B2 ∪ . . . ∪B2qR ]
≤ P(Bc1) +
2qR∑
i=2
P(Bi)
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Let ε > 0. According to Lemma 1.2, we know that there exists q large enough such that
P(Bc1) ≤ ε. Moreover, for Bi with i 6= 1, the probabilities are independent. Therefore, we have,
according to Lemma 1.2 we have: P(Bi) ≤ 2−n(I(X;Y )−D(PY |X ||P̂Y |X)−3ε) Therefore, we have, for
ε > 0 and q sufficiently large:
P(E|M = i) ≤ ε+
2qR∑
i=2
2−q(I(X;Y )−D(PY |X ||P̂Y |X)−3ε)
≤ ε+ (2qR − 1)2−q(I(X;Y )−D(PY |X ||P̂Y |X)−3ε)
≤ ε+ 2q(R−I(X;Y )+D(PY |X ||P̂Y |X)+3ε)
≤ 2ε if R− I(X;Y ) + D(PY |X ||P̂Y |X) + 3ε < 0
Remark 1.1. We notice that I(X;Y ) − D(PY |X‖P̂Y |X) is equal to the Perceived information
metric proposed by Franc¸ois-Xavier Standeart in [30]. This means that, in a side-channel context,
if the perceived information if positive, it is possible to recover the secret key of the device.
However, we are not able to tell how fast the key recovery will be with this approach since
this calculation only shows the achievability o fa coding rate.
A.6.2 Discussion About Merhav’s Paper
In 1994, Merhav et al. published an article dealing with mismatch decoding in information
theory. When the decoding is performed with a maximum likelihood distinguisher based on an
estimation of the distribution P̂ instead of P, the article show that the the maximum achievable
rate of transmission exists and can be calculated. Moreover, if the coding rate is higher than
this limit, the probability of error tends towards 1. In side-channel analysis, to result does not
tell how fast the probability of success of the attack Ps will converge to 1.
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B.1 Proof of Lemma 5.3
The MIA distinguisher is expressed as
D(k) = I(Y (k∗) +N ;Y (k)) = h(Y (k∗) +N)− h(Y (k∗) +N | Y (k)). (B.1)
From Section 5.3.1, Y (k∗) knowing Y (k) is a binary random variable with probability κ(k).
As N is Gaussian independent from Y (k), the pdf of Y (k∗) +N knowing Y (k) is a Gaussian
mixture that can take two forms:
pκ(k)(x) =
 1√2piσ [κ(k)e
− (x−1)2
2σ2 + (1− κ(k))e− (x+1)
2
2σ2 ]
1√
2piσ
[κ(k)e−
(x+1)2
2σ2 + (1− κ(k))e− (x−1)
2
2σ2 ]
, (B.2)
By symmetry, their entropy h(Y (k∗) +N | Y (k)) will be the same and we can take any of these
pdfs. Letting ϕ be the standard normal density, we can write
pκ(k)(x) = p1/2(x)− 2(1/2− κ(k))ϕ(x)e−
1
σ2 sinh(
x
σ2
) (B.3)
= p1/2(x)(1− 2(1/2− κ(k)) tanh( x
2σ2
). (B.4)
where
p1/2(x) =
1
2
√
2piσ
[e−
(x−1)2
2σ2 + e−
(x+1)2
2σ2 ] =
1
σ
e−
1
2σ2 ϕ(
x
σ
) cosh(
x
σ2
). (B.5)
For notational convenience define ε = 2(1/2− κ(k)), p = p1/2(x), and t = tanh(x). Then
I(X;Y (k)) = h(Y (k∗) +N)− h(Y (k∗) +N | Y (k)) (B.6)
= −
∫
p log2 p+
∫
(p(1− εt)) log2(p(1− εt)) (B.7)
= −
∫
εpt log2 p+
∫
p log2(1− εt)−
∫
pεt log2(1− εt). (B.8)
The first term vanishes since p is even and t odd. We apply a Taylor expansion:
I(X;Y (k)) =
∫
p[−εt− ε
2t2
2
− ε
3t3
3
+O(ε4)]−
∫
εpt[−εt− ε
2t2
2
− ε
3t3
3
+O(ε4)]. (B.9)
The odd terms of the expansion are null as t is odd and p even. We therefore obtain:
I(X;Y (k)) =
∫
p[−ε
2t2
2
+O(ε4)]−
∫
[−ε2pt2 +O(ε4)] =
∫
ε2pt2
2
+O(ε4). (B.10)
Thus, finally,
D(k) = 2 log2(e)(1/2− κ(k))2g(σ), (B.11)
where
g(σ) =
1
σ
e−
1
2σ2
∫
R
ϕ(
x
σ
) cosh(
x
σ2
) tanh2(
x
σ2
)dx. (B.12)
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There are several ways to express g(σ). For example, we have:
g(σ) = e−
1
2σ2
∫
R
ϕ(x) cosh(
x
σ
) tanh2(
x
σ
)dx. (B.13)
This expression can be reduced to:
g(σ) =
1
2
EX
[
tanh2(
X
σ
+
1
σ2
) + tanh2(
X
σ
− 1
σ2
)
]
, (B.14)
where X ∼ N(0, 1). By the dominated convergence theorem (tanh2(Xσ + 1σ2 ) is always smaller
than 1) when σ → 0, we obtain g(0) = 1 and when σ →∞ we obtain the equivalent 1σ2 .
B.2 Proof of Lemma 5.4
The success exponent is defined by
SE =
E[D̂(k∗)− D̂(k)]2
2Var(D̂(k∗)− D̂(k))
. (B.15)
where in our case
D̂(k) =
1
q
√
1 + σ2
∣∣∣ q∑
i=1
XiYi(k)
∣∣∣. (B.16)
First for large q we can consider that E[|∑iXiYi(k)|] = |E[∑iXiYi(k)]|.
E[D̂(k)] = |E[XY (k)]| = 2× |
1/2− κ(k)|√
1 + σ2
(B.17)
hence
E[D̂(k∗)− D̂(k)] = 1− 2× |
1/2− κ(k)|√
1 + σ2
. (B.18)
Secondly we have
Var(D̂(k∗)− D̂(k)) = 1
q2(1 + σ2)
Var
(∣∣∣ q∑
i=1
XiYi(k
∗)
∣∣∣− ∣∣∣ q∑
i=1
XiYi(k)
∣∣∣). (B.19)
To remove the absolute values, we distinguish two cases whether the sum is positive or negative.
We consider that q is large enough to have strictly positive or negative values.
Var(D̂(k∗)− D̂(k)) = 1
q2(1 + σ2)
Var
( q∑
i=1
XiYi(k
∗)∓
q∑
i=1
XiYi(k)
)
(B.20)
=
1
q2(1 + σ2)
Var
( q∑
i=1
Xi
(
Yi(k
∗)∓ Yi(k)
))
(B.21)
=
1
q(1 + σ2)
Var
(
X
(
Y (k∗)∓ Y (k))) (B.22)
=
1
q(1 + σ2)
Var
(
(Y (k∗) +N)
(
Y (k∗)∓ Y (k))) (B.23)
=
1
q(1 + σ2)
Var
(∓Y (k∗)Y (k) +N(Y (k∗)∓ Y (k))). (B.24)
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The variance term is the difference of the two following quantities
E
[
(∓Y (k∗)Y (k) +N(Y (k∗)∓ Y (k)))2
]
= 1 + 2σ2(1− 2|1/2− κ(k)|) (B.25)
E
[
∓Y (k∗)Y (k) +N(Y (k∗)∓ Y (k))
]2
=
(
2(1/2− κ(k))
)2
. (B.26)
Combining all the above expressions we obtain (5.33).
B.3 Proof of Lemma 5.5
To prove the success rate of KSA, we first need an estimator for the cumulative density function.
We take as kernel a function Φ as simple as possible i.e. the Heaviside function Φ(x) = 0 if
x < 0 and Φ(x) = 1 if x ≥ 0.
With this function and for x ∈ R, we can estimate F (x|Y (k) = 1)− F (x) by the following
estimator:
F˜ (x|Y (k) = 1)− F˜ (x) =
∑
i|Yi(k)=1 Φ(x−Xi)∑
i|Yi(k)=1 1
−
∑
i Φ(x−Xi)
q
. (B.27)
We suppose that q is large enough to consider that
∑
i|Yi(k)=1 1 =
q
2 (by the law of large
numbers). Therefore we have:
F˜ (x|Y (k) = 1)− F˜ (x) =
∑
i|Yi(k)=1 Φ(x−Xi)
q
− 2
∑
i Φ(x−Xi)
q
. (B.28)
We notice that
∑
i|Yi(k)=1 Φ(x−Xi) = 12
∑
i(Yi(k) + 1)Φ(x−Xi). Therefore
F˜ (x|Y (k) = 1)− F˜ (x) = 1
q
q∑
i=1
Yi(k)Φ(x−Xi). (B.29)
This estimator is a sum of i.i.d. random variables. We can therefore apply the central limit
theorem.
E[F˜ (x|Y (k) = 1)− F˜ (x)] = E[Y (k)Φ(x−Xi)] (B.30)
= E[Y (k)Φ(x− Y (k∗)−N)] (B.31)
=
1
2
(κ(k)− 0.5)
(
erf
(1− x
σ
√
2
) + erf
(1 + x
σ
√
2
))
. (B.32)
The maximum of the absolute value is for x = 0 and we obtain:
‖E[F˜ (x|Y (k) = 1)− F˜ (x)]‖∞ = |0.5− κ(k)| erf
( 1
σ
√
2
)
. (B.33)
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We notice that ‖E[F˜ (x|Y (k) = 1)− F˜ (x)]‖∞ = ‖E[F˜ (x|Y (k) = −1) − F˜ (x)]‖∞. To calculate
the variance, we consider that x = 0 as it is the value that maximizes the expectation of the
distinguisher.
Var(D̂(k∗)− D̂(k)) = Var
(1
q
( q∑
i=1
Φ(x−Xi)(Yi(k∗)− Yi(k))
))
(B.34)
The computation of this variance gives:
Var(D̂(k∗)− D̂(k)) = 2(0.5− |0.5− κ(k)|)− erf
( 1
σ
√
2
)2
(0.5− |0.5− κ(k)|)2. (B.35)
Overall, the success exponent is:
SE =
1
2
min
k 6=k∗
erf
(
1√
2σ
)2
(1/2− |1/2− κ(k)|)
2− erf( 1√
2σ
)2
(1/2− |1/2− κ(k)|)
. (B.36)
B.4 Proof of Lemma 5.6
For MIA, we refer to [36, Section 5.3] for the theoretical justifications. In order to obtain a
simple closed-form expression of the success exponent, we suppose that σ  1 and that the
probability density functions are all Gaussian. This means that X|Y (k) is a Gaussian random
variable of standard deviation
√
4κ(k)(1− κ(k)) + σ2. Moreover, we will keep only the first
order approximation in SNR = σ−2 of the SE.
h(X|Y (k))− h(X|Y (k∗) = 1
2
log2(2pie · (4κ(k)(1− κ(k)) + σ2)−
1
2
log2(2pie · σ2) (B.37)
=
1
2
log2
4κ(k)(1− κ(k)) + σ2
σ2
(B.38)
≈ log2(e)4κ(k)(1− κ(k))
2σ2
(B.39)
The Fisher information of a Gaussian random variable of standard deviation ζ is equal to 1ζ2 .
Therefore the Fisher information of X knowing Y = y(k) is:
F (X|Y (k) = y(k)) = 1
4κ(k)(1− κ(k)) + σ2 . (B.40)
As this value does not depend on the value of Y (k), we have:
F (X|Y (k)) = 1
4κ(k)(1− κ(k)) + σ2 (B.41)
J(X|Y (k))− J(X|Y (k∗)) = 1
4κ(k)(1− κ(k)) + σ2 −
1
σ2
(B.42)
≈ −κ(k)(1− κ(k))
σ4
. (B.43)
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Last, we have to calculate Var(− log2 p(X|Y (k) = y(k))). Let ζ2 = σ2 + 4κ(k)(1− κ(k)) and C
the normalization constant. We have:
Var(− log2 p(X|Y (k) = y(k))) = Var
(
− log2
(
C exp
(
−1/2 (X − µ)
2
ζ2
)))
(B.44)
= Var
(
− log2(C) + 1/2
(X − µ)2
ζ2
)
(B.45)
=
1
4
Var
( (X − µ)2
ζ2
)
=
1
4ζ4
Var(X2) (B.46)
=
1
4(σ2 + 4κ(k)(1− κ(k)))2 2(1 + σ
2)2 ≈ 1
2
. (B.47)
Overall, the success exponent defined in [36, Proposition 6] can be simplified in the case of
monobit leakage as:
SE ≈ min
k 6=k∗
4
log2(e)
2κ(k)2(1− κ(k))2
σ4
. (B.48)
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C.1 The OpenSSL AES Encryption Code
We have copied here the OpenSSL C code for the encryption function. We notice that this is a
straightline code, and that there is a use of Look Up Tables (the T boxes) that may cause the
non constant time.
void AES_encrypt(const unsigned char *in , unsigned char *out ,
const AES_KEY *key) {
const u32 *rk;
u32 s0 , s1 , s2 , s3 , t0 , t1 , t2 , t3;
int r;
# 796 "aes_core.c" 3
((void)0)
# 796 "aes_core.c"
;
rk = key ->rd_key;
s0 = ((( u32)(in)[0] << 24) ^ ((u32)(in)[1] << 16) ^ ((u32)(in)
[2] << 8) ^ ((u32)(in)[3])) ^ rk[0];
s1 = ((( u32)(in + 4)[0] << 24) ^ ((u32)(in + 4)[1] << 16) ^ ((
u32)(in + 4)[2] << 8) ^ ((u32)(in + 4)[3])) ^ rk[1];
s2 = ((( u32)(in + 8)[0] << 24) ^ ((u32)(in + 8)[1] << 16) ^ ((
u32)(in + 8)[2] << 8) ^ ((u32)(in + 8)[3])) ^ rk[2];
s3 = ((( u32)(in + 12) [0] << 24) ^ ((u32)(in + 12) [1] << 16) ^
((u32)(in + 12) [2] << 8) ^ ((u32)(in + 12) [3])) ^ rk[3];
t0 = Te0[(s0 >> 24)] ^ Te1[(s1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s2 >>
8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s3 & 0xff] ^ rk[ 4];
t1 = Te0[s1 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s3 >> 8)
& 0xff] ^ Te3[s0 & 0xff] ^ rk[ 5];
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t2 = Te0[s2 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s0 >> 8)
& 0xff] ^ Te3[s1 & 0xff] ^ rk[ 6];
t3 = Te0[s3 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s1 >> 8)
& 0xff] ^ Te3[s2 & 0xff] ^ rk[ 7];
s0 = Te0[t0 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t2 >> 8)
& 0xff] ^ Te3[t3 & 0xff] ^ rk[ 8];
s1 = Te0[t1 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t3 >> 8)
& 0xff] ^ Te3[t0 & 0xff] ^ rk[ 9];
s2 = Te0[t2 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t0 >> 8)
& 0xff] ^ Te3[t1 & 0xff] ^ rk[10];
s3 = Te0[t3 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t1 >> 8)
& 0xff] ^ Te3[t2 & 0xff] ^ rk[11];
t0 = Te0[s0 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s2 >> 8)
& 0xff] ^ Te3[s3 & 0xff] ^ rk[12];
t1 = Te0[s1 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s3 >> 8)
& 0xff] ^ Te3[s0 & 0xff] ^ rk[13];
t2 = Te0[s2 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s0 >> 8)
& 0xff] ^ Te3[s1 & 0xff] ^ rk[14];
t3 = Te0[s3 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s1 >> 8)
& 0xff] ^ Te3[s2 & 0xff] ^ rk[15];
s0 = Te0[t0 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t2 >> 8)
& 0xff] ^ Te3[t3 & 0xff] ^ rk[16];
s1 = Te0[t1 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t3 >> 8)
& 0xff] ^ Te3[t0 & 0xff] ^ rk[17];
s2 = Te0[t2 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t0 >> 8)
& 0xff] ^ Te3[t1 & 0xff] ^ rk[18];
s3 = Te0[t3 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t1 >> 8)
& 0xff] ^ Te3[t2 & 0xff] ^ rk[19];
t0 = Te0[s0 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s2 >> 8)
& 0xff] ^ Te3[s3 & 0xff] ^ rk[20];
t1 = Te0[s1 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s3 >> 8)
& 0xff] ^ Te3[s0 & 0xff] ^ rk[21];
t2 = Te0[s2 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s0 >> 8)
& 0xff] ^ Te3[s1 & 0xff] ^ rk[22];
t3 = Te0[s3 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s1 >> 8)
& 0xff] ^ Te3[s2 & 0xff] ^ rk[23];
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s0 = Te0[t0 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t2 >> 8)
& 0xff] ^ Te3[t3 & 0xff] ^ rk[24];
s1 = Te0[t1 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t3 >> 8)
& 0xff] ^ Te3[t0 & 0xff] ^ rk[25];
s2 = Te0[t2 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t0 >> 8)
& 0xff] ^ Te3[t1 & 0xff] ^ rk[26];
s3 = Te0[t3 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t1 >> 8)
& 0xff] ^ Te3[t2 & 0xff] ^ rk[27];
t0 = Te0[s0 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s2 >> 8)
& 0xff] ^ Te3[s3 & 0xff] ^ rk[28];
t1 = Te0[s1 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s3 >> 8)
& 0xff] ^ Te3[s0 & 0xff] ^ rk[29];
t2 = Te0[s2 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s0 >> 8)
& 0xff] ^ Te3[s1 & 0xff] ^ rk[30];
t3 = Te0[s3 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s1 >> 8)
& 0xff] ^ Te3[s2 & 0xff] ^ rk[31];
s0 = Te0[t0 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t2 >> 8)
& 0xff] ^ Te3[t3 & 0xff] ^ rk[32];
s1 = Te0[t1 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t3 >> 8)
& 0xff] ^ Te3[t0 & 0xff] ^ rk[33];
s2 = Te0[t2 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t0 >> 8)
& 0xff] ^ Te3[t1 & 0xff] ^ rk[34];
s3 = Te0[t3 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t1 >> 8)
& 0xff] ^ Te3[t2 & 0xff] ^ rk[35];
t0 = Te0[s0 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s2 >> 8)
& 0xff] ^ Te3[s3 & 0xff] ^ rk[36];
t1 = Te0[s1 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s3 >> 8)
& 0xff] ^ Te3[s0 & 0xff] ^ rk[37];
t2 = Te0[s2 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s0 >> 8)
& 0xff] ^ Te3[s1 & 0xff] ^ rk[38];
t3 = Te0[s3 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s1 >> 8)
& 0xff] ^ Te3[s2 & 0xff] ^ rk[39];
rk += key ->rounds << 2;
# 944 "aes_core.c"
s0 =
(Te2[(t0 >> 24) ] & 0xff000000) ^
(Te3[(t1 >> 16) & 0xff] & 0x00ff0000) ^
(Te0[(t2 >> 8) & 0xff] & 0x0000ff00) ^
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(Te1[(t3 ) & 0xff] & 0x000000ff) ^
rk[0];
{ (out)[0] = (u8)((s0) >> 24); (out)[1] = (u8)((s0) >> 16); (
out)[2] = (u8)((s0) >> 8); (out)[3] = (u8)(s0); };
s1 =
(Te2[(t1 >> 24) ] & 0xff000000) ^
(Te3[(t2 >> 16) & 0xff] & 0x00ff0000) ^
(Te0[(t3 >> 8) & 0xff] & 0x0000ff00) ^
(Te1[(t0 ) & 0xff] & 0x000000ff) ^
rk[1];
{ (out + 4)[0] = (u8)((s1) >> 24); (out + 4)[1] = (u8)((s1) >>
16); (out + 4)[2] = (u8)((s1) >> 8); (out + 4)[3] = (u8)(
s1); };
s2 =
(Te2[(t2 >> 24) ] & 0xff000000) ^
(Te3[(t3 >> 16) & 0xff] & 0x00ff0000) ^
(Te0[(t0 >> 8) & 0xff] & 0x0000ff00) ^
(Te1[(t1 ) & 0xff] & 0x000000ff) ^
rk[2];
{ (out + 8)[0] = (u8)((s2) >> 24); (out + 8)[1] = (u8)((s2) >>
16); (out + 8)[2] = (u8)((s2) >> 8); (out + 8)[3] = (u8)(
s2); };
s3 =
(Te2[(t3 >> 24) ] & 0xff000000) ^
(Te3[(t0 >> 16) & 0xff] & 0x00ff0000) ^
(Te0[(t1 >> 8) & 0xff] & 0x0000ff00) ^
(Te1[(t2 ) & 0xff] & 0x000000ff) ^
rk[3];
{ (out + 12)[0] = (u8)((s3) >> 24); (out + 12)[1] = (u8)((s3)
>> 16); (out + 12) [2] = (u8)((s3) >> 8); (out + 12) [3] = (
u8)(s3); };
}
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Titre: Vers une meilleure formalisation des attaques par canaux cachés.
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Résumé: Dans le cadre de la sécurité des
systèmes embarqués, il est nécessaire de con-
naître les attaques logicielles et physiques pou-
vant briser la sécurité de composants cryp-
tographiques garantissant l’intégrité, la fiabilité
et la confidentialité des données. Étant donné
que les algorithmes utilisés aujourd’hui comme
Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) sont con-
sidérés comme résistants contre la cryptanalyse
linéaire et différentielle, d’autres méthodes plus
insidieuses sont utilisés pour récupérer les se-
crets de ces composants. En effet, la clé se-
crète utilisée pour le chiffrement de données
peut fuiter pendant l’algorithme. Il est ainsi
possible de mesurer cette fuite et de l’exploiter.
Cette technique est appelée attaque par canal
auxiliaire.
Le principal objectif de ce manuscrit de thèse est
de consolider les connaissances théoriques sur ce
type de menace. Pour cela, nous appliquons des
résultats de théorie de l’information à l’étude
par canal auxiliaire. Nous montrons ainsi com-
ment il est possible de comparer un mod-
èle de fuite à un modèle de transmission de
l’information.
Dans un premier temps, nous montrons que la
sécurité d’un composant est fortement dépen-
dante du rapport signal à bruit de la fuite. Ce
résultat a un impact fort car il ne dépend pas
de l’attaque choisie. Lorsqu’un designer équipe
son produit, il ne connaît pas encore la manière
dont son système embarqué pourra être attaqué
plusieurs années plus tard. Les outils mathé-
matiques proposés dans ce manuscrit pourront
aider les concepteurs à estimer le niveau de fia-
bilité de leurs puces électroniques.
Title: Towards a Better Formalisation of the Side-Channel Threat.
Keywords: Cryptography, Side-Channel, Information Theory, Optimization
Abstract: In the field of the security of the
embedded systems, it is necessary to know and
understand the possible physical attacks that
could break the security of cryptographic com-
ponents. Since the current algorithms such as
Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) are very
resilient against differential and linear crypt-
analysis, other methods are used to recover the
secrets of these components. Indeed, the secret
key used to encrypt data leaks during the com-
putation of the algorithm, and it is possible to
measure this leakage and exploit it. This tech-
nique to recover the secret key is called side-
channel analysis.
The main target of this Ph. D. manuscript is to
increase and consolidate the knowledge on the
side-channel threat. To do so, we apply some in-
formation theoretic results to side-channel anal-
ysis. The main objective is show how a side-
channel leaking model can be seen as a commu-
nication channel.
We first show that the security of a chip is de-
pendant to the signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) of the
leakage. This result is very useful since it is
a generic result independent from the attack.
When a designer builds a chip, he might not be
able to know in advance how his embedded sys-
tem will be attacked, maybe several years later.
The tools that we provide in this manuscript will
help designers to estimated the level of liability
of their chips.
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